LONDON: The withdrawal of the censure vote in the European Parliament in Strasbourg on January 14th, which would have forced the resignation of all of the members of the Council of Ministers, should not be judged simply on whether such a vote was won or lost, but mainly as a fundamental turning point in the relationship between the European Parliament and the Commission.

The threat of censure marks a vital turning point in the relationship between the Parliament and the Member States in the Council of Ministers. For no matter which way the vote went, and even with its withdrawal, the European Parliament, by flexing its muscles as it did, would still have emerged strengthened.

Ostensibly, the purpose of the Parliament’s censure motion was to sanction the Commission for what was alleged to be the maladministration of the European Union’s 1996 budget; and there were (and remain) accusations in the air of fraud and corruption. The paradox of the situation, however, is that, in political terms, the very holding of a vote of censure will be more important than whether it was successful or not.

In order to succeed, the Commission’s critics in Parliament needed to muster a very large majority in order to carry a vote of censure: two thirds of the votes cast, and over half of all the members of the Parliament. Auditors have undoubtedly revealed some maladministration of parts of the budget. Yet if the detailed accusations are justified, the blame probably lies more, either with the previous Commission of Jacques Delors (now long out of office), rather than the present Commission presided by Jacques Santer, or else with the Member States, who spend 80% of the Union budget.

Even though the vote of censure did not take place, it seems almost inevitable that the very fact of threatening such a vote will, at least temporarily, weaken the position of the Commission, as one of the European Union’s key institutions, and that it will correspondingly strengthen the position of the European Parliament.

One of the central dilemmas of the European Union’s institutional structure is that a comprehensive vote of censure is the only instrument allowed under the Treaty by which the European Parliament can sanction the Commission. There is no provision for the Parliament to register even a moderate protest or a targeted sanction against detailed elements of the record of the European executive. If a vote of censure is carried, however, with the necessary majority, all 20 Commissioners would be required to resign.

Since the Commission is an essential part of the administration and policy-making of the Union, the mass resignation of the Commissioners would inevitably plunge the Union into a state of confusion and paralysis, or worse. That is why a Parliamentary censure motion of the sort just attempted is often described as a "nuclear weapon".

And since, in addition, the Commission and the Parliament have traditionally tended to regard each other as essential allies (on the side of European integration), against the Council of Ministers (representing the nation states), it is not surprising that a censure vote has only been tried four times in the past 20 years, and never carried.

If there is one thing that is clear about the European Union’s institutional arrangements, it is that it is insufficiently democratic for the degree of integration that is now underway or planned. There is, of course, no agreement on what in detail should be done about this. But at a time when the European Union is making large integrationist strides forward, in the shape of the single currency and the negotiations that will begin on expansion eastward, it must in principle be obvious to any democrat that there must be some counterbalancing strengthening of the democratic factor.

This is why this week’s attempted censure vote in the European Parliament should not be deplored as a reckless act of irresponsibility, but should rather be recognised for what it is, and therefore welcomed, as a necessary and unavoidable act in support of the democratic principle. Reckless and undisciplined? Yes, of course; but that is the only way that Parliaments have, over the centuries, ever pushed forward the frontiers of democratic power against the executive.

If the democratic principle is not strengthened, it is most unlikely that the European Union will be able to deal satisfactorily with any of the massive challenges lying immediately ahead: making a success of the Single Currency, revising the Union’s spending policies, and reforming the Union’s existing policies and institutions. And if the Union does not master these problems in short order, there will be no enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe: it is as simple as that.

The immediate consequence of this week’s trial of strength is that the Member States will be compelled to offer the Parliament a more moderate alternative to the use of the "nuclear weapon". Which means that they will be compelled to recognise that the Parliament should have the right to a more extensive, a more flexible, and a more democratic, power of sanction.

For had a censure vote been carried, the entire Commission would have been forced to resign, and the Union would likely have been paralysed for months, which is manifestly over the top. Even in defeat, with the current Commission remaining in office, its credibility may be fatally weakened for the last 11 months of its term in office.

This is not to say that the Commission will be permanently wounded, for the Union desperately needs a vigorous Commission. But the Commission cannot in the long run be vigorous unless the Union’s democratic principle is strengthened.