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The Rules Of The Game by Lucian Bebchuk |
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War and Peace by Shlomo Ben-Ami |
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Transatlantic Perspectives by Boskin, Sinn |
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Crossing Cultures by Ian Buruma |
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The Statesmen's Debate by Castaneda, Haass, Rocard |
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Finance in the 21st Century by Davies, Shiller |
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Anatomy of the Global Economy by J. Bradford DeLong |
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Net World by Esther Dyson |
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The Next Financial Order by Barry Eichengreen |
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The Magic of the Market by Martin Feldstein |
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The Rebel Realist by Joschka Fischer |
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Capitalism Then and Now by Harold James |
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Global Warning by Bjorn Lomborg |
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European Observer by Dominique Moisi |
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Of Might and Right by Joseph S. Nye |
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History in Motion by Chris Patten |
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Roads to Prosperity by Dani Rodrik |
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The Unbound Economy by Kenneth Rogoff |
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After the Storm by Nouriel Roubini |
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Economics and Justice by Jeffrey D. Sachs |
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The Ethics of Life by Peter Singer |
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Against the Current by Robert Skidelsky |
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I Dissent: Unconventional Economic Wisdom by Joseph E. Stiglitz |
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Awakening India by Shashi Tharoor |
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The Next Wave by Naomi Wolf |
NEW YORK – Wir sind jetzt alle Keynesianer. Selbst der rechte Flügel in den Vereinigten Staaten hat sich dem keynesianischen Lager mit ungezügelter Begeisterung und in einem Maße angeschlossen, das früher wahrhaft unvorstellbar gewesen wäre.
Für diejenigen unter uns, die eine gewisse Verbindung zur keynesianischen Tradition für sich beanspruchten, ist dies ein Moment des Triumphs, nachdem sie über drei Jahrzehnte lang in der Wildnis zurückgelassen, ja beinahe gemieden wurden. In einer Hinsicht ist das, was derzeit passiert, ein Triumph des Verstands und der Beweise über Ideologie und Interessen.
Die Wirtschaftstheorie hatte seit Langem erklärt, warum unbehinderte Märkte nicht selbstkorrigierend waren, warum Regulierung notwendig war und warum die Regierung in der Wirtschaft eine wichtige Rolle zu spielen hatte. Doch viele, insbesondere Leute, die für die Finanzmärkte arbeiteten, forcierten eine Art „Marktfundamentalismus“. Die daraus resultierende, irrige Politik, die unter anderem von einigen Mitgliedern aus dem Team des designierten US-Präsidenten Barack Obama vorangetrieben wurde, hatte früher Entwicklungsländern gewaltige Kosten auferlegt. Der Moment der Erleuchtung kam erst, als diese Politik anfing, auch den USA und anderen weitentwickelten Industrieländern Kosten aufzubürden.
Keynes behauptete nicht nur, dass die Märkte nicht selbstkorrigierend sind, sondern dass geldpolitische Maßnahmen bei einem schweren Konjunkturrückgang wahrscheinlich wirkungslos wären. Da war die Fiskalpolitik gefragt. Doch sind nicht alle fiskalpolitischen Maßnahmen gleichwertig. Im heutigen Amerika mit seinem Überhang an Haushaltsschulden und der hohen Unsicherheit sind Steuersenkungen wahrscheinlich wirkungslos (genau wie in Japan in den 1990er Jahren). Ein großer Anteil, wenn nicht das meiste, der US-Steuersenkungen im letzten Februar wurde in Ersparnisse umgewandelt.
Bei dem gewaltigen Schuldenberg, den die Regierung Bush hinterlässt, sollten die USA besonders motiviert sein, aus jedem ausgegebenem Dollar die größtmögliche Stimulation herauszuziehen. Das Erbe der zu geringen Investitionen in – insbesondere grüne – Technologie und Infrastruktur und die wachsende Kluft zwischen Arm und Reich erfordern eine Übereinstimmung zwischen kurzfristigen Ausgaben und langfristiger Vision.
Dazu ist es notwendig, sowohl Steuer- als auch Ausgabenprogramme umzustrukturieren. Die Senkung der Steuern für Arme und die Anhebung der Arbeitslosengelder bei gleichzeitiger Erhöhung der Steuern für Reiche können die Wirtschaft ankurbeln, das Defizit verkleinern und die Ungleichheit verringern. Die Senkung der Ausgaben für den Irak-Krieg und die Erhöhung der Ausgaben für das Bildungswesen können gleichzeitig auf kurze wie auf lange Sicht die Arbeitsleistung steigern und das Defizit verringern.
