Saturday, April 19, 2014
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用尼克松的办法解决伊朗问题?

华盛顿—把船上的躺椅换掉救不了泰坦尼克号。为越南谈判的谈判桌形状争执不休对于结束这场恶性冲突也无济于事。尽管如此,不少美国总统仍然凭借大幅改变与敌谈判的方法在不发动战争的情况下解决了国家安全问题。如今,伊朗和谈判也需要作出此类大幅改变。

1933年,富兰克林·罗斯福与苏联外交部长李维诺夫进行了个人谈判,这便是两国外交关系之滥觞。1959年,艾森豪威尔邀请赫鲁晓夫访美,开了苏联领导人访美之先河。20世纪60年代,华沙美中双边会谈一直没有取得进展,直到尼克松及其国务卿基辛格另辟蹊径,在巴基斯坦的协助下与中国开展了更加直接的交流。

与伊朗就其核计划所开展的国际谈判也需要引入新概念、扩大谈判日程。上个月的伊斯坦布尔会议达成了积极意向。双方决定应该避免相互指责和毫无助益的扯淡。通向温和目标的初步一致的大门已经敞开了。

但是别指望可以在缺少美伊直接对话的基础上开启新篇章。与联合国安理会五常及德国(P5+1)的谈判只是一种形式,刻板而不可能达成突破。伊朗人觉得对方人数太多,安排变数太大,颇有孤立之感。美国需要重新安排更能让伊朗妥协的谈判环境。

美国应该要求双边谈判。诸位前任总统留下的教训是与对手展开高层次的直接对话非常有效。当然,至少从目前看,要奥巴马和哈梅内伊面对面坐下来对话显得相当不切实际。但1969年和1971年尼克松与毛泽东的会谈不是更加不可思议吗?美国和伊朗需要找出一条通向广泛双边谈判之路,主题应包括世界观、地区安全以及增进互相理解以尽力消除差异的计划。

即使不能在现在开展美伊对话,目前的谈判也需要重新安排。P5+1应该继续与伊朗就其核浓缩项目展开谈判,同时,国际原子能机构应该与伊朗就增加其核计划透明度的问题展开谈判。伊朗希望直接与国际原子能机构解决问题,而不愿与五常谈判解决,后者对伊朗实施了旨在强迫其中止核浓缩计划的制裁。

这一状况表明需采取阶段性方法。首先,在巴格达谈判期间,P5+1应该争取形成提振信心的协议,让伊朗停止将U-235裂变同位素浓度浓缩至20%的活动并削减或外运该裂变同位素存量,该浓度已接近核武器级别。P5+1还可以争取让伊朗停止富尔道(Fordow)深度低下核浓缩设施运转,作为交换,P5+1可以向伊朗提供研究用燃料棒并冻结某些制裁措施。

接着,P5+1可以同意伊朗进行某些核浓缩活动,以激励其与国际原子能机构达成增加透明度的协定。这些同时实行的步骤能够促使局面朝美国所期待的目标转变:确保伊朗遵守哈梅内伊本人所提出的反核武器宗教法令。

第三,双方应该给出长期谈判目标纲要。正如国际原子能机构敦促伊朗在增加透明度的协定上签字,伊朗希望了解这类协定将会给它带来什么,特别是有关制裁的方面。

伊朗人说,每当他们朝着与美国合作的方向努力时,就会出现新的问题阻挠关系的改善。伊朗希望知道,作为伊朗当下和未来的让步的交换,哪几项制裁会被推迟、冻结或取消。他们担心,美国会在人权、安全和其他领域继续对伊朗实施制裁。

而美国则将伊朗看做狡猾而不可靠的谈判对手,他们誓要拥有核武器,对谈判根本不上心。现在是对伊朗的考验时刻,他们到底有没有形成本文所列举的两阶段协定——一个长期的、逐步实现的过程,需要协定各方精诚合作,给予对方所欲之物——的意愿?

