Thursday, April 24, 2014
Exit from comment view mode. Click to hide this space
5

Why No Glass-Steagall II?

MANILA – Eighty years ago this month, Ferdinand Pecora, the cigar-chomping former assistant district attorney for New York City, was appointed chief counsel for the US Senate Committee on Banking and Currency. In subsequent months, the hearings of the Pecora Commission featured many sensational revelations about the practices that led to the 1930’s financial crisis.

More than that, the Commission’s investigation led to far-reaching reform – most famously, the Glass-Steagall Act, which separated commercial and investment banking. But Glass-Steagall didn’t stop there. It created federal insurance for bank deposits. With unit banking (in which all operations are carried out in self-standing offices) viewed as unstable, banks were now permitted to branch more widely. Glass-Steagall also strengthened regulators’ ability to clamp down on lending for real-estate and stock-market speculation.

The hearings also led to passage of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Securities issuers and traders were required to release more information, and were subjected to higher transparency standards. The notion that capital markets could self-regulate was decisively rejected.

The contrast with today is striking. Say what you will about the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, but it is weak soup by the standards of the 1930’s. In response to what is widely regarded as the most serious financial crisis in 80 years, it does much less to change the structure and regulation of the US financial system.

The explanation is not that the bankers were less well organized in the 1930’s. The American Bankers Association, worried about the fees that banks would be obliged to pay, vehemently opposed deposit insurance. The State Bankers Association, to which many unit banks belonged, condemned the provisions designed to facilitate state-wide branching.

Nor is it obvious that the bankers suffered from more adverse publicity. The Pecora Commission hearings were sensational, but it is difficult to argue that the public anger they whipped up was much greater than that which greeted Wall Street’s titans when they testified before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in 2010.

In fact, Pecora examined only one commercial bank, National City Bank, prior to the enactment of Glass-Steagall. The bank’s chairman, Charles Mitchell, danced around the question of conflicts of interest between his bank’s deposit-taking and securities-underwriting activities. In any case, more attention was paid to the revelation that Mitchell had sold 18,000 bank shares to his wife at a loss to evade taxes. To the extent that the hearings focused on a few bad apples, they made the case for systematic reform less compelling.

Pecora turned next to the investment banks. This time, the revelation was that J.P. Morgan & Co. had provided special access to initial public offerings for prominent public figures, including a former treasury secretary and future Supreme Court justice. But, again, these disclosures did not speak to issues like the desirability of branching or deposit insurance. However damning, the revelations were no more embarrassing than the knowledge that Countrywide Financial provided mortgages on favorable terms to “friends of Angelo” (powerful figures close to Countrywide’s then-chairman and CEO, Angelo Mozilo) like former Fannie Mae CEO Franklin Raines and former Senate Banking Committee member Christopher Dodd.

Another popular argument for the success of 1930’s reform is that Congress had already agreed on a diagnosis of the problem and could build on its own earlier efforts to treat it. Senator Carter Glass had been pushing for years for more permissive branching laws and centralized supervision of banks. He had already introduced a bill containing several such measures in January 1932.

Similarly, more than 100 bills for federal deposit insurance had been proposed in the preceding 50 years. One, co-sponsored by Representative Henry Steagall, had been passed by the House. The idea, in other words, was already in the air.

But this ignores the fact that Steagall was not enamored of more extensive branching, which disadvantaged small banks. Glass, for his part, opposed deposit insurance. The final bill passed only when its sponsors agreed to combine deposit insurance with new banking regulation, creating a package with something for everyone.

In some cases, the reformers were pushing on an open door. National City Bank and Chase National Bank had already announced that they were liquidating their securities affiliates. Underwriting had collapsed, and banks were more than ready to get out of the securities business. The Glass-Steagall separation of commercial and investment banking simply validated a transition that was already underway.

In 2009-2010, by contrast, the big banks were still seeking to maintain their existing range of activities. This caused the industry to resist strongly efforts to rein in practices like proprietary trading.

Ultimately, the explanation for the passage of far-reaching financial reform can only be the severity of the crisis. In the 1930’s, the Great Depression brought the entire economy to its knees. The need for root-and-branch reform was undeniable. After 2008, by contrast, policymakers succeeded in preventing the worst, which ruled out the sense of urgency that surrounded the Pecora Commission hearings. The ultimate irony is that this very success led to less reform.

Exit from comment view mode. Click to hide this space
Hide Comments Hide Comments Read Comments (5)

Please login or register to post a comment

  1. Commentedde Lafayette

    {BE: The notion that capital markets could self-regulate was decisively rejected.}

    Perhaps, but a child, then seven years old, by the name of Alan Greenspan was clearly not attentive to what was happening.

    Some years later, having read books by an Ayn Rand, it seems he came to that very idea cited in the caption above. And would insist upon the notion later as head of the Fed until the very end of his tenure ... as the banking sector fell into a deep dark hole in the fall of 2008.

    And to this day, he claims "Nobody saw it coming!" Well he should have, shouldn't he? After all, he was in the catbird seat at the time the dark abyss was opening its giant maw.

    Meaning what? Meaning this, paraphrasing an American philosopher by the name of George Santayana, "Those who refuse to learn from the mistakes of history are condemned to repeat them."

  2. CommentedMargaret Fairchild

    We are in the midst of the biggest financial breakdown crisis in modern human history. The urgency of Glass Steagall is greater now than in the 1930s!

    Marcy Kaptur has introduced a bill in Congress to restore Glass Steagall-HR 129-Americans should exert pressure on their reps in Washington to co-sponsor and pass this bill forthwith!

    The alternative is hyper inflation and bailouts, which will finish us off.

  3. CommentedRalph Musgrave

    Re the U.S. practice of having a banker as Treasury Secretary, if a banker were appointed to the equivalent position in the U.K., there’d be riots. Americans don’t realize how totally and completely they’ve been suckered.

  4. CommentedProcyon Mukherjee

    One would be particularly attracted to Dr. Reddy’s Per Jacobsson Lecture where he had mentioned the reasons behind the public perception of a comprehensive regulatory capture, which is what the essence of the article ‘Why no Glass- Steagall II’ is. The five reasons for this as cited by Reddy is as follows:

    1. The financial sector has demonstrated disproportionate gains and have shifted the pains of adjustment to the rest of the population
    2. The minimum fiduciary responsibility have been found to be missed as in Libor fixing or wrong credit rating of firms that were about to be bailed out later
    3. The details of malfeasance and the losses incurred by the general investors were never transparently known throughout the crisis
    4. Compensation of senior management in the financial sector as compared to the same in the the rest of the economy
    5. Much needed credit is always elusive to the real needs of the economy

    Procyon Mukherjee

  5. CommentedShane Beck

    An alternative explanation could be that Wall St had not captured the executive and legislature of Washington DC as thoroughly in 1930s as they have in the 2000s and 2010s. The surprise is not that the Dodd-Frank Act is a watered down version of the Glass-Steagall Act, the surprise is that the Dodd-Frank Act got passed at all.

Featured