Keynes machte sich wegen einer Liquiditätsfalle Sorgen – dem Unvermögen der Währungsbehörden, eine Steigerung der Kreditvergabe zu bewirken, um das Niveau der Wirtschaftsaktivität zu heben. Der Vorsitzende der US-Notenbank Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, hat vehement versucht zu verhindern, dass die Schuld für die Vertiefung dieses Abschwungs auf die Fed fällt, so wie sie auch für die Große Depression verantwortlich gemacht wird, die bekanntlich mit einer Verknappung der Geldmenge und dem Zusammenbruch von Banken verbunden wird.
Trotzdem sollte man die Geschichte und Theorie sorgfältig lesen: Die Erhaltung von Finanzinstituten ist kein Selbstzweck, sondern ein Mittel zum Zweck. Es ist der Kreditfluss, der wichtig ist, und der Grund dafür, dass der Konkurs von Banken während der Großen Depression wichtig war, ist, dass sie an der Ermittlung der Bonität beteiligt waren; sie waren die Informationsquellen, die erforderlich waren, um den Kreditfluss aufrechtzuerhalten.
Doch hat sich Amerikas Finanzsystem seit den 1930er Jahren dramatisch verändert. Viele der großen amerikanischen Banken sind aus dem „Kreditvergabegeschäft“ ausgestiegen und in das „Verschiebungsgeschäft“ eingestiegen. Sie haben sich darauf konzentriert, Vermögenswerte zu kaufen, neu zu verpacken und zu verkaufen, wobei sie bei der Risikobewertung sowie bei der Prüfung der Bonität einen Rekord in Inkompetenz aufstellten. Hunderte Milliarden sind ausgegeben worden, um diese untauglichen Institute zu erhalten. Nichts ist unternommen worden, um ihre perversen Anreizstrukturen zu beheben, die kurzsichtiges Verhalten und übertriebene Risikofreudigkeit fördern. Zumal sich die privaten Belohnungen so eindeutig von den gesellschaftlichen Vorteilen abheben, überrascht es nicht, dass die Verfolgung der eigenen Interessen (Gier) zu diesen gesellschaftlich zerstörerischen Folgen geführt. Noch nicht einmal die Interessen ihrer eigenen Aktionäre wurden gut vertreten.
Unterdessen wird zu wenig getan, um Banken zu helfen, die tatsächlich das machen, was Banken tun sollen – Geld leihen und Bonität bewerten.
Die US-Regierung hat Billionen Dollar an Verpflichtungen und Risiken übernommen. Bei der Rettung des Finanzsystems müssen wir uns, nicht weniger als in der Fiskalpolitik, um die größte Wirkung des Geldes kümmern. Andernfalls wird das Defizit, das sich in acht Jahren verdoppelt hat, noch weiter in die Höhe schießen.
Im September war die Rede davon, dass die Regierung ihr Geld mit Zinsen zurückbekäme. Während sich der Rettungsplan weiter aufbläht, wird immer deutlicher, dass dies bloß ein weiteres Beispiel dafür war, dass die Finanzmärkte Risiken falsch einschätzen – genau wie sie diese in den letzten Jahren konsequent falsch eingeschätzt haben. Die Bedingungen der Bernanke-Paulson-Rettungspläne waren nachteilig für die Steuerzahler und haben dennoch, ungeachtet ihres Umfangs, bemerkenswerterweise wenig dazu beigetragen, die Kreditvergabe wieder anzukurbeln.
Das neoliberale Drängen auf Deregulierung kam einigen Interessen wunderbar entgegen. Den Finanzmärkten ging es durch die Liberalisierung des Kapitalmarktes gut. Dass Amerika überall auf der Welt seine riskanten Finanzprodukte verkaufen und spekulieren konnte, mag seinen Unternehmen dienlich gewesen sein, auch wenn sie anderen große Kosten aufgebürdet haben.
