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¿Ha llegado el estancamiento global con deflación?

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2008-12-12

NUEVA YORK – Las noticias macroeconómicas más recientes de los Estados Unidos, otras economías avanzadas y los mercados emergentes confirman que la economía global se enfrentará a un recesión grave en 2009. En los Estados Unidos, la recesión comenzó en diciembre de 2007 y durará al menos hasta diciembre de 2009 – la recesión más larga y profunda en el país desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial, con una caída acumulada del PIB que tal vez supere el 5%.

La recesión en otras economías avanzadas (la zona del euro, el Reino Unido, la Unión Europea, Canadá, Japón, Australia y Nueva Zelanda) empezó en el segundo trimestre de 2008, antes de que los problemas financieros de septiembre y octubre agravaran la contracción global del crédito. Desde entonces, esta contracción se ha hecho aun más severa.

Ahora, los mercados emergentes están experimentando también el principio de un aterrizaje brusco a medida que los efectos negativos de la recesión en las economías avanzadas, la caída de los precios de los productos básicos y la fuga de capitales se empiezan a sentir en el crecimiento. En efecto, el mundo debe esperar algo cercano a una recesión en Rusia y Brasil en 2009, debido a los bajos precios de los productos básicos y una abrupta desaceleración en China y la India que será el equivalente de un aterrizaje brusco (crecimiento muy por debajo del potencial) para estos países.

A otros mercados emergentes de Asia, África, América Latina y Europa no les irá mejor y algunos podrían sufrir crisis financieras plenas. En efecto, más de una docena de economías de mercados emergentes se enfrentan ahora a presiones financieras severas: Belarús, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungría, Letonia, Lituania, Rumania, Turquía y Ucrania en Europa; Corea, Indonesia y Pakistán en Asia; y Argentina, Ecuador y Venezuela en América latina. La mayoría de estas economías pueden evitar lo peor si aplican los ajustes de política adecuados y si las instituciones financieras internacionales (incluyendo al FMI) les dan créditos suficientes para cubrir sus necesidades de financiamiento externo.

Con la certeza casi total de una recesión global, la deflación –más que la inflación—se convertirá en la preocupación principal de los encargados del diseño de políticas. La caída de la demanda agregada, mientras que la oferta agregada potencial ha estado aumentando debido a la inversión excesiva de China y otros mercados emergentes, reducirá abruptamente la inflación. Los mercados laborales deprimidos, con tasas de desempleo crecientes, limitarán los salarios y los costos de la mano de obra. Las caídas adicionales de los precios de los productos básicos –que ya disminuyeron un 30% de su punto más elevado en el verano—aumentarán estas presiones deflacionarias.

Los encargados del diseño de políticas tendrán que preocuparse por una bestia rara llamada “estancamiento con deflación” (una combinación de estancamiento económico, recesión y deflación); por las trampas de liquidez (cuando las tasas de interés oficiales se acercan tanto a cero que la política monetaria tradicional deja de ser efectiva); y por la deflación de la deuda (el aumento del valor real de las deudas nominales, que aumenta el riesgo de quiebra de los hogares, empresas, instituciones financieras y gobiernos en problemas).

Al hacerse menos efectiva la política monetaria tradicional, será necesario hacer uso de herramientas no tradicionales de política orientadas a generar mayor liquidez y crédito (mediante la facilitación cuantitativa y las compras directas por los bancos centrales de activos privados no líquidos). Y si bien la política fiscal tradicional (gasto gubernamental y recortes de los impuestos) se aplicará agresivamente, la política fiscal no tradicional (gasto para rescatar a las instituciones financieras, los prestamistas y los deudores) será cada vez más importante.

En este proceso se ampliará enormemente el papel de los Estados y los gobiernos en la actividad económica. Tradicionalmente, los bancos centrales han sido los prestamistas de último recurso, pero ahora se están convirtiendo en los de primero y único recurso. A medida que los bancos restringen sus préstamos mutuos, y los que conceden a otras instituciones financieras y al sector empresarial, los bancos centrales se están convirtiendo en los únicos prestamistas que existen.

Igualmente, con el colapso del consumo de los hogares y de la inversión de las empresas, los gobiernos pronto serán los primeros y únicos que gasten para estimular la demanda y rescatar bancos, empresas y hogares. Las consecuencias a largo plazo del resultante aumento súbito de los déficit fiscales son graves. Si los bancos centrales monetizan los déficit, la inflación seguirá las presiones deflacionarias a corto plazo; si se financian con deuda, la solvencia a largo plazo de algunos gobiernos podría estar en riesgo, a menos que se restablezca la disciplina fiscal a mediano plazo.

No obstante, a corto plazo deben emprenderse medidas muy agresivas de política monetaria y financiera –tanto tradicionales como no tradicionales—para asegurar que el inevitable estancamiento con deflación de 2009 no se extienda a 2010 o más. Hasta ahora, la respuesta de los Estados Unidos parece ser más agresiva que la de la zona del euro, puesto que el Banco Central Europeo se ha quedado por debajo de la curva en materia de tasas de interés y la postura fiscal de la UE sigue siendo débil.

Dada la gravedad de esta crisis económica y financiera, los mercados financieros no mejorarán durante un tiempo. Los riesgos de deterioro de los precios que plantean una amplia gama de activos riesgosos (acciones, bonos de empresas, productos básicos, viviendas y clases de activos de los mercados emergentes) perdurarán hasta que haya señales verdaderas –hacia finales de 2009—de que la economía global se podrá recuperar en 2010.

Nouriel Roubini es profesor de economía en la Stern School of Business de la Universidad de Nueva York y presidente de RGE Monitor (www.rgemonitor.com) una consultoría sobre temas económicos.

