The Unbound Economy
Von der Finanzkrise in die Schuldenkrise?
Kenneth Rogoff
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CAMBRIDGE – Von der Königin von England bis zum entlassenen Autoindustrie-Arbeiter in Detroit fragen sich alle, warum viele Experten die Finanzkrise nicht kommen gesehen haben. Das ist eine unangenehme Frage. Wie können politische Entscheidungsträger so sicher sein, dass die Finanzkatastrophe nicht schon bald wiederkommt, wenn sie offenbar keine Ahnung hatten, dass eine derartige Krise überhaupt jemals eintreten würde?
Die Antwort ist nicht sehr beruhigend. Im Grunde besteht nach wie vor die Gefahr, dass die Finanzkrise nur in den Winterschlaf gefallen ist und sich langsam in eine staatliche Schuldenkrise verwandelt.
Wie dem auch sei: Der Grund, warum die meisten Investoren momentan viel mehr Vertrauen an den Tag legen als noch vor ein paar Monaten liegt darin, dass Regierungen auf der ganzen Welt unter großen Teilen des Finanzsystems ein umfangreiches Sicherheitsnetz gespannt haben. Gleichzeitig hat man durch die Anhäufung massiver Defizite die Wirtschaft angekurbelt und die Zentralbanken haben die Zinssätze auf fast Null gesenkt.
Aber kann allumfassende staatliche Großzügigkeit der Weisheit letzter Schluss sein? Die staatlichen Schutzmaßnahmen funktionieren, weil man den Steuerzahlern tief in die Tasche greifen kann, aber jede Tasche ist irgendwann leergeräumt. Und wenn Staaten – vor allem große – in Schwierigkeiten geraten, dann gibt es keinen Schutz mehr. Nachdem die Staatsschulden auf der ganzen Welt Werte erreichen, die man sonst nur nach Kriegen kennt, ist es offensichtlich, dass diese Strategie nicht nachhaltig ist.
Wenn dem nun so ist, stellt sich die Frage, wie lange man Schulden anhäufen kann. Das wissen wir nicht. Wissenschaftlich arbeitende Ökonomen haben brauchbare Instrumente entwickelt, um vorherzusagen, welche Ökonomien für eine Finanzkrise am anfälligsten sind. Aber obwohl wir Risikofaktoren identifizieren können, ist eine zeitliche Festlegung praktisch unmöglich.
Unsere Modelle zeigen, dass selbst eine massiv überschuldete Ökonomie sich theoretisch über Jahre, wenn nicht gar viele Jahrzehnte, über Wasser halten kann, bevor es zum Crash und zum Zusammenbruch kommt. Im Endeffekt läuft alles auf das Vertrauen und die Koordination der Erwartungen hinaus, die wiederum von den Unwägbarkeiten der menschlichen Natur abhängen. Wir können daher sagen, welche Länder am anfälligsten sind, aber wir können nicht genau bestimmen, wo und wann die Krise als nächstes ausbricht.
Das ist so wie mit der Vorhersage eines Herzinfarkts. Eine fettleibige Person mit hohem Blutdruck und hohen Cholesterinwerten hat statistisch eine höhere Wahrscheinlichkeit, einen schweren Herzinfarkt oder Schlaganfall zu erleiden als Menschen, die keinen dieser Risikofaktoren aufweisen. Doch oft können Jahrzehnte vergehen, ohne dass die gefährdete Person ein Problem hat. Gleichzeitig gibt es Menschen, die offenbar ein „geringes Risiko“ tragen, aber dennoch anfällig für Herzinfarkte sind.
Natürlich bringt eine engmaschige Überwachung potenziell sehr nützliche Informationen, um einen Herzinfarkt zu vermeiden. Letzen Endes aber ist diese Information nur dann hilfreich, wenn die betreffende Person behandelt wird und möglicherweise ihren Lebensstil grundlegend ändert.
Das gilt auch für Finanzsysteme. Gute Überwachung führt nur dann zu hilfreichen Informationen, wenn daraus entsprechende Reaktionen abgeleitet werden. Leider leben wir in einer Welt, wo politische Systeme und Regulierungsstrukturen oftmals schwach und auf kurze Sicht ausgebildet sind.
