Peter Singer
When Doctors Kill
Peter Singer
PRINCETON – Of all the arguments against voluntary euthanasia, the most influential is the “slippery slope”: once we allow doctors to kill patients, we will not be able to limit the killing to those who want to die.
There is no evidence for this claim, even after many years of legal physician-assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and the American state of Oregon. But recent revelations about what took place in a New Orleans hospital after Hurricane Katrina point to a genuine danger from a different source.
When New Orleans was flooded in August 2005, the rising water cut off Memorial Medical Center, a community hospital that was holding more than 200 patients. Three days after the hurricane hit, the hospital had no electricity, the water supply had failed, and toilets could no longer be flushed. Some patients who were dependent on ventilators died.
In stifling heat, doctors and nurses were hard-pressed to care for surviving patients lying on soiled beds. Adding to the anxiety were fears that law and order had broken down in the city, and that the hospital itself might be a target for armed bandits.
Helicopters were called in to evacuate patients. Priority was given to those who were in better health, and could walk. State police arrived and told staff that because of the civil unrest, everybody had to be out of the hospital by 5 p.m.
On the eighth floor, Jannie Burgess, a 79-year-old woman with advanced cancer, was on a morphine drip and close to death. To evacuate her, she would have to be carried down six flights of stairs, and would require the attention of nurses who were needed elsewhere. But if she were left unattended, she might come out of her sedation, and be in pain. Ewing Cook, one of the physicians present, instructed the nurse to increase the morphine, “giving her enough until she goes.” It was, he later told Sheri Fink, who recently published an account of these events in The New York Times, a “no-brainer.”
According to Fink, Anna Pou, another physician, told nursing staff that several patients on the seventh floor were also too ill to survive. She injected them with morphine and another drug that slowed their breathing until they died.
At least one of the patients injected with this lethal combination of drugs appears to have otherwise been in little danger of imminent death. Emmett Everett was a 61-year-old man who had been paralyzed in an accident several years earlier, and was in the hospital for surgery to relieve a bowel obstruction. When others from his ward were evacuated, he asked not to be left behind.
But he weighed 380 pounds (173 kilograms), and it would have been extremely difficult to carry him down the stairs and then up again to where the helicopters were landing. He was told the injection he was being given would help with the dizziness from which he suffered.
In 1957, a group of doctors asked Pope Pius XII whether it is permissible to use narcotics to suppress pain and consciousness “if one foresees that the use of narcotics will shorten life.” The Pope said that it was. In its Declaration on Euthanasia, issued in 1980, the Vatican reaffirmed that view.
The Vatican’s position is an application of what is known as “the doctrine of double effect.” An action that has two effects, one good and the other bad, may be permissible if the good effect is the one that is intended and the bad effect is merely an unwanted consequence of achieving the good effect. Significantly, neither the Pope’s remarks, nor the Declaration on Euthanasia, place any emphasis on the importance of obtaining the voluntary and informed consent of patients, where possible, before shortening their lives.
According to the doctrine of double effect, two doctors may, to all outward appearances, do exactly the same thing: that is, they may give patients in identical conditions an identical dose of morphine, knowing that this dose will shorten the patient’s life. Yet one doctor, who intends to relieve the patient’s pain, acts in accordance with good medical practice, whereas the other, who intends to shorten the patient’s life, commits murder.
Dr. Cook had little time for such subtleties. Only “a very naïve doctor” would think that giving a person a lot of morphine was not “prematurely sending them to their grave,” he told Fink, and then bluntly added: “We kill ‘em.” In Cook’s opinion, the line between something ethical and something illegal is “so fine as to be imperceivable.”
At Memorial Medical Center, physicians and nurses found themselves under great pressure. Exhausted after 72 hours with little sleep, and struggling to care for their patients, they were not in the best position to make difficult ethical decisions. The doctrine of double effect, properly understood, does not justify what the doctors did; but, by inuring them to the practice of shortening patients’ lives without obtaining consent, it seems to have paved the way for intentional killing.
Roman Catholic thinkers have been among the most vocal in invoking the “slippery slope” argument against the legalization of voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted dying. They would do well to examine the consequences of their own doctrines.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2009.
www.project-syndicate.org
For a podcast of this commentary in English, please use this link: http://media.blubrry.com/ps/media.libsyn.com/media/ps/20091113Singer.mp3
twizzle 06:45 01 Dec 09
The slippery slope argument expresses a fundamental distrust towards the collective democratic decision process. It holds that A will lead to B, then to C, and so on. But if A is wrong in itself, the slippery slope argument is unnecessary and opponents to A should argue directly against A. If instead A is, by itself, right, but B wrong, why does A necessarily have to lead to B? Why couldn't society be trusted to simply and firmly decide to accept A and reject B, if the arguments against B are compelling, while those against A are not? There is something paternalistic about the idea that society is necessarily weak and prone to "slipping", and must be protected against temptation by keeping it at a safe distance from sin.
By its indirect nature, the argument is also paradoxical in that it commands us to sacrifice the interests of the individual to some greater purpose. In the case of the euthanasia debate, it forces prolonged suffering on people in the name of preventing society from sliding down some future and hypothetical slippery slope. It is strange that such arguments are so often put forward by the most vocal opponents of utilitarianism!
jon 02:36 30 Dec 09
Doesn't this article itself give credence to the "slippery slope argument"?
It seems to me that the physicians went from i) giving dosages of morphine to terminally ill patients; to ii) giving overdoses of morphine (and another drug) to patients who were likely to die anyway, and who otherwise might suffer unnecessarily; to iii) giving overdoses of morphine (and another drug) to a patient who was either to heavy to carry, or too heavy to easily carry, and might therefore end up without medical care (but who would still be not necessarily in danger of either unnecessary pain or discomfort, and who was in no danger of dying).
BTW I am an ex-catholic, and are deeply unaffected by papal decisions, but having witnessed the way a licensed veterinarian lied to (about both the proximity and cost of a veterinary hospital) and harangued me into allowing animal euthanasia, then (as carried out by a subordinate vet) used an euthanesia method that caused my cat unnecessary agony (as attested to by a horrifying grimace that remained on her deceased face), I can only say I remain deeply suspicious of advocates for "euthanesia" (ancient greek for an "easeful death").
What is wrong with morphine / pethidine / heroin drips, and supply of anti-nausea drugs (where requisite)? The mere fact they may leave a patient semi-conscious, or even put them to sleep? Personally I would far rather be sleeping than dead, while I actually enjoy semi-consciousness when opiate-induced.
Jon Devitt.
twizzle 06:17 11 Jan 10
Concerning the "slippery slope" referred to by Jon (30 Dec.): if we believe it right to give pain-killing doses to terminally ill patients (1), but wrong to