最后,即使在伊朗核计划问题上有了逐步解决的过程,仍然需要更广泛的讨论以解决对地区稳定构成威胁的非核问题。目前还没有讨论阿富汗、伊拉克、贩毒、波斯湾安全、突发冲突紧急交流以及根深蒂固的互不信任和理解的根源等问题的论坛。

这些问题的探讨可能需要非P5+1国家代表的参与,包括那些与伊朗关系密切的国家。为了组织这些更广泛问题的讨论,美国和其他国家应该研究任命特使——可以是由联合国出面任命的前国家元首——前往伊朗以新办法解决问题。

如果奥巴马能在改变和制定美国及其他国家对伊谈判程序中起到领导作用,那么取得进展就会更加容易一些。伊斯坦布尔谈判开启了初步突破性协定(即使只是一小步)的大门。现在,找出建立共同立场、形成更具持久力的政治解决方案的新办法的机会已经摆在了美国面前。

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  1. CommentedIvan Azymov

    '..progress would become easier.'

    Progress in what, exactly?  And for whom?

    Iranians are NOT interested in conquest disguised as 'Democracy'.  They are not interested in occupation disguised as 'help'.  And they are not interested in becoming a colony disguised as yet another addition to an 'alliance'.

    The IAEA has not found n iota of weapons-grade material despite numerous inspections to every location deemed suspect. Yet, the U.S. insists Iran is lacking in cooperation.

    Logic dictates the conflict is not about the thinly veiled argument of non-cooperation, but instead, it is about control.

    Iran understands this, and clearly sees past the subterfuge purported by the U.S., and thus maintains itself on guard (and rightly so). Regardless of attempts at reconciliation, if the philosophies on both sides remain the same (a likely possibility), the end solution will also amount to the same: confrontation.

    It is surprising to see the same errors repeated time and again to this day--should the U.S. keep pressing for control in the Middle East, despite the existing differences amongst the arab-speaking countries, said push for dominance may have the opposite effect: unification in order to prevent conquest by a foreign power.

    In the 1960s, an initiative to permanently limit nuclear armament to a few 'select' countries was launched. The initiative was flawed from the beginning, given that Russia was included as a matter of consequence.

    I recall being astonished at the arrogance of such an initiative. Knowledge cannot be systematically and indefinitely supressed--humanity simply does not function in that manner.

    Numerous present (and past) 'world leaders' subscribe to the fallacy of absolute control. They refuse to accept the fact that provided time, discoveries and accomplishments are duplicated--even in isolation. They also purport to respect sovereignty, though their actions speak volumes to the contrary. Unless the U.S. and allied countries accept these facts (and subsequently conduct themselves in a manner which accommodates the actuality and right of sovereign states), the end result will always be conflict. Regrettably, in light of the unchanging pattern, the inevitable escalation may prove to be catastrophic--for all involved.


    1. CommentedKevin Lim

      You suggest the real issue is control. Arguable. But you then suggest that we should not aim for total control.

      If ever there was an area of knowledge for which total control is required, it is the technology behind building a nuclear weapon.

      Your objections are both philisophical (we must respect state sovereignty) and practical (they are gonna figure it out sooner or later). Your philosophical argument assumes that state sovereignty is inviolate. But international law has never recognised state sovereignty as something so absolute e.g. A state can not hide behind state sovereignty to perpetuate genocide. When it comes to nuclear weapons, the stakes are so large that state sovereignty should not, cannot be a defence. You object to the hypocrisy that some states are permitted such weapons. Granted, but that is a practical concession not a philosophical one. Once a state develops a significant nuclear arsenal, in the ultimate analysis who has the leverage to compel it to relinquish it? So is it hypocritical? Yes, but you are just gonna have to get over it because every new state that possesses such weapons results in creating more flash points and more global instability as power relationships try to reach a new equilibrium.

      As for your practical argument, that is simply countered. The development of nuclear weapons is not something that governments accidentally stumble upon. It is a deliberate choice. And like all deliberate choices it can be influenced. Iran is seeking such weapons because it fears (rightly) that the US is seeking regime change. It is of course not entirely innocent in that affair but thats an argument for another time. With the right incentives e.g. assurances of non-interference, ending of sanctions, and the right disincentives e.g. further sanctions, perhaps it can be convinced that it can reach an accomodation with the West that does not involve having the Bomb. We may already be seeing the beginnings of that accomodation - Khamanei has recently declared possession of such weapons as a "grave sin" a position that it will be hard to back track from, and in Israel policy makers are openly saying that Iran is not seeking the Bomb. A face-saving accomodation can be reached which would allow Iran to have nuclear energy with the assurances that the world needs that it cannot easily turn that technology to warlike ends.

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