Saturday, November 29, 2014

Did Taxes Cause the Financial Crisis?

CAMBRIDGE – After the financial crisis erupted in 2008, many observers blamed the crisis in large part on the fact that too many financial firms had loaded up on debt while relying on only a thin layer of equity. The reason is straightforward: whereas equity can absorb a business downturn – profits fall, but the firm does not immediately fail – debt is less forgiving, because creditors do not wait around to be paid. Short-term creditors cash out or refuse to roll over their loans, denying credit to financially weakened firms. Long-term creditors demand to be “made whole” and sue. Without cash, the firm fails.

Financial firms in the United States pay about 34% of their profits in taxes, and, while they can deduct interest payments to creditors from taxable income, equity is not taxed as favorably. Most countries have similar tax preferences for debt over equity, thereby encouraging financial and other corporations to use more debt, as financial analysts have long known.

And yet the argument that this tax preference for debt played a role in the financial crisis – and that it remains an ongoing risk to financial stability – was quickly rejected. After all, the tax preference for debt has existed for a long time, and nothing heightened it before the crisis hit. On the contrary, if anything, the tax preference has decreased somewhat over time. And the crisis was quite clearly tied to the explosion in risky mortgage-backed securities in the US; when the market abruptly realized that these securities could not be paid off in full, many systemically important financial firms were seen to be much weaker than they had seemed. Catastrophic economic consequences followed.

All of this is true, but, given the possibility of a major overhaul of US corporate taxation, which President Barack Obama has proposed, we should revisit the conventional wisdom concerning the supposedly weak connection between corporate taxation and the financial crisis. Indeed, in my view, policymakers, academics, and the media have rejected too resolutely the idea that corporate taxation played no more than a minor role.

To be sure, the tax preference for debt has been embedded in the economy for a long time, with no financial crises for most of that period. And, yes, tax incentives are not the only – and perhaps not even the most important – reason why financial institutions use a lot of debt and minimize equity. Most important, while reliance on debt made financial institutions riskier, creditors knew that, in a crisis, the government would probably bail out the largest, if not all of them. Government was less likely to bail out equity.

Viewed from this perspective, it is no wonder that the question of how debt is taxed has played a small role in financial-reform packages. Financial institutions fell off the cliff in 2008, it is argued, because they got too close to the edge. Destabilized by too much short-term debt and too much exposure to risky, overvalued, low-quality mortgage-backed securities, they tripped and fell over it. So regulators have focused on command-and-control orders to financial firms to increase their equity, and to reduce the riskiness of their investments.

But consider another way of viewing the crisis and our financial institutions: the financial system was never all that far from the cliff’s edge, even before 2008, because the tax system encouraged financial firms to overload themselves with debt. They generally managed themselves and their risks well, so they did not fall. But then, in the run-up to the crisis, they miscalculated, taking on too much short-term debt and over-investing in risky securities. The added risks pushed the financial system past the tipping point, but the baseline problem was that it always contained too much risky debt.

From this perspective, it becomes clear that the baseline tax-induced risks should not be ignored. The policy consensus has properly focused first on the new risks that were added. But focusing on those added risks should be only the first step; doing so should not lead us to ignore the baseline risks that the tax system creates.

The taxation issue may go deeper. The tax system first encourages financial firms to use more debt than is safe, but there is a parallel effect on non-financial firms and many homeowners. Tax deductions for interest payments encourage them to borrow, too, an issue that has long been understood. But, less obviously, these borrowers then demand more tax-induced lending from financial institutions, because tax benefits make their own use of debt cheaper. Were their demand for debt lower – and, in the case of corporate debtors, were they to rely more on equity – financial institutions would face less pressure to use so much debt themselves.

Much consideration has already been devoted to how to reform corporate taxation in a way that levels the playing field for equity relative to debt; more than 20 years ago, the US Treasury conducted a major analysis and devised a plan to do so. As the Obama administration moves ahead with its new proposals, it should look back at the financial crisis, which provides strong grounds for implementing such a change.

