Why do popular and elite perceptions of globalization clash? People in the rich world think globalization resembles an implacably malignant force that snatches away well paying jobs and sends them to faraway places; people in developing countries think it ushers in a self-obsessed consumerist ethic on a train of corrupt privatization and environmental destruction. Elites dismiss their opponents as empty-headed populists, and are accused, in turn, of being out of touch with the concerns of ordinary people.

Globalization has always been inherently Janus-like, showing to some the face of limitless progress and wealth, while others see only a soulless giant hurling their lives to and fro. Consider the previous wave of globalization: the period between the mid-19 ^th century and the outbreak of the First World War. Transportation costs plummeted with the advent of the steamship and the railroad. New telecommunications permitted information to be sent instantly around the world. Capital flowed to remote places like Argentina, Russia, Malaya, and South Africa. A Londoner, as Keynes put it, could send his servant to fetch any amount of foreign currency, and he could invest his sterling wherever he wished.

But this was also the heyday of imperialism, colonialism, violent conquest, and slavery. Several million people are believed to have died in Congo alone under King Leopold's misrule--perhaps the worst imperial crime, but hardly unique. The slave trade continued until the 1850's in most of the world, and in some places almost until the end of the 19 ^th century.

Imperial diplomacy had little use for subtlety. A disobedient Sultan or tribal chief would be made to comprehend the error of his ways with a few gun ships moored offshore. Western powers often claimed extraterritorial rights. Western boats plied China's internal waterways. England, France, Holland, and other imperial powers controlled trade and resources throughout Southeast Asia. They used the constant threat and routine application of force and violence to impose slavery, low inward tariffs, and immunity for their colonists.

Economists tend not to dwell on this too much. Indeed, a recent article on 19 ^th -century globalization by two well-known economic historians, Jeff Williamson and Peter Lindert, never uses the words imperialism, colonialism, or slavery.

It is not that all economists are insensitive and dislike developing countries. The problem is that mainstream economics assumes that transactions are voluntary. The tools and methods of the discipline are not adequate to deal systematically with coercion as a way of acquiring and maximizing wealth.

Gunboat diplomacy is officially passé, as are foreign administrators, extraterritoriality, colonial economic diktats, and slavery. But are today's bombings and UN sanctions

much more considerate of human life than 19 ^th -century conquests?

For most ordinary people in places deemed unsuitable for self-government (Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Cambodia, soon Iraq), foreign administrators seem none too different from the rulers of the British Raj. They enjoy autonomy, full immunity, and, in the view of the governed, obscenely high salaries. The UN's intentions may be nobler, but 19 ^th -century European administrators also believed that they were bettering the lot of indigenous populations, making them "fit" for self-rule.

Multilateral financial institutions influence much of macroeconomic policy in many countries. Poor countries have barely any voice in these institutions, because voting rights are apportioned according to countries' wealth--not unlike the bygone practice of conditioning the franchise on property ownership. Slavery, too, is back, in the form of global trafficking in indentured women and unskilled workers from Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia.

Of course, abject poverty, poor sanitation, dangerous workplaces, and child labor existed long before the current wave of globalization. They may even have been more widespread. But as targets of popular wrath go, globalization is as logical a choice now as it was in the age of imperialism.

For many people, including most economists, globalization implies greater opportunities, expanded trade, faster travel, better connectivity, and higher incomes. True, everyone may not benefit in the short term, but what critics regard as injustice is necessary , hence unavoidable. A coffee picker in Guatemala may get only a tiny share of what Starbucks charges for a cappuccino, but without Starbucks, he would have to look elsewhere for a job.

But just as in the age of imperialism, the current wave of globalization is breeding its own resistance. Globalization, after all, forces people to recognize how similar they are in the most fundamental respects, and yet how vast are their differences in status, influence, and wealth.

The rich tend to discount their wealth and power, because it seems deserved and natural. But for the poor, global disparities in wellbeing, seen against the background of human similarity, fuel anger and opposition. Economists and pundits can preach for all eternity about the many ways that multinational companies make coffee pickers in Guatemala happier. And yet, at the end of the day, it is the coffee picker's judgment that matters. Little wonder, then, that globalization continues to call forth old-fashioned non-economic concepts like dignity, justice, fair prices, and decent wages.