Heute besteht die Gefahr darin, dass die neuen keynesianischen Grundsätze dazu eingesetzt und missbraucht werden, in einigen Fällen denselben Interessen zu dienen. Haben diejenigen, die vor zehn Jahren auf Deregulierung gedrängt haben, ihre Lektion gelernt? Oder werden sie einfach für oberflächliche Reformen werben – das Mindeste, was notwenig ist, um die etliche Billionen schweren Rettungspläne zu rechtfertigen? Gab es einen Sinneswandel oder lediglich eine Strategieänderung? Schließlich sieht die Umsetzung keynesianischer Maßnahmen im heutigen Kontext sogar noch gewinnbringender aus als die Ausrichtung am Marktfundamentalismus!
Vor zehn Jahren, zur Zeit der Finanzkrise in Asien, gab es viele Diskussionen über die Notwendigkeit, die globale Finanzarchitektur zu reformieren. Wenig wurde unternommen. Es ist unbedingt notwendig, dass wir nicht nur angemessen auf die aktuelle Krise reagieren, sondern dass wir die langfristigen Reformen umsetzen, die notwendig sein werden, wenn wir eine stabilere, erfolgreichere und gerechtere Weltwirtschaft schaffen wollen.
Joseph E. Stiglitz ist Professor für Wirtschaftswissenschaften an der Columbia University und erhielt 2001 den Nobelpreis für Ökonomie. Zusammen mit Linda Bilmes ist er Mitverfasser von The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Costs of the Iraq Conflict (Die wahren Kosten des Krieges: Wirtschaftliche und politische Folgen des Irak-Konflikts).
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2008.
www.project-syndicate.org
Aus dem Englischen von Anke Püttmann
Please look at Portoalegre and how they decide on their own priorities.
"Lowering taxes on the poor and raising unemployment benefits while simultaneously increasing taxes on the rich can stimulate the economy, reduce the deficit, and reduce inequality."
That's what we do in Canada and our per capita income is 30% below US per capita income.
"Have those who pushed deregulation ten years ago learned their lesson?"
Fannie and Freddie were government regulation failures. What about the wonderful Sarbanes-Oxley regulation? Another regulatory failure. Regulators are like traffic cops: They always show up after the accident and make things worse for those not involved.
"The moment of enlightenment came only when those policies also began inflicting costs on the US and other advanced industrial countries. "
A pesky fact, US per capita income will be higher in 2008 than in any other year in history.
Prof Stiglitz is giant in the economics profession for proving theoretically intriguing exceptions rather than general rules. It is the general rules that always trip him up in the policy making arena.
Keynes was worried about a liquidity trap – the inability of monetary authorities to induce an increase in the supply of credit in order to raise the level of economic activity. US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has tried hard to avoid having the blame fall on the Fed for deepening this downturn in the way that it is blamed for the Great Depression, famously associated with a contraction of the money supply and the collapse of banks.
And yet one should read history and theory carefully: preserving financial institutions is not an end in itself, but a means to an end. It is the flow of credit that is important, and the reason that the failure of banks during the Great Depression was important is that they were involved in determining creditworthiness; they were the repositories of information necessary for the maintenance of the flow of credit.
One of the things that is both amazing and revolting about the current policy response is the actions of the Fed. With more than a year's lead time and with confidence born of years of study, Bernanke applied his monetary remedies .... to no effect. The crash occurred. The only change in the Fed chairman has been an increase in the fever with which he applies the wrong medicine.
As Keynes said, paraphrasing, expansionary monetary policy is like buying a larger belt in hopes of getting fat.
His ass-backwards means of stabilizing housing was for too long attempting to create a credit environment which would somehow reflate the housing bubble. Too late he came to the table of stabilizing housing markets by stabilizing housing prices.
But the main point is that he, as you point out here, attempted to prop up the banks in hopes the banking function would be stabilized. It is not these decrepit and defunct institutions that are needed, it is the function of banking. We need a new bridge, not a multi-trillion dollar prop up of the broken one.
"Keynes was worried about a liquidity trap – the inability of monetary authorities to induce an increase in the supply of credit in order to raise the level of economic activity. US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has tried hard to avoid having the blame fall on the Fed for deepening this downturn in the way that it is blamed for the Great Depression, famously associated with a contraction of the money supply and the collapse of banks.