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    1. CommentedKanchhedia Chamaar

      The benefits of leverage (present value of tax shield) are supposed to be offset by the costs of financial distress and information-sharing disadvantages of higher leverage. The tax shield does not create perverse incentives to take on too much risk for non-financial firms. It is the financial firms, in particular, inadequately regulated depository institutions with federally insured deposits, that have perverse incentives to take on too much risk. The solution is to do away with deposit insurance or reregulate the depository institutions in particular and financial sector in general.

    2. Commentedphilip meguire

      Federal tax law encourages all firms to leverage themselves, especially financial firms that pay a lot of interest. Here's a way of addressing this.

      Value added by business should be taxed once, at the business level. It should not matter whether that value added is disbursed as wages, interest or dividends, or retained. Only then will the tax bias towards leveraged speculation come to an end.

      The radical tax policy I propose is rather harsh to those on modest incomes. This can be addressed in two ways. First, FICA/Medicare tax payments would be credited in full towards business tax liabilities. This would transform the payroll taxes financing Social Security into earmarked value added taxes. Second, the Federal government would pay a periodic lump sum to every legal resident of the USA. I propose $10-12/person/day.

    3. CommentedWalter Gingery

      Roe completely ignores the effect of personal income taxes. While firms may pay 34%, individuals pay much less: "carried interest" is taxed at only 15%(!), ordinary income only slightly more. Since bonuses constitute such a big part of compensation in the financial industry, the consequence is a CASINO MENTALITY: gambling with borrowed money. They reap prodigious pay-offs if they're successful, (85% after taxes); if they fail, well, then, the public is on the hook. Heads I win, tails you lose. This incentive virtually guarantees excessive risk-taking. If we want the financial industry to assess risks better, we would have to re-write the tax laws to discourage gambling: e.g., raise the top rates to 70% (or higher).

        CommentedWalter Gingery

        When top tax rates in the US were in the 80% range, after WWII and into the '60's & '70's, we never experienced the risky behavior we've seen lately. The reason is simple: it didn't pay the way it does now. It was only after rates were slashed under Reagan that the casino mentality started to take over.

    4. CommentedFrank O'Callaghan

      Let's be clear; the tax policy was written for (and often by) the corporate entities, individuals and their representatives who gained from it. The endgame has been to place huge debt on the citizen. Decades of increasing affluence by the wealthy minority have been financed by debt that the poor and the many are saddled with. The so-called meritocracy of finance has turned out to be no more than a mirage and a scam created by a huge ponzi scheme of which the tax system was an important part. Until this core issue is accepted there is no analysis possible.

    5. CommentedDave Thomas

      It seems odd than a professor writing an article on tax policy and the causes of the financial crisis would completely neglect mentioning the 1997 bipartisan Taxpayer Relief Act.

      A serious argument on this subject of tax policy and the causes of the meltdown would not omit this crucial legislation. Dr. Roe should a New York Times piece from December 2008 entitled "Tax Break May Have Helped Cause the Housing Boom." It provides a basic outline on the legislation's effects.

    6. CommentedCraig Hardt

      While corporate tax codes may have played a role in the level of debt relative to equity that accounted for the liabilities on corporate balance sheets, I think you are missing the forest in the trees. The problem with the financial system was (and to a large extent remains) a problem of incentives. Banks issued loans to people they knew would never be able to pay them off because it didn't matter to the banks whether or not borrowers defaulted. They passed off the risk to investors eager to buy the supposedly AAA rated MBS and insurance companies like AIG. For the banks who charged a fee for issuing the loans this was basically zero-risk money. Their goal was to create as many of the subprime mortgage loans as possible to increase the fees they could charge. Reforming the corporate tax code to encourage banks to hold more in equity isn't going to change that.

        CommentedKevin Remillard

        The trees in the forest were Indy Mac, First Franklin, Fremont Financial, and Washington Mutual to name four. AIG's SWAPs were done through a London Bank exchange and many more less supervised. The CDO tranches from Freddie and Fannie you may want to take a closer look at?