Gerhard Schröders trip to Versailles last week to celebrate the 40 ^th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty which ended for all time the historic Franco/German enmity and to pose jointly with President Chirac in opposition to a US-led invasion of Iraq, allowed him to appear to be another in an impressive line of powerful post-war German chancellors. But like the sight lines in Versailles Hall of Mirrors, the image of a powerful German Chancellor is an illusion.

Chancellor Schröder knows this. Back home, he is the subject of satirical songs and finds himself engaged in frivolous lawsuits about whether he dyes his hair or spends enough time with his wife. More importantly, his governments hesitance in addressing the countrys deep problems with its health care system, pensions, and the labor market creates a sense of political paralysis. Germany seems mired in passivity, as it did in the final years of Helmut Kohls long rule. But Schröder was elected because he promised to be more dynamic than Kohl.

What went wrong? Schröders failures are less connected with his personal qualities and politics than is often assumed. Despite the seeming power of Germanys postwar Chancellors, the countrys political system can only be administered; governance in the sense of addressing fundamental problems by enacting far-reaching reforms is usually impossible. As Germany struggles to restore economic growth this constitutionally mandated debility is increasingly obvious.

The problem stems from the greater influence that ruling parties and parliamentary factions in Germany have relative to their counterparts in, say, Great Britain or France. If a chancellor is no longer popular Schröders case today he loses leverage over his parliamentary majority. Schröder won approval for deploying German armed forces to Afghanistan only by attaching the issue to a vote of confidence in his government. Such a stratagem is possible only in connection with foreign policy matters, and, unlike in Britain, it is the exception, not the rule.

In domestic affairs, no German government can avoid the Bundestags powerful committees and commissions, or force them to behave as the government wishes. The Bundestag Barons the long serving MPs who rule the legislative committees and enjoy enormous clout within their parties cannot shape politics against the governments will, but they can impede almost everything. In contrast to Britain, there is nothing like the threat to dissolve parliament. Nor is it possible to force decisions without parliamentary support, as in France.

Parliamentary sovereignty in Germany means sovereignty, first and foremost, over the government. Every German government is essentially powerless vis-à-vis its own parliamentary majority. In this, Kohls government was no different than Schröders. It, too, failed to carry out health care and pension reforms even if resistance at that time came from different interest groups.

The problem is structural: members of the Bundestag depend on local or regional party organizations, not on their party leader, for their political survival and advancement within the Bundestags hierarchy. Once a German Chancellor becomes unpopular regardless of why these party organizations no longer view him as a vote-winner, and the parliamentary majoritys barons will balk at implementing painful reforms, no matter how necessary and beneficial.

The chief source of the barons power is that German governments have nowhere to turn. Unlike the American President, who may seek votes to support his policies even from the opposing party in Congress, a German Chancellor promises not to govern by seeking the votes of opposition party members. Moreover, the opposition, is typically always oriented more toward the next election than to providing support on any single issue for the Chancellor, even an issue that it wishes to promote.

German political parties also are constitutionally more powerful than in other Western countries. Germanys Basic Law bars the government from enforcing laws against the will and decision of a ruling partys statutory bodies. Party caucuses, decisions of party executive committees, and party congresses assume the status of public institutions with informal authority to block government policy.

The resulting paralysis is aggravated by Germanys type of federalism. The Bundesrat, the upper house where the federal states (Bundesländer) are represented, must approve most laws. Since the 1970s, no government has maintained a majority in the Bundesrat for very long, with the opposition in the Bundestag gaining a majority in the Bundesrat after mid-term state elections. As a result, all legislation can be threatened by the oppositions veto, blocking any reform that harms the opposition's constituents.

In short, the parliamentary barons of the governing party buttressed by the ban on seeking opposition support can sabotage legislative projects they dont like. The coalition partners party institutions may exert massive influence over planned reforms, even to the point of stopping them. Federalism forms a final barrier to change, by allowing opposition parties to alter, dilute, and reject bills that are detrimental to their clientele.

Konrad Adenauers and Willi Brandts foreign policy achievements created the illusion of the German Chancellors power. Today, German governance resembles an 18 ^th century liberal system, with veto rights embedded throughout the decision-making process. Whatever Schröders own shortcomings and mistakes, they pale in significance for the future of Germany and the EU alike against the weakness of his office.