In the next three weeks, the Israeli army will do something unprecedented: instead of defending the country against external enemies or terrorism, it will evacuate – by force if necessary – 9,000 Israelis from their homes.

Israel’s unilateral withdrawal is the outcome of a deep political shift that has been caused by two somewhat contradictory convictions that have characterized Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s policies since 2003: first, that the US-initiated “road map” is going nowhere and, second, that the status quo is untenable. Certainly, according to Sharon’s thinking, there is no future for 9,000 Jewish settlers living among 1.2 million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. Hence, in the absence of negotiations, a unilateral withdrawal is the only meaningful step towards de-escalation and stabilization.

This policy has deeply divided Israel: the settlers – mostly, but not exclusively religious – feel betrayed by Sharon, “The Father of the Settlements.” It is now the Israeli left that, however reluctantly, realizes that Sharon’s new pragmatism may be the first step in the right direction. Like de Gaulle in Algeria, Sharon has reshuffled the cards of Israel’s politics.

The last weeks have seen massive demonstrations, some of them verging on violence; many of the settlers have declared that they will not obey government orders to evacuate. The army and the police have mobilized almost 50,000 troops to carry out evictions. This forcible approach is traumatic not only for the settlers, but also for many other Israelis. Only the next days and weeks will tell whether the evacuation proceeds peacefully or not.

In the meantime, Sharon has paid heavily for his policies. Two right-wing parties have left his ruling coalition, he has lost his majority within his own Likud Party, and his finance minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, has quit his government. Only by bringing Shimon Peres’s Labor Party into his cabinet did Sharon manage to retain his parliamentary majority.

The question, of course, is what will happen after the Gaza disengagement. Many governments were initially skeptical about disengagement, but realized that – as the Washington saying goes – “this is the only game in town.” Among them, as well as among the Palestinians, one hears the hope that after the Gaza withdrawal, it will be possible to return to the road map and to resume negotiations leading to a final agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.

This is a major mistake. While motivated by the best of intentions, the hope of reviving the road map is out of touch with reality. Future negotiations will have to deal with the ultimate borders between Israel and Palestine, the fate of 200,000 Jewish settlers in the West Bank, the status of Jerusalem, and with the problem of the 1947-48 Palestinian refugees. On all of these issues, the gulf between the Israeli and Palestinian positions has not narrowed since the failed negotiations at Camp David in 2000, while fear and distrust have increased.

To attempt negotiations under these circumstances would not only be an exercise in futility, but may merely deepen alienation and suspicion on both sides. The failure of the Annan Plan for Cyprus suggests that good intentions are not enough – and the disagreements in Cyprus were miniscule compared to what divides Israelis and Palestinians.

So what can be done? Probably the only rational way to proceed would be to acknowledge that unilateral steps on both sides can still further the cause of de-escalation and ultimate reconciliation. On the Israeli side, further disengagement from dozens of isolated and small settlements on the West Bank, entailing the evacuation of between 20,000 and 30,000 settlers, may be politically feasible and would give the Palestinians a contiguous territory on the West Bank.

On the Palestinian side, consolidation of the Palestinian Authority’s control over a dozen security services and militias would be an important step. The Palestinian leader, Abu Mazen, recognizes this, but the question is whether he can deliver. The Palestinian leadership could also start down the difficult road of telling the refugees that – contrary to almost 50 years of Palestinian propaganda – they will not return to Israel, but will have to be settled in the West Bank and Gaza, the areas that will become part of the eventual Palestinian state.

In an ideal world, conflicts end by agreements and treaties. But in the real world – and Cyprus, Bosnia, and Kosovo may be examples – stabilization and the slow de-escalation of violence can sometimes achieve the same end, even without formal agreement. In the absence of plausible alternatives, one hopes that this will also be the case for Israelis and Palestinians.