Franz Müntefering’s resignation as chairman of Germany’s Social Democrats in the face of a challenge from his party’s leftwing has, like the divisive French referendum on the European Constitution this past May, exposed deep ideological cleavages – divisions not only about Europe, but about the very foundations of society and the economy. Behind the critiques directed at the EU and national governments as “not being social enough,” lurks an image of the Union as a trap that is forcing its members to bend to the fateful disciplines of the market, thus depriving national leaders of their ability to realize important social goals. This cleavage now seems set to shape not only Germany’s future coalition government, but the future of politics across Europe.

In France, this division is evident not only on the extremes of right and left, and in traditionally nationalist Gaullist circles, but also among most socialist voters, who decided to spurn the party leadership’s pro-European stance.

This fundamental debate is not about to abate. On the contrary, as the German election shows and with a presidential election looming in France, the debate has intensified.

In France, this intensity is particularly visible within Socialist ranks. With preparations for the party’s November congress in full swing, a conflict that goes back to the party’s founding is reappearing. On one side is a social-democratic vision, which basically favors the market economy but seeks to alleviateits harsher effects; on the other side stands a radical vision that extols a revolutionary “break with capitalism.”

With the disappearance of the communist world and the failure of its collectivist policies, one would think that this debate had been resolved in favor of the reformist vision. But the surprise of the last few months is that an important part of the Socialist electorate and party leaders back radical change.

Moreover, a substantial portion of the broader anti-liberal left, composed of communists, ecologists, union activists, and adherents of the movement Attac accuse the reformists of subordinating themselves to liberal globalization and advocate, instead, a radical transformation of society and the economy.

The media success of Olivier Besancenot, a 31-year-old representative of the most intransigent section of the Trotskyist Revolutionary Communist League, reflects the power of this dream. Having received over 4% of the vote during the first round of the presidential election of 2002, Besancenotis now, according to opinion polls, the 38th most popular person in France.

Interestingly, an echo of the ideas mooted by radical anti-globalists can be found in someinitiatives coming from the right. President Jacques Chirac of France, but also Brazil’s leftist president, Lula da Silva support a tax on airline tickets designed to finance poor countries’ development. Similarly, the centrist leader François Bayrou, has proposed imposing a “Tobin tax” (named after its creator, the Nobel laureate economist James Tobin) on financial transactions, with the proceeds to be used to support socially worthy causes.

How do we explain this resurgent radicalism, which seems to ignore European and international political realities?

One might suspect the influence of French political traditions which, on the right as much as on the left, always prefer purity of principle to messy compromise. Add to this the congenital French mistrust of liberalism – indeed, French is one of the rare languages in which the word “liberalism” has a pejorative connotation – joined to an equally deep-rooted perception of the state (again, on both the right and the left) as the defender of the general interest par excellence. While pragmatism has come to dominate northern Europe’s socialist parties since the 1930’s – and, after the 1957 Congress of Bad Godesberg, the Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD) as well – a preference for revolutionary ideology has always prevailed, at least on the rhetorical level, among French socialists.

But this cannot be the whole explanation, because a similar radicalization is occurring within German’s left, where the alliance of the post-communist PDS – still powerful in the Länder of what was East Germany – and SPD dissidents led by Oskar Lafontaine promotes equally radical proposals. With the evident failure of both leftist and rightist governments to stem the rising wave of unemployment, a growing part of the French and German electorates no longer seems to believe in traditional solutions.

The welfare state, largely associated with the reformist social-democratic movement, is now reaching its limits in the form of uncontrolled public deficits and unsupportable levels of taxation. Similarly, the social mobility once fostered by the welfare state has suffered serious reverses. Globalized markets are viewed as bringingmore inequalities, austerity, and insecurity than the promised benefits of economic growth.

In this disenchanted environment, dreams of utopia thrive. But it is a fundamental characteristic of utopias that they cannot be implemented.

What is now needed is a more modest debate about how to reconcile the deficiencies of the market with the demands of solidarity. Should the state confine itself to creating an economic environment favorable to private enterprise? How extensively should it contribute to security, education, research, innovation, and protection of the poor?

But such debates can be fruitful only if they recognize the economic and political constraints under which modern states operate. Indeed, the role of the state is made more complicated by the fact that market regulation is becoming less national and more transnational.

Instead of throwing up our hands in despair, we should adhere to a distinction dear to the great German sociologist Max Weber, for now is a time when the ethics of responsibility must prevail over the ethics of conviction.