Tatsächlich ist ja keine Ökonomie immun gegen Finanzkrisen, ganz egal, wie sehr Investoren und Spitzenpolitiker versuchen, sich selbst vom Gegenteil zu überzeugen. Darauf gehen Carmen Reinhart und ich in unserem neuen Buch ein, das den ironischen Titel Diesmal ist alles anders: Acht Jahrhunderte Finanzwahnsinn trägt. Der aktuelle Finanzwahnsinn im Sinne von „diesmal ist alles anders“ besteht darin, dass wir uns keine Sorgen machen müssen, weil die Staaten sämtliche Schulden auf sich nehmen.
Bei jeder Gelegenheit wird uns versichert, dass Staaten unter der Schuldenlast nicht zusammenbrechen werden. Tatsächlich aber kommen Staaten auf der ganzen Welt mit überraschender Regelmäßigkeit ihrem Schuldendienst nicht nach – entweder sie stellen die Zahlungen gänzlich ein oder bewirken dies durch Inflation. So inflationierten beispielsweise sogar die USA in den 1970er Jahren ihre Schulden weg und verminderten den Goldwert des Dollars in den 1930er Jahren von 20 Dollar auf 34 Dollar pro Unze.
Die gute Nachricht ist momentan, dass die Krise eingedämmt wird, solange der Staat für die Schulden geradesteht. Die schlechte Nachricht ist, dass die Geschwindigkeit mit der Staaten Schulden anhäufen, innerhalb von ein paar Jahren leicht zu einer zweiten Welle einer Finanzkrise führen könnte.
Der Besorgnis erregendste Aspekt ist Amerikas enorme Abhängigkeit von ausländischem Geld, vor allem aus China – ein Ungleichgewicht, das wahrscheinlich den Grundstein für die gegenwärtige Krise legte. Die Asiaten erkennen, dass sie bei fortgesetzter Anhäufung von Papierschulden Gefahr laufen, das gleiche Schicksal wie Europa vor drei Jahrzehnten zu erleiden, als man US-Schulden anhäufte, die dann aufgrund der Inflation dramatisch dahin schmolzen.
Die Frage heute lautet nicht, warum niemand vor der nächsten Krise warnt. Diese Warnungen gibt es. Die Frage lautet vielmehr, ob die politischen Führer sie auch hören. Der Abbau von untragbaren Staatschulden ist eine Schlüsselfrage, die sich die Staats- und Regierungschefs der G-20 bei ihrem in diesem Monat stattfindenden Treffen in Pittsburgh stellen müssen. Denn andernfalls werden Königin Elisabeth II. und die Autoarbeiter in Detroit allzu bald wieder fragen, warum die Krise niemand kommen sah.
Kenneth Rogoff ist Professor für Ökonomie und Public Policy an der Universität Harvard und ehemaliger Chefökonom des IWF.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2009.
www.project-syndicate.org
Aus dem Englischen von Helga Klinger-Groier
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tvselvakumaran 05:29 30 Sep 09
The official consensus
Professor Martin Feldstein's latest article, "The G-20's Empty Promises" on Project Syndicate needs careful consideration. In his article, Professor Feldstein essentially adopts the "official consensus" of the economics profession on the current economic crisis. This official consensus, in its various mainfestations, has also been elaborated on by other famous economists, notably Professor Robert Lucas in his article in the Economist in early August, and by Professor Paul Krugman in his recent article in the New York Times Magazine. One characterizing feature of this official consensus is a confidence (a.k.a. triumphalism) in the certainty of outcomes predicted by modern economic theory. The main precepts of this official consensus are
(i) Professor Ben Bernanke, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, has at his disposal all the theoretical tools of economics that are necessary and sufficient to deal with the current economic crisis. As Professor Lucas explains it in his Economist article, if one were able to predict in advance exactly when a market crash would occur, it would imply that the market entertains arbritrage opportunities. Hence, it is not possible to predict financial crises in advance. However, except for the precise timing of the occurrence of financial crises, macroeconomic theory could explain the workings of the economy completely. In particular, to avert the recurrence of the Great Depression, certain actions were needed to be taken by the Fed -- the specifics of these actions were all clearly understood by the economics profession. However, it was politically untenable to take these actions before there was a financial crisis. Once the financial crisis occurred though, Professor Bernanke could intervene in the markets and take the necessary actions (in the Fall of 2008). These actions include the injection of several trillion dollars into the economy and making the availability of credit the cheapest possible. The actions taken by the Fed have now resulted in the economy avoiding a recurrence of the Great Depression. This is, in brief, what Professor Lucas has stated in his Economist article.
