Elected with a parliamentary majority almost big enough to change the country's constitution, Turkey's new Islamist government faces daunting challenges. The most urgent is the looming war between America and Iraq. Will Turkey maintain its vital diplomatic and logistical support for its American ally? Or will religious solidarities reshape Turkey's orientation, as the new government joins other Muslim countries in opposing any invasion of Iraq?

Obviously, Turkey's Islamists are not the only ones with serious doubts about the war. Many Turks share the view that the war could have harsh consequences for their country, both in the short and long run.

The struggling economy does not need the disruption of even a rapidly resolved military conflict. The Turkish establishment (the military as well as the diplomatic corps) worries about the possibility that a war will fracture Iraq, leading to an independent Kurdish state on Turkey's southern border that would inevitably serve to strengthen Kurdish nationalism within Turkey, raising new threats to Turkey's unity and stability.

Turkey's secular bureaucratic establishment has traditionally been pro-West but with a strong dose of nationalism. Aside from the Kurdish issue, their attention is now focused on Cyprus as well. The Cyprus problem has reached a critical turning point, following a peace proposal put on the table by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan with a deadline impending at the end of February.

Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriots have been given their entry invitation to the EU, despite the fact that there is still no agreement on the Cyprus problem. Cyprus now becomes a key issue athwart the road of Turkey eventually joining the EU. Unresolved, it will provide a sure means of preventing Turkey's membership by those who are against it. This constitutes another potential trap for the new government.

Despite the importance of Cyprus, it is the possible war with Iraq that poses the most severe test of the delicate balance that now exists between Turkey's conservative old guard and the more liberal reformers within the ruling Justice and Development Party. Could it lead to a new power struggle in the party? The fact that the party leader Mr.Erdogan was prevented through technicalities from becoming a deputy in the Parliament and thus Prime Minister makes the maintenance of this balance even more tricky. Any open rupture will weaken the hands of the reformers who want to have close ties with the West and the US.

Though the Justice and Development Party has held power only briefly, it has already given clear indications of its choice. Well aware of western doubts about the party, Erdogan travelled immediately after the elections to western capitals, pressing his argument that the change in government had not changed Turkey's fundamental orientation. He is well aware of the contrast with the approach taken by Turkey's previous Islamist-led government. Elected in 1996, after a campaign marked by strong claims of religious revival, the Welfare Party's Necmettin Erbakan made a conspicuous point of making his first official visits to Iran, Libya, Indonesia and Malaysia.

Erdogan stressed this pro-Western orientation again but a few weeks later, at the EU enlargement summit held in Copenhagen in mid-December. The new government's aggressive lobbying before the summit was perceived both at home and abroad as a clear sign of its commitment to the EU cause. Rejecting Erbakan's earlier accusation that the EU was a "Christian Club," Erdogan has campaigned openly for full membership. In this, he received enthusiastic support from the Bush administration, which hopes that Erdogan might have found a way to mix democracy and Islam.

So far, Erdogan has played the European card skillfully, reassuring Turkey's western allies and boxing in the Turkish military, which remains skeptical of his party's intentions. By accepting European demands for democratic reform as a pre-condition for EU membership, Erdogan played a liberalizing role, reinforcing his claim that his party represents a genuinely democratic option for a Muslim-majority country B indeed, that it is an Islamic version of the Christian Democratic parties that have long dominated Europe's political right.

There is no doubt that the political and economic program of Erdogan and his party is a dramatic departure from traditional Turkish Islamism. Islamist movements have generally been characterized by strong anti-market and anti-western attitudes. Yet Prime Minister Gul routinely calls his government "business friendly."

The coming months will be crucial. To convince skeptics, the party will have to break with conventional Turkish policies on Cyprus, and with conventional Islamist doubts about Europe. To top it off, Turkey must reach some agreement with its closest ally, the US, if it moves against Iraq.

Erdogan's insistent opening to Europe may be the key to how this all turns out. By pressing for membership in the EU, he is reinforcing Turkey's long-held western orientation. This may give him room to distance himself somewhat from American policy. After all, in becoming more European, isn't Turkey entitled to share Europe's doubts about a war with Iraq?