Russia's President Vladimir Putin was incredibly successful in achieving his goals during his first term. He strengthened the power of the federal government, while defeating big business, free media, the communist party, the liberal parties and civil society. Within government, he squezzed regional governors, both chambers of parliament and even the government apparatus, concentrating all legislative, executive and judicial power in himself. Meanwhile, solid macroeconomic stability and steady growth of 6.5% a year were attained.

Alas, Putin's success may lead to his downfall. He was fortunate during his first term because he recognized limits to his power. An avid reader of opinion polls, he tried enigmatically to be everything to all voters. Now, he seems to think himself free of constraint, but no politician is that lucky. Putin is violating too many rules of politics, and just cannot stop.

Putin is too jealous of power to delegate. Because he wants to make all decisions, he replaced a strong prime minister and chief of staff with two men unable to make decisions. So rather than creating a strong vertical command, he paralyzed his government.

One reason for this extreme overcentralization is that Putin does not trust anyone. Another reason is his preoccupation with secrecy. A true secret policeman, he relies on his circle of KGB men from St. Petersburg. His power base shrinks by the day, and his strangling of independent information makes him increasingly ill-informed.

The consequences were apparent in the school hostage drama in Beslan in North Ossetia.

Law enforcement failed the population. It possessed no relevant intelligence. Policemen accepted bribes to let the terrorists though. Russia's best special forces were sent to Beslan, but they were not given ammunition, body armor, battle plans, or operative command. The school was never cordoned off. In the end, local Ossetians stormed the school with their own guns and killed several special troops in contempt.

Incredibly, the Chairman of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Minister of Interior arrived in Beslan soon after the siege started, but hid doing nothing. Similarly, the two regional governors concerned refused to go to Beslan.

In fact, nobody from the government did anything. Putin and his government simply ignored the Beslan crisis, minimizing news coverage about it. Official statements came from a junior local official, who made himself a fool through gross lies. Obviously, such secrecy hurts Russia.

It is difficult to imagine a worse government performance. In his time, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev was ridiculed for only being interested in concealing bad news and not wanting to remedy problems. Putin now acts just like that.

The conclusions from the Beslan drama are obvious. Chechen policy must be revisited. The security forces should be cleansed and disciplined. Impotent ministers and governors should be sacked, while their offices should be given more authority. More open information flows and fewer KGB appointees are needed.

Putin, however, wants nothing of the kind. He does not obey the elementary rule that when in a hole, you stop digging. None of the culprits has been sacked, while the editor of Izvestiya was sacked as a punishment for accurate reporting.

Nothing is done against the rampant corruption of the FSB. Rather than give governors more authority, he demanded to appoint them himself. Instead of strengthening the government, he deprived it of his one of his best men, Dmitri Kozak, and appointed another unknown KGB man from St. Petersburg in his place. This is all harm and no cure.

Putin's rule is not only authoritarian; it is dysfunctional. It is too rigid and centralized to handle crises. Rather than address actual problems, Putin pursues his personal authoritarian agenda. This centralized police state is interested in little but its own economic and political power. It is difficult to escape the impression that Putin is more interested in pampering his KGB men than fighting terrorism. Because liberal economic reforms harm their interests, such reforms have been abandoned.

Ordinary Russians are not blind. They ask: "How can the appointment of governors be a means of fighting terrorism?" Putin is swiftly eroding the great authority he built up during his first term. This process can destabilize Russia faster than anybody now realizes.

The question is no longer whether Putin will really leave office when his term ends in 2008, but whether he will be able to save himself that long. He can probably do so, but will need to undertake a complete U-turn. He must sack his top KGB friends and hapless Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov. A return to democracy, regional self-government and free media are other requirements. He must also settle the Yukos affair and change his Chechen policy. Putin has the power to do so, but hardly the mindset.