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josefski 07:53 22 Dec 08

and here I was, hoping inflation would decrease the value of my 80000 dollar student loan debt....sigh


tvselvakumaran 02:21 26 Dec 08

There are two economic situations where prolonged deflation could occur:

1. Globalization: In the last several centuries, there have been specific periods, each stretching up to several decades, when there were significantly increased flows of goods and services across national borders. During these times, the less developed countries had figured out how to produce goods that require older technologies efficiently. Hence, they could trade these goods at significantly lower prices. Also, improvements in transportation enabled the free trade of these goods. For example, the late 19th century was one such period. I quote from Professor Jeffry Frieden's Global Capitalism (p. 8), "From 1873 until 1896 prices dropped by 22 percent in the United Kingdom, 32 percent in the United States, more elsewhere. ... ... Prices and earnings declined but debt burden remained constant. Expectations of further price declines caused uncertainty and pessimism. More important, the price declines were not across the board. The prices of goods that entered readily into world trade fell particularly rapidly, such raw materials as wheat, cotton, and coal by 59, 58, and 57 percent respectively. But the prices of other goods and services fell more slowly or not at all. For example, American farm prices declined by more than a third, mining prices by nearly half, but construction costs stayed constant."

2. Depression: In a depression situation, due to severe miscommunication of price signals, the economy invariably goes into a chaotic condition. Firms lay off employees in large numbers expecting a severe downturn. The result is that consumers don't have the incomes necessary for purchasing goods. Inventories pile up and firms have to cut prices. However the more the firms cut prices the more is their losses, and they have to lay off more employees and reduce production. In the worst case, a quarter or a fifth of the working age population is unemployed. This cutting of production and prices and laying off employees leads to a downward spiral of contraction, deflation and unemployment, where these three factors reinforce each other. Thus there is a prolonged period of spiraling downwards, in particular a deflation in prices, before some external event puts an end to it. This was the situation in the Great Depression of the 1930s. During its worst phase, the GDP contracted by a third.

It is clear that the current economic crisis of 2008 would not lead to unemployment above 20%, nor a contraction of a third of GDP. Moreover, due to massive accumulations of capital, like social security and pension funds, consumers could continue to maintain their usual level of spending on essential goods even if they lose their jobs. Thus the re-appearance of a dire economic situation like the Great Depression cannot be cited as a reason for prolonged deflation in contemporary times.

Next, during the current phase of economic globalization, the phenomenon of 'China price' has been hitting the global economy since the 90s. These deflationary forces have been successfully managed so that there would not be severe destabilization of the global economy. This is the great contribution of Alan Greenspan, that he allowed the stock market to boom right into 2000, even though he worried about a bubble in the stock markets as early as 1996. China's supply of manufactured goods at low prices helped to keep inflation low, and enabled America to continue to grow with unemployment rates well below that specified by the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU). On the demand side, the wealth effect created by the stock market boom enabled consumers to keep spending so that the economy could keep growing, which in turn allowed an increasing trade deficit with China. Thus Greenspan's stewardship ensured that America and China developed a stake in each other's well-being. Moreover, the case for globalization producing a prolonged period of deflation this time around is not compelling at all, since the resulting deflationary forces have been successfully managed for the last 15 years or so.

So why are several famous economists still warning against the dangers of a recurrence of the Great Depression? Depending on their preferences, these economists are either advocating inflationary monetary expansion, or huge fiscal spending to the extend that the budget deficit next year could be a trillion dollars. These are in addition to the massive expansion of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet (from $900 billion to $2.3 trillion so far), the $700 billion TARP program, and the large scale off-balance sheet programs announced by the Fed and the government for rescuing financial corporations and buying all kinds of securities.

Well, it appears that a consensus has been developing among economists in the advanced industrial economies that by enacting massive fiscal spending programs, they could re-engineer entire economies of the West so as to shift their focus on manufacturing and construction, and possibly away from services. As Professor Paul Krugman put it in his recent New York Times column, Life Without Bubbles, "By selling more to other countries and spending more of our own income on U.S.-produced goods, we could get to full employment without a boom in either consumption or investment spending". Other famous economists like Professor Robert Shiller, Professor Nouriel Roubini and Professor Joseph Stiglitz have written in expressing support for a massive fiscal spending program with the goal of maintaining full employment.

Well, there is some strength in this argument. Infrastructure is definitely crumbling in many parts of the United States. It would be appropriate to recall here that not long ago, a large bridge on an Interstate highway collapsed in Minnesota killing dozens of people. Schools, public libraries, courtrooms, police stations, airports, railway stations and other public buildings require upgrades urgently. Moreover, potholes have been springing on most public roads, and the local governments have only been doing patch-work on them for lack of funds. Similarly, the manufacturing industry has been languishing for several decades now. So there is definitely a case for upgrading infrastructure and reviving the manufacturing industry in the Western economies.

However, I should also point out that expending all the political capital that the left has won in the recent elections (for US President and US Congress) on a one trillion deficit spending program may not be the 'best bang for the buck' (to borrow Professor Stiglitz's lingo). At present, the most economic benefit that the United States can obtain is to recover its standing among the world nations by conducting its foreign policy with vastly improved diplomacy. In particular, spending the far less amount of $20 or $30 billion towards Millennial Development Goals and eradicating poverty would improve the goodwill for America around the world. As a result, America would obtain much better long-term economic benefits by spending just 2 or 3 percent of the trillion dollar deficit program.


fujimoto 02:30 29 Dec 08

josefski: if you are a future doctor it will help you. if you are a future financier or even architect, it won't.



AUTHOR INFO

Nouriel Roubini is Chairman of Roubini Global Economics, Professor of Economics at the Stern School of Business, New York University, and co-author of the book Crisis Economics.