"And yet one should read history and theory carefully: preserving financial institutions is not an end in itself, but a means to an end. It is the flow of credit that is important, and the reason that the failure of banks during the Great Depression was important is that they were involved in determining creditworthiness; they were the repositories of information necessary for the maintenance of the flow of credit. "
One of the things that is both amazing and revolting about the current policy response is the actions of the Fed. With more than a year's lead time and with confidence born of years of study, Bernanke applied his monetary remedies .... to no effect. The crash occurred. The only change in the Fed chairman has been an increase in the fever with which he applies the wrong medicine.
As Keynes said, paraphrasing, expansionary monetary policy is like buying a larger belt in hopes of getting fat.
His ass-backwards means of stabilizing housing was for too long attempting to create a credit environment which would somehow reflate the housing bubble. Too late he came to the table of stabilizing housing markets by stabilizing housing prices.
But the main point is that he, as you point out here, attempted to prop up the banks in hopes the banking function would be stabilized. It is not these decrepit and defunct institutions that are needed, it is the function of banking. We need a new bridge, not a multi-trillion dollar prop up of the broken one.
Some perspectives on the relevance of John Maynard Keynes to the modern economy:
1) Consumerism: Keynes may be considered as one of the first intellectuals to have understood the meaning of the new age of consumerism in the 20th century. Throughout the Renaissance period, and even leading up to the early 20th century, the Western liberal tradition relied heavily on the ideals of the Protestant Reformation. The influence of these ideas in economics can be seen in the writings of Max Weber. In this worldview, pious thrift and delayed gratification formed the foundation of people's economic outlook. It was in this economic environment that Keynes advocated a consumerist (or even hedonistic) freedom to be able to stimulate demand in an advanced industrial economy. From that brave new world that contemplated releasing a much self-denied consumer from thrift and delayed gratification, we have come a long way eighty years later, where consumers are now so much immersed in instant gratification that they simply can't stop consuming even if they realize that they are neck-deep in debt.
2) Deficit financing: The free market knows no yesterdays, nor any tomorrows. It is relentlessly focused on the present. Of course, one may purchase insurance and future contracts to safeguard oneself against the vagaries of the future behavior of the market. But one would be doing that based on information that one has from outside the market framework. The market mechanism itself does not guarantee anything other than a random walk of price movements. While there are many advantages to this quality of the market, the single major disadvantage is that it does not reflect normal economic activity accurately. Sure enough, changes in economic activity can be sudden and random, but usually a nation's economy has some continuity to its functioning, and based on this assumption, economic decisions are often made looking into the future. Investments on raw materials, inventory management, extension of credit to consumers, time value of money, experimenting with new technology, R & D, hiring new employees are some examples where the trust in our ability to gauge the future is crucial. Thus there is some role for another institution like a central bank or the state to step in to ensure that the market mechanism, in its pre-occupation with the present, does not get too much out-of-touch with reality. In fact, when there is a severe downturn, a central bank's changes in interest rates or printing money could be insufficient, and the state needs to provide substantial budgetary support (overlooking any concerns about fiscal deficits in the short-term) to a market-based economy. This is the policy prescription of Keynesianism when the economy is experiencing seriously difficult conditions.
Provided that a group of experts can peek into the future and see some socio-economic facts that the market appears to be obviously missing, then there is some justification to take corrective action. However, there is no provision in Keynesian theory to release trillion after trillion in dollars into the national economy with no clear understanding about what the problem is. This approach of throwing the kitchen-sink could lead to massive mis-allocations of capital, rampant corruption and cronyism, which seems to be what is actually happening now. Moreover, out-of-control spending, and announcements of drastic changes in policies, by the central bank and the treasury department could prevent private capital from entering the market. But most importantly, the implication for the global economy with such massive expansion of money would definitely be detrimental, because the dollar is widely used as a reserve currency, as a safe store of value.
3) Market failures: Keynesian propensity to focus on market failures misses out on what seems to be a really important success story of the market mechanism. Unlike the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, Western economies have successfully thwarted the negative effects of the sudden spikes in oil prices in recent years. The oil producing countries tripled the price of a barrel of crude oil during 1972-75 and then tripled it again during 1976-80. These oil shocks were among the main reasons why the American economy went through a prolonged period of stagnation and inflation in the 1970s. Similarly, in recent years, betting that the fast growing emerging economies like China would provide effective competition for oil-demand against the West, the oil producing countries took to another round of oil price hikes. Between 2002 and 2008, the price of a barrel of crude oil shot up from $23 to over $150. However, when the stock markets, financial markets and the real estates crashed in America, there was a simultaneous crash in the markets in Europe and Asia. This made the high oil prices unsustainable and they have crashed to below $40 in recent days. This crash in oil prices has shown that the advanced economies have shifted, in the last 30 years, to Services, Information and Innovation as the sources of economic value, rather than Manufacturing. Moreover, it has demonstrated that the world economy is not willing to put a high value on commodities, ahead of human capital, modern political systems and the rule of law.
