In Search of Dynamism
Cómo la desigualdad alimentó la crisis
Raghuram Rajan
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CHICAGO – Antes de la reciente crisis financiera, los políticos estadounidenses de ambos partidos alentaban a Fannie Mae y Freddie Mac, los gigantescos organismos hipotecarios respaldados por el gobierno, a que dieran préstamos a las personas de bajos ingresos de sus circunscripciones. Detrás de esta nueva pasión por dar vivienda a los pobres había una preocupación más grave: la creciente desigualdad de los ingresos.
Desde los años setenta, el salario de los empleados en el percentil 90 de la distribución de los ingresos en los Estados Unidos –como los gerentes de oficinas—han aumentado a una velocidad mucho mayor que los salarios del trabajador medio (del percentil 50), como los obreros y los asistentes de administración. Varios factores explican esta diferencia.
Tal vez el más importante es que el progreso tecnológico en los Estados Unidos exige que la fuerza de trabajo esté cada vez más capacitada. Un diploma de educación media bastaba para los trabajadores administrativos hace 40 años, mientras que ahora un título universitario apenas es suficiente. Sin embargo, el sistema educativo no ha logrado dar la educación necesaria a una parte suficiente de la fuerza de trabajo. Las razones van desde la calidad mediocre de la nutrición, socialización y aprendizaje en la primera edad hasta escuelas primarias y secundarias disfuncionales que dan lugar a que muchos estadounidenses salgan sin preparación para la universidad.
Las consecuencias en la vida cotidiana de la clase media son un salario estancado y una creciente inestabilidad laboral. Los políticos perciben los problemas de sus electores, pero es difícil mejorar la calidad de la educación, porque hacerlo requiere cambios políticos reales y efectivos en una esfera en la que demasiados intereses creados prefieren mantener el statu quo.
Además, los efectos de cualquier cambio tardarían años en surtir efecto y por lo tanto no aliviarían las preocupaciones actuales del electorado. Así pues, los políticos han buscado otros medios de aplacar a sus votantes. Sabemos desde hace mucho que lo importante no es el ingreso sino el consumo. Un político inteligente o cínico se daría cuenta de que si se pudiera mantener de alguna forma el consumo de los hogares de clase media, si pudieran comprar un automóvil nuevo de vez en cuando e irse de vacaciones a algún lugar exótico, tal vez no prestarían tanta atención a su salario estancado.
Por lo tanto, la respuesta política a la creciente desigualdad –ya sea que se haya planeado cuidadosamente o que haya sido la vía de menor resistencia—fue ampliar los créditos a los hogares, especialmente a los de bajos ingresos. Los beneficios –aumento del consumo y más empleos—fueron inmediatos, mientras que el pago de la inevitable factura se podía posponer. Por cínico que parezca, a lo largo de la historia los gobiernos que no pueden resolver las ansiedades más profundas de la clase media han utilizado el crédito flexible como paliativo.
No obstante, los políticos prefieren expresar los objetivos en términos más alentadores y persuasivos que el burdo aumento del consumo. En los Estados Unidos, la ampliación de la vivienda en propiedad –un elemento clave del sueño americano—a las familias de ingresos bajos y medios fue el eje justificable de los objetivos más amplios de expansión del crédito y el consumo.
¿Por qué no emprendieron los Estados Unidos un camino más directo de redistribución, de impuestos o endeudamiento y gasto para la nerviosa clase media? Grecia, por ejemplo, se metió en problemas por hacer exactamente eso, al dar empleos públicos con salarios excesivos a miles de personas, aun cuando eso provocó que la deuda pública llegara a niveles astronómicos.
No obstante, en los Estados Unidos ha habido recientemente una alineación de fuerzas políticas poderosas contra la redistribución directa. Los créditos hipotecarios dirigidos fueron una política con mayor apoyo porque todas las partes pensaron que se beneficiarían.
La izquierda apoyaba los flujos hacia su electorado natural, mientras que la derecha veía con agrado a los nuevos propietarios, a los que quizá podría convencerse de cambiar de partido. La política de dar más créditos hipotecarios a las familias de bajos ingresos fue uno de los pocos temas en los que estuvieron de acuerdo la administración del presidente Bill Clinton, con su mandato de viviendas asequibles, y la del presidente George W. Bush, con su fomento de una sociedad de la "propiedad".
