Extreme-right and post-fascist parties, whose rising popularity caused alarm across Western Europe a few years ago, seem to be fading from the electoral scene. But does this mean that political radicalism, extreme-right sentiments, and fascism in Europe are dying out?

Hardly. Just as both extreme-right and post-fascist groups in Western Europe weaken, Eastern Europe has seen a revival of extreme-right and fascist parties, most ominously with the successes of nationalist radicals in the recent Russian and Serbian elections.

At the same time, the costs of weakening extreme-right, nationalist, and post-fascist parties in Western and Central Europe have been high: mainstream political forces were forced to adopt some of the extreme right's vocabulary and agenda. Many mainstream European politicians and parties now espouse anti-immigration policies, express greater skepticism toward European integration, or wield a form of anti-Semitism that masquerades as criticism of Israel's policies.

Extremist parties have also been marginalized owing to their weak position in pan-European politics. Voters in Italy, France, the Netherlands, or Austria - the countries in which post-fascist or extreme-right parties incited the greatest concerns - gradually realized that mainstream democratic forces in Europe would allow extremist parties only limited influence in the European Parliament and other EU institutions. Some - for example, Jörg Haider's Free Democrats in Austria, or Gianfranco Fini's Italian post-fascists - were forced to temper their radicalism after joining government coalitions.

While xenophobia - provoked mostly by fears about immigration, EU enlargement, and pressures of globalization - has driven West European extremism, xenophobic radicalism in Europe's east has different causes. The recent electoral successes of the Serbian Radical Party of Vojislav Seselj, Russian nationalist parties, as well as the strong position of Vadim Tudor's Greater Romania Party in Romania, were caused mainly by a combination of rabid nationalism and the pressures of modernization.

These countries, after some delay, are following in the footsteps of some postcommunist nations in Central Europe, where nationalist/populist parties, such as the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia of Vladimir Meciar, retarded democratization and market reform a decade ago. As in Western Europe, in most postcommunist countries that will become EU members in May 2004, both political radicalism and nationalism have been neutralized at the cost of being to some extent embraced by mainstream political parties.

Milder versions of nationalist, euroskeptic, or xenophobic slogans can now be heard from political parties such as the Czech Republic's Civic Democrats or Hungary's Fidesz, the largest opposition forces in those countries. In other words, both the language and the agenda that originally belonged to extreme-right parties have been appropriated by the political mainstream.

But Russia, Serbia, and Romania probably have a more difficult road ahead in fending off their extremists. First, unlike the postcommunist countries of Central Europe, they lack Western political and philosophical traditions. Close ties between the state and their Orthodox churches forged state religions that helped to create a strong sense of national messianism. So nationalists in Russia, Serbia, and Romania draw on deep-rooted beliefs that their nations have special historical missions.

Second, because the role of the state has traditionally been strong in these countries - the democratic separation of powers and efforts to introduce the rule of law are relatively new developments - corporatist tendencies that characterized, for example, Italian fascism in the 1930's, remain potent. Finally, globalization, the pressures arising from market reform, modernization of institutions, and other new phenomena, disrupt and disorient these societies.

A strong sense of historical mission, social and economic problems, a diminished international status: all combine to form an explosive mix that plays into the hands of radicals. So, at least in these three countries, the rise of post-fascist tendencies, nationalism, and political extremism may not be temporary, as in Central Europe, or remain the marginal phenomena witnessed recently in Western Europe.

But important differences between Russia, Serbia, and Romania should be noted. The last of the three countries is a candidate for EU membership in 2007, and the accession process has had a moderating effect on Romanian politics.

Romania's two million ethnic Hungarians, the main political targets of Romanian nationalists, represent a bridge to the EU, because Hungary will be a member of the EU three years before Romania. Transylvania, where the country's ethnic Hungarians are overwhelmingly concentrated, is also Romania's cultural bridge to the West, because this part of Romania belonged for centuries to the Hapsburg Empire. The hope of EU membership gives mainstream Romanian politicians and the Romanian public strong incentives not to succumb to nationalist sentiments.

Serbia and Russia pose more difficult cases, as the national pride of both - for different reasons - has been wounded. While Russia has almost completely lost its superpower status, Serbia was deeply humiliated by NATO in 1999. Many Serbs also feel mortified by the ongoing trials of their former leaders at the International Criminal Tribunal at The Hague.

The international community, especially the EU, can offer few incentives to encourage moderate politics in these two countries. Moreover, the average Russians' experiences of liberal economic and political reforms since communism's fall have been rather negative. While most Russians seem to realize that their country can no longer be "salvaged" by the Communists, many are betting on semi-authoritarian rule and national revival stemming from traditional Russian values. That fusion, however, remains modern politics'other lethal temptation.