This success of the world markets in thwarting the oil cartels did not come about through any interference from the central bank or the state. In fact, there has been a change in the methodology of measuring inflation in recent years. Central banks now remove food and energy prices and focus on 'core inflation'. They consider spikes in oil prices and food prices as something exogenous to the national economic system. As a result, they did not take any significant steps to counter the oil price hikes of recent years. In fact, they were quick to take advantage of the fall -- the US Federal Reserve cited the fall in oil prices as an indication of the waning of inflationary forces and cut interest rates much further than it would have done otherwise. Similarly, the governments in the advanced countries did not make substantial efforts to promote alternative energies. They kept dragging their feet on this issue, favouring the big oil corporations. So, it was solely through the work of the markets that the efforts of the oil cartels to hold the world economy to ransom has been thwarted. It may be noted here in passing that high volatility in the markets appears to be one of the mechanisms that helped to dismantle the oil prices.
4) Technology and innovation: Keynes did not have any penetrating insights about technology, in contrast to the works of famous economists like Adam Smith, Karl Marx and John Kenneth Galbraith. In his oft-quoted example on the pin factory, Adam Smith illustrated how division of labor in carrying out a technological process could lead to vast increases in the productivity of the laborers. Karl Marx wrote extensively about the negative impact that technological progress had on the poorer sections of society. John Kenneth Galbraith analyzed systematically how the nature of technological changes in the industrial economies was closely related to the organization of working people as large corporations, and how these forms of organization affected the performance of the economy.
In contrast, Keynesian theory seems to be an abstract theoretical edifice on capitalism, which is self-referential, and lays emphasis on logical consistency and precision. This was part of the larger movement among 20th century economists to increasingly use complicated mathematical language in their research papers. Technology and innovation are assumed to be exogenous to economic theory, and these two phenomenon impact the economy in whatever way they do so. Their influence is only measured posteriori through empirical means and used to explain past events. For example, Alan Greenspan used productivity gains, that could be identified in economic data, as an explanation for the stock market boom in the mid-90s. There is no theoretical framework in modern economics for explaining technology and innovation in a coherent manner, something that Keynesian theory would not be able to rectify.
5) Remains of empires: Keynes seems to have had a deep understanding for people's sense of justice. Indeed, in his "Economic Consequences of the Peace", he was able to foresee that the heavy war indemnities that the Allies had forced on Germany at the end of the First World War was unjust and it would lead to hyperinflation in Germany. However, by and large, Keynesian policies are a sort-of ad hoc prescriptions for the advanced industrial economies, without any broader intellectual framework (unlike Adam Smith who had much to say about international trade and technology, or Karl Marx who had much to say about social issues and history). After the Second World War, Keynes was looking at a world that had emerged from the remains of empires. Keynes was the main architect of the Bretton Woods institutions -- the IMF and the World Bank, and their functioning in contemporary world would leave no doubt that the concerns of empires weighed more in Keynes' mind, when he was helping draft the rules & bylaws of these institutions, much more than any liberal or social agenda.
This was the weakest link in Keynesian theory. American people who saw themselves historically as fighting for freedom from the British empire would not take easily to Keynes' prescription of state intervention. In contrast, Milton Friedman's libertarian agenda which minimized the role of the state struck a deep chord among Americans. In this context, it is of great concern that the new economic team of the President-elect Barack Obama does not include Professor Joseph Stiglitz who is the only serious economist that has a deep grasp of the new global order. Fifty three years after the end of the Second World War, the concepts of the nation-state and democracy have proved to be the only robust frameworks for representing the aspiration of people around the world. Thinking in terms of empires and realpolitik is regressive. Most leading economists would just like to implement a laundry list of changes to IMF and World Bank, and continue with business-as-usual. They don't have the professional credibility nor sufficient understanding that is required for America to benefit from the new equitable world order. Only Professor Joseph Stiglitz has demonstrated that ability through his books, "Making Globalization Work", "The Roaring Nineties", "Globalization and its Discontents" and "Free Trade for All".
bri is completely wrong. If Canada has a lower GDP per capita than US is not a problem of the Stiglitz´proposals on taxes an unemployment insurance. The truly assesment of bri is that US is a model of growth (because there are very few countries with such a big GDP -per capita) but when the proposals are to combat the income inequality in a country with more serious problems in this area than CAnada.
