A Window on Russia
Towards a Liberal Dictatorship?
Mikhail Delyagin
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MOSCOW: Russia's presidential elections next month now look like a coronation. The speed of Vladimir Putin's seemingly irresistible rise astounds everyone. What is the secret of his phenomenal political success?
The answer, at its most general, appears simple: Putin took the two warring clans of Boris Berezovsky and Anatoly Chubais – which together control much of Russia's wealth and public space – and united them behind him. The upshot of this marriage of convenience has brought an obscure former KGB officer, a strongman whose activities gave rise to rumors of illegal enrichment and shady real estate deals, reportedly hushed and covered up in Yeltsin's Russia, to the summit of power.
What Putin brings to this menage is control over the security ministries – as always in Russia, an important key to power and one of the main pillars of Putin's political edifice. Putin is wary about relinquishing this asset, so he vested its supervision in the loyal hands of Sergei Shoigu, who is in many ways a Putin clone, for he used the ruins of the old Soviet civil defense system to construct in a short space of time a secretive empire of his own.
The second element in Putin's edifice of political power – contributed by his clan allies – is a hidden control of Russia's media. Political scientist Sergei Markov has labeled today's Russia a "manipulative democracy" – a system in which the state pulls the strings behind a facade of democratic institutions. During December's Duma elections, for example, the government – in violation of existing electoral laws – used its influence to give both covert and overt support to the "party of power," Unity (Yedinstvo). Russia's leaders' willingness to ignore the law when it is not to their liking revives bad memories here, as government domination of the media shuts off the public from influence over the state, which is becomes ever more unaccountable.
The third element of Putin's order is the connection to the new Russian oligarchy, also delivered by his mentors. When it comes to the economy, Putin is a clean slate upon which his entourage – the clans of Berezovsky and Chubais – will write. But the price of this may be even greater than the crash of August 1998 which resulted from policies pursued by the very same people. What the aftermath of that crisis showed was that even an underdeveloped democracy, such as Russia, is enough to turn an economically incompetent government out of power. To continue with the privatization of the natural monopolies that will give a criminal and corrupt elite another chance to fill their pockets, may require extinguishing even the vestiges of democracy that existed under Yeltsin, thus pushing Russia on the way to a “liberal dictatorship.”
Finally, the fourth pillar of Putin's edifice is his control over the Duma. This control is ostensibly democratic – the "Kremlin bloc" of parties holds a majority of votes. But it was achieved by a cynical alliance with the Communists which gives them a new standing in the political establishment and restores their ability to participate in the power game. The alliance was possible precisely because the Communists, who may not understand political reform or economics, do understand the naked use -- and abuse -- of power.
The combination of finance, media, police, and corrupt politicians may be enough to nip any opposition to Putin in the bud. Not only is the Duma now likely to be a puppet parliament, as was the Supreme Soviet; it may “democratically” stamp out hints of real democracy in Russia.
The challenge for Putin is to make sure that his relations with the West do not sour. His war in Chechnya, while popular at home, is responsible for much bad press recently, even if the American administration's response is tepid. But the real test of whether Putin persuades America that he fits the West's long-term interests is not Chechnya; it is the fight against corruption, as personified by Berezovsky. President Clinton has said that battling corruption is now Russia's priority; and the Swiss prosecutor's office has expressed its readiness to make all materials in the "Berezovsky case" available to Russia.
Should Putin turn against Berezovsky, even if superficially, and force him off the political stage, Putin could look good, and even receive IMF assistance in May this year. Moreover, this may very well be in Putin's own interest. Removing Berezovsky just before presidential elections would be a good publicity stunt, and a way of silencing the "unwanted witnesses" of Yeltsin's entourage. If anti-corruption investigations target Berezovsky alone, others will keep their mouths shut. If Berezovsky's punishment is more apparent than real, Berezovsky too will say nothing. Removing Berezovsky would also allow Putin to establish direct control over Berezovsky's media empire – another boost to his personal power.
What's good for Putin may not be good for Russia. Putin's war in Chechnya enables him to keep public opinion mobilized and to accuse the opposition of lacking patriotism, even of treason. But for the second time in ten years Russia is burying its potential for economic development in Chechnya's mountains and cities. There is by now little room for maneuver in the economy: the positive effect of devaluation has worn off, world oil prices are falling again (and with them the state's prime source of revenue), the debt crisis lingers. The temptation to soften these blows by printing money as elections roll around will only worsen the financial situation.
In the end, mounting economic failure may make Putin follow the pathetic course pioneered by Yeltsin: trying to wash his hands of a failing economy, dismissing governments as the country lurches from crisis to crisis, hoping all the while to remain remote enough to survive. For Russia, the result will be a further brain drain and ever greater degradation.
Mikhail Delyagin is Member of Fatherland party and was an economic advisor to Former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov.
Copyright Project Syndicate 2012
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