(ii) Thus in Professor Lucas' interpretation of things, the collapse of Lehman Brothers, for example, was necessary, in order to justify the intervention of the Federal Reserve in the functioning of the markets. The collapse of Lehman Brothers was, although regrettable, an unavoidable event. But, on the whole, monetary policy, even if it is a profligate one, would be necessary and sufficient to prevent the recurrence of the Great Depression, in Professor Lucas' view. Furthermore, the old wisdom of the Chicago School that government should be kept minimal at all times continues to hold, even in light of the current economic crisis. The Keynesians led by Professor Krugman, on the other hand, believe that Lehman Brothers should never have been allowed to fail. In their view, when the Fed's fund rate is at zero, monetary policy is largely ineffective for sustaining and stimulating economic activity. This is because of liquidity traps caused by businessmen who don't see economic opportunities that would induce them to borrow the cheap money available from the banks. Hence the government should step in to provide massive fiscal assistance to the economy by taking on spending directly, even if it means assuming trillions of dollars of public debt.
(iii) Professor Krugman scored a lot of points by pointing out that the current state of economic theory, highly influenced as it is by the efficient market hypothesis of the Chicago School, indicated that a crisis of such magnitude as the current economic crisis could not happen at all. This fundamental failure to recognize that an enormous crisis could indeed happen, calls for the overthrow of the policy that markets provide the best social gain when they are completely free from government interference. From first impressions, it might seem that the views of the monetarists and Keynesians are vastly different. However, it is important to note that in the view of the Keynesians too, once large scale government spending as prescribed by the Keynesians is instituted, there is again enough assurance that modern economic theory (although with a heavy Keynesian tilt) would be sufficient to deal with the current economic crisis.
(iv) In this regard, perhaps it is relevant to refer here to Professor Robert Shiller's latest article, "Re-inventing Economics" on Project Syndicate. Professor Shiller points out that the free market ideology fails to identify bubbles. Because of the belief that markets know best on all occasions, bubbles cannot occur according to the free market ideology. Professor Shiller's approach pursues a different branch of the Keynesian school of thought than the big spenders. Rather than advocate large government spending to avert a depression, Professor Shiller proposes using techniques from behavioral psychology to predict bubbles in advance. In this way, the socially harmful effects of massive misallocations of capital that arose in the case of the housing bubble or the tech bubble could be prevented in the future. In his other recent article, "Echo Chamber of Boom and Bust" in the New York Times, Professor Shiller elaborates further on the techniques that one could use for studying bubbles. Briefly, the process by which confidence or panic spreads in markets is very similar to the process by which diseases spread among populations. This outlook allows for introducing methods that scientists use to study epidemics into the study of bubbles.
(v) The Keynesians have also managed to re-write the conventional wisdom on the advantages of a strong dollar. Through the works of Professors Barry Eichengreen, Jeffrey Sachs and Ben Bernnake, a consensus has developed that attempting to support the gold standard was a major cause for the prolongation of the Great Depression. This has resulted in a viewpoint among economists that a devaluation of the dollar at present would help to reduce global imbalances by restoring the American manufacturing industry. The implications of this viewpoint were analyzed by Professor Feldstein in his July 2009 article "America's Saving Rate and the Dollar's Future" on Project Syndicate, with the conclusion that devaluation of the dollar would necessarily lead to a better future for America. Lost in this new interpretation is the fact that a stable dollar provides many economic benefits for America. The equity premium for American companies taking more risks globally, the transaction charges for providing market making facilities in global markets, and the provisions of liquidity for the currency of international trade are major drivers of economic growth for America, which derive from the dollar being the global reserve currency.
(vi) Some other Keynesians have gone beyond questioning just the free market ideology. For example, in his latest article, "GDP Fetishism" on Project Syndicate, Professor Joseph Stiglitz proposes a broad set of economic indicators like health, well-being and sustainability rather than a narrow focus on GDP growth. Yet other developments imply that the rest of the world is steadily moving away from using the dollar as the main reserve currency. To finance this new global reserve system, the IMF has created $250 billion worth of Special Drawing Rights (SDR), and the IMF has indicated its intention to triple this allocation of $250 billion in the future. It would need a strong commitment from the policy-makers in America to re-claim for the dollar its position as the predominant global reserve currency. However, judging from the writings of American economists like Professor Feldstein, it appears that the consensus among professional economists favors devaluing the dollar instead.