Sin embargo, al final, este esfuerzo equivocado de aumentar las viviendas en propiedad mediante el crédito ha dejado a los Estados Unidos con viviendas que nadie puede pagar y con familias excesivamente endeudadas. Irónicamente, desde 2004 la tasa de propiedad de viviendas ha estado disminuyendo.
El problema, como sucede a menudo con las políticas públicas, no fueron los propósitos. Rara vez lo son. No obstante, cuando una gran cantidad de dinero fácil liberado por un gobierno con muchos recursos entra en contacto con las motivaciones de lucro de un sector financiero sofisticado, competitivo y amoral, las cosas rebasan por mucho las intenciones del gobierno.
Por supuesto, esta no es la primera vez en la historia que se utiliza la expansión del crédito para aplacar las preocupaciones de un grupo que se está quedando atrás, ni será la última. De hecho, ni siquiera es necesario mirar hacia afuera de los Estados Unidos para encontrar ejemplos. La desregulación y la rápida expansión del sector bancario estadounidense en los primeros años del siglo XX fueron en gran medida una respuesta al movimiento Populista, apoyado por pequeños y medianos agricultores que veían que se rezagaban frente al número creciente de obreros y que exigían créditos más flexibles. El excesivo endeudamiento rural fue una de las causas importantes de las quiebras de los bancos durante la Gran Depresión.
Esto tiene una implicación más amplia, que es que debemos buscar más allá de los banqueros codiciosos y los reguladores débiles (y hubo muchos de ambos) para encontrar las causas de esta crisis. Los problemas no se solucionan con una ley de regulación financiera que le dé más poder a esos reguladores. Los Estados Unidos necesitan atacar las raíces de la desigualdad y dar a más estadounidenses la capacidad de competir en el mercado global. Esto es mucho más difícil que repartir créditos, pero es más efectivo a la larga.
Raghuram Rajan es profesor de finanzas en la Escuela Booth de Chicago y autor de Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures still Threaten the World Economy,
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2010.
www.project-syndicate.org
Traducción de Kena Nequiz
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jonbonanno 02:44 10 Jul 10
Silly me. I always figured it was the banks, now able to securitize the loans and sell them to unsuspecting Germans, who were the major supporters of subprime. But no, Barney Frank's good intentions were the root of all the trouble!
One wonders if people like Rajan actually believe this nonsense. Mr. Rajan, like they say in All the President's Men, follow the money.
If only bleeding hearts like myself actually had the power granted us by the likes of Rajan and Wallison.
richardcoronado 10:26 10 Jul 10
One thing is for sure. Attempting to solve the inequality problem by relying on education will simply produce more inequality. The evidence is found in our non-response to the growth in inequality over the last thirty years and in the profound resistance to help those on the bottom of American society in the midst of the current financially induced crisis.
This proposed solution is one of the refuges - certainly not the last - of scoundrels.
dbalmer 12:45 11 Jul 10
Here is another perspective about how inequality fueled the crisis.
Economists have described the causes of the great recession and the possible ways forward from a number of perspectives. One perspective that deserves more discussion is the concept of a savings glut that created pressures to seek yield. Viewing the great recession as arising from too much debt misses the other side of the coin, pressure to lend from too much savings. Borrowing has to equal savings. Three factors contributed to a large savings pool seeking returns through lending. An (1) increased consumer savings pool partly arose from tax cuts for which government had to replace with borrowing. The (2) financial system magnified savings. (3) Trading partner mercantile policies contributed diverted savings from emerging economies to the US. The following provides a simplified macroeconomic model of how wealth and income inequality increased and contributed to causing the great recession.
Macroeconomic analysis starts with four cohorts, consumers (C), businesses (B), government (G), and trading partners (F). To understand the following dynamic, consumers will be divided into two cohorts and businesses will be divided into two cohorts.