The doubtful fact per capita GDP will be higher in US is not a reason to believe that is not costful for US, it is trmeodously costful for US, I mean, have you read the same newspapers that all in the world?
Stiglitz is being motivated for general facts around the world: poverty and deep inequality, and he is right when he says that the Tequila crises, Asian crises, Rusian crises and their effects around the developing world were not a problem for the financial system, now a financial turmoil in developed world is changing the opinions. The unfairness is evident
regulation and government are necessary evil when it comes to preserving the rule of law, private property and providing public services. i don't want to bargain with doctors about the price of surgery if i'm bleeding.
however, when it comes to the rest, to say that markets failed is wrong too. RIGGED markets failed. Scholes' "financial innovation", nothing more than abuse of the ever imperfect regulation, failed. if you want to set the record straight, let's first try to:
- banish the Fed, whose regulation of key input, price of money, got us into this hole
- banish the credit rating agencies. their idiotic or corrupt incompetence has exposed millions of hard working people to losses of their savings
- banish Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's of this world. what was their purpose again? how would a housing subsidy to the poor not achieve the same goal without this massive blow up.
- banish fractional reserve banking. greenspan puts and FDIC guarantees is why the people don't discriminate between the IndyMacs and HSBC of the world anymore.
Too many groups are claiming the "I told you so" prize. Unfortunately Keynesians are the ones who are going to win. Because when it comes to the rich and mighty, they are "all Keynesians now", since that's how they bail out their status quo.
Should not we allow some time before judging the Bernanke-Paulson bailouts?
Sorry, Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, But Quantitative Easing Won't Work.
In a Liquidity Trap although Saving (S) is abnormally high investment (I) is next to 0.
Hence, the Keynesian paradigm I = S is not verified.
The purpose of Quantitative Easing being to lower the yield on long-term savings and increase liquidity it doesn't create $1 of investment.
In a Liquidity Trap the last thing the Market needs is liquidity.
Quantitative Easing does diminish the yield on long-term US Treasury debt but lowers marginally, if at all, the asked yield on long-term savings.
Those purchases maintain the demand for long-term asset in an unstable equilibrium.
When this desequilibrium resolves the Market turns chaotic.
This and other issues are explored in my tract:
A Specific Application of Employment, Interest and Money
Plea for a New World Economic Order
Abstract:
This tract makes a critical analysis of credit based, free market economy, Capitalism, and proves that its dysfunctions are the result of the existence of credit.
It shows that income / wealth disparity, cause and consequence of credit and of the level of long-term interest-rates, is the first order hidden variable, possibly the only one, of economic development.
It solves most of the puzzles of macro economy: among which Unemployment, Business Cycles, Under Development, Trade Deficits, International Division of Labour, Stagflation, Greenspan Conundrum, Deflation and Keynes' Liquidity Trap...
It shows that no fiscal or monetary policy, including the barbaric Quantitative Easing will get us out of depression.
A Credit Free, Free Market Economy will correct all of those dysfunctions.
The alternative would be, on the long run, to wait for the physical destruction (through war or rust) of most of our productive assets. It will be at a cost none of us can afford to pay.
A Specific Application of Employment, Interest and Money
http://www.17-76.net/interest.html
Press release of my open letter to Chairman Ben S. Bernanke:
Sorry, Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, But Quantitative Easing Won't Work.
http://www.prlog.org/10162465.html
Yours Sincerely,
Shalom P. Hamou
Chief Economist & Master Conductor
1776 - Annuit Cœptis.
"Market fundamentalism": Is that like: Sacrificing work pay on a cross of derivatives, or the "cojones" whims of three mid-llevel japanese auto execs meeting in Kyodo over lunch? And you suspect little will be done this time about as well. "A more stable and prosperous and equitable global economy."