(vii) The official consensus is a result of a grand compromise between the Chicago School economists and the Keynesians.The conservative economists of the Chicago School would like to avoid the embarassment of getting publicly criticized for the failures of the efficient market hypothesis that this current economics crisis has severely exposed. So famous conservative economists like Professor Lucas have reached out for a consensus by indicating their willingness for a compromise. This compromise involves among other things, (a) foregoing raising concerns about the government's mismanagement of Fanie Mae and Freddie Mac, and (b) lending support to the Fed and the Treasury in their efforts to stabilize the economy, even if the methods that the Fed and the Treasury employ are highly inefficient. What are the Keynesians compromising on? Well, the Western liberal tradition has been intellectually bankrupt ever since the late 1960s. It is only the free market ideology of the Chicago School that has served as the driver of wealth creation in the advanced countries during the last four decades. Hence, the official consensus is a convenient compromise for the Keynesians to avoid asking difficult questions about the future of the Western liberal tradition. Instead, they would like to enact much drama in the media about the resurrection of their hero, John Maynard Keynes.
(viii) One other characterizing feature of the official consensus in the economics profession is a collective tendency to "Blame It All On Obama". The conservative economists blame President Obama for not focusing adequately on America's ballooning national debt. The liberals, led by Professor Krugman, fault President Obama for getting distracted from the left's free spending ways by concerns on the size of the fiscal deficit. In the confusion that has ensued, President Obama's own team of economics advisors has fallen back on the official consensus in the economics profession. Availing themselves of the security provided by this official consensus, President Obama's economics team has misled the President thoroughly in economic matters. To begin with, the President is only empowered to administer the nation's affairs for a four year term. The projections put out by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) for the deficits in the next decade are only a non-authoritative guidance for where the nation's finances would be, if current policies hold for the next decade. Instead, the democrats have been behaving as if the $9 trillion of additional public debt that the CBO projects for the next decade is already a given certainty. In particular, they have not been careful to mention clearly in public discussions how much of this extra spending can be attributed to the President's own spending plans in his current four-year term. Neither have they shown any concerns for taking the Fed and the Treasury to taks for their highly inefficient methods to stabilize the economy. Because of these instances of neglect, the public is not willing to trust the government in financial matters. President Obama has rapidly lost his approval ratings. Professor Lawrence Summers, Professor Christina Romer, Professor Austan Goolsbee and Professor Peter Orszag are directly responsible for this abuse of public trust.
(ix) The official consensus has also prevented economists from recognizing that President Obama's universal message of tolerance and justice, which has been received very favorably all around the world, actually opens up vast areas of economic opportunity for America. Unfortunately, it does not matter, for the economists, whether George W. Bush or Barack Obama is in office. The most they can do is re-work their models to favor Keynesian policies, and to argue that the policies they propose arise directly from their number-crunching methods. One might be tempted to attribute this widespread consensus among economists to stick to a narrow theoretical interpretation of the current economic crisis, to the certainty afforded by the mathematical models, which have become indispensible through the course of the 20th century, for the development of economic theory. However, this would be a big mistake. The official consensus in the economics profession is primarily a result of undue influences of power and money. It is much less a result of mathematically based economic theory. In the long-term, this attitude among economists of sticking to an official consensus is going to do serious damage to the American economy. Some other aspects of the official consensus have been explained very well by Professor Kenneth Rogoff in his recent article, "The Confidence Game" on Project Syndicate. I recommend that the reader go through that article. The official consensus is the single largest threat to a robust recovery in the global economy. The official consensus also gravely misinterprets the events of the Great Depression. The implications of this misinterpretation bear directly on the economic health of America.
josefski 04:47 13 Oct 09
I don't want to sound nihilist, because that carries the connotation that life is pointless. But, when watched from a distance, this is a lot of fun. I recognize that in the end it involves me too, but I have so little control over it that I prefer to come along for the ride. This too shall pass, right?


BillS 02:27 12 Sep 09
So, we'd better start raising taxes sooner rather than later? Given the change in income distribution since 1980 with a dramatic change in the top 1%, and previous tax changes, this sounds like the place to go.