The two business cohorts are finance industry (Bf) and non-finance industry (Bn). Understanding the finance industry (Bf) cohort is critical to the following model. The finance industry (Bf) cohort is a conduit for matching savings and borrowing and a creator of an increasing level of funds for borrowing. Money is created by the Federal Reserve. Fractional banking magnifies the funds created. If bank reserve requirements are 10%, the fractional system provides an increase of $10 in loans for every $1 created by the Federal Reserve. The finance industry (Bf) cohort magnified Federal Reserve money creation even further by the creation of shadow banking units, some of which had reserves of about 3% creating $30+ dollars for every dollar of reserves.
For the consumer cohorts, assume a correlation between income level and savings. Stated simply assume low income consumers to be net borrowers and high income consumers to be net savers. Assume some percentage of consumers such as the lowest 90% in income borrow on net an amount equal to the net savings of the highest income 10% magnified through the finance industry (Bf). Whether 90% is the right number is not critical to the following discussion. The consumers cohorts are consumer borrowers (C90%) and consumer savers (C10%).
Some observations about the 2000s leading up to the great recession. Government (G) net borrowing and trading partners (F) net savings in the US were about equal. The finance industry (Bf) accounted for more GDP and profit growth in the 2000s than non-finance industry (Bn). Consumer savings were low and are assumed to be zero for the following discussion. Consumer income and wealth inequality did increase.
Here is a simplified description of what took place.
* Government (G) lowered taxes benefiting primarily the consumer savers (C10%) cohort. This increased the level of savings searching for investment.
* Consumer borrowers (C90%) wanted to buy much of our trading partners (F) products and services.
* For consumer borrowers (C90%) to buy these products and services, savings had to be made available to them.
* As we well know now, the borrowing of consumer borrowers (C90%) greatly exceeded their ability to pay from current and expected income.
* Savings was made available to consumer borrowers (C90%) through the finance industry (Bf) based on expected increases in new and existing home values used as collateral.
* Trading partners (F) on net ran mercantile policies. The US trade deficit (and current account deficit) was financed by trading partners lending to us. In other words our trading partners on net had dollars they wanted to save instead of spend.
* Savings flowed from consumer savers (C10%) and trading partners (F).
* The finance industry (Bf) was a conduit magnifying consumer savers (C10%) savings. Since the finance industry (Bf) is primarily owned by consumers savers (C10%), it can best be viewed as an extension of consumer savers (C10%). The growth of the finance industry (Bf) primarily benefited consumer savers (C10%) cohort contributing to wealth and income inequality.
* High finance industry (Bf) wages and bonuses went primarily to people who were in the consumer savers (C10%) cohort further contributing to wealth and income inequality.
* Non-finance businesses (Bn) were not major borrowers or savers.
* The flow of savings was to consumer borrowers (C90%) and government (G).
* The source of savings was trading partners (F) and consumer savers (10%).
* Trading partners (F) savings went primarily to fund government (G) debt.
* Consumer savers (C10%) (including finance industry (Bf) created money) went primarily to consumer borrowers (C90%).
* When home values ceased to provide collateral for consumer borrower (C90%) debt, consumer savers (C10%) and the finance industry (Bf) suffered the losses. The losses for consumer savers (C10%) were increased by the fact that this cohort was the primary owner of finance industry (Bf) equity and bonds.
What was the role of government deficits in this dynamic. If government (G) had not run deficits, consumer savers (C10%) would have had less savings and trading partners (F) would have had to make up the savings difference (or sell less) taking on some of the consumer borrowers (C90%) credit risk. Trading partners (F) might have been less generous with credit terms. Even if the great recession still happened the risk would have been spread more broadly between beneficiaries of the boom, the consumer savers (C10%) and trading partners (F). Interestingly trading partners (F) savings placed in government (G) borrowing avoided the losses that consumer savers (C10%) suffered as result of placing savings through and having ownership interest in the finance industry (Bf).
AnonAnon 04:02 11 Jul 10
Surely Professor Rajan makes a huge leap here - it was not inequality itself that caused the crisis, but a series of political decisions to "fix" inequality - and to regard the inequality between US homeowners and non-homeowners as somehow consequential, meaningful, non-trivial. By world standards - by historical standards - by humane standards, the condition of US non- homeowners should never have been a cause for concern and hand-wringing. What are the ill consequences of relative inequality when the bottom fifth is healthy, employed, well-fed and has access to all the opportunities and enjoys all the rights of the top fifith? It is refusing to ask this question, and merely assuming that "inequality" defined this way matters to anyone, that caused the crisis. In this respect, Professor Rajan is part of the problem, not part of the solution, because he will advance some other scheme to solve this triviality that will doubtless cause other harm (without ever bothering to tell us why inequality matters, and why he has any expertise to determine that a certain level of inequality that he designates is permissible, while a higher level is not).
bumticker 05:56 13 Jul 10
If globalization benefits the country but all of the benefits flow to the top 10% of the workforce while the bulk of the population suffers economically how should a democracy be expected to react?
hernando 07:39 16 Jul 10
R Rajan is right when he suggests that: "we need to look beyond greedy bankers and spineless regulators (and there were plenty of both) for the root causes of this crisis"
in fact, the solution is so simple that because it is so simple it is almost impossible to see it.
the only way to create wealth is through the production of goods and services.
the trillion dollar question is: ¿what is the social force that enhances the production of goods and services?. the answer is: the power of money.
¿in whose hands is today the power of money?: in the hands of a few people who operate the central banks worldwide.
as a consequence, the operators of the central banks, the House of Rothschild, have had enough ressources to obtain control of the agricultural, the industrial, the mineral, the financial and trade processes of the entire world.
the concept of globalisation is, therefore, an euphemism vis-a-vis a world economy under the control of the House of Rothschild.
now, the major asset in the hands of the world emperor is his control of all the states through the bosses of the political parties. they constitute his world aristocracy.
and through the control of the states he has the control of all the supranational organisations, the imf is his world ministry of finance, wto that of production and trade, nato his ministry of war and the pentagon simply his world policeman....
the 2007 crisis is a step to cover his world economic empire with a political umbrella, a world state.
just as the 1907 new york financial crisis was an excuse to create the federal reserve bank.
¿IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE WORLD EMPIRE OF THE HOUSE OF ROTHSCHILD?
the first question we have to answer is whether there is any reason or need to have the management of the power of money in the hands of any private group, be it that of the Rothschilds, or any other.
in other words, ¿is it possible to create a world project managers' bank to provide financing to producers of goods and services in all nations...at a fee?
governments would then simply become coordinators and guarantos of the liberties of individuals and nations...under the umbrella of a world nation.
then, we would start all over again, no public debts, no private debts.
should the House of Rothschild abdicate the throne, the world would move to the Heavens on Earth which has been promissed to us since times immemorial.
otherwise, it would be up to us to recall that liberties are not granted...we must deserve and conquer them!
Andrew 01:51 17 Jul 10
Banking and credit would not have had as much an effect as they have if a large number of the borrowers had been able to keep their jobs. Outsourcing or the shipping jobs oversees and technology (hisghspeed internet especially) have displaced many workers whose paychecks would have used to service those mortgage loans.
josefski 10:17 03 Aug 10
Throwing more education at the problem won't fix anything. I have a masters degree and can't find gainful employment. The education system does not create jobs, it just gives you a credential. But what do I know? I'm only a high school teacher.
hoppers13 06:44 20 Oct 10
"America needs to tackle inequality at its root, by giving more Americans the ability to compete in the global marketplace. This is much harder than doling out credit, but more effective in the long run."
How, exactly? Any suggestion?
Because like that is like saying that we want global peace
Nico 02:21 10 Jul 10
Hasn't this been refuted countless times? The subprime crisis was NOT a result of government policy, as the vast majoirty of subprimes were done outside the direct auspecious of the pro-housing law from the Carter Administration. If I am not mistaken, those individuals who bought homes under that law are those with some of the lowest rates of foreclosure.
I agree that the problem, fundamentally, is a question of wages and effective demand among workers. However, what is the solution? It seems Rejan is trotting the same ideological response, i.e. globalization, skills-upgrading, etc., to make these wages go up, but this has to ignore that millions of people in the thirld world now have access to the same education and still will be working for less than someone in the US. So, no matter how much you may upgrade, you can be replaced and your wages will remain stagnant or even decline. This is the reality of globalization, and its not surprising that a Chicago economist would dole out this 'contradictory consciousness' as a coherent piece of work.
Recently, Rajan's work has been incoherent, as Paul Krugman and DeLong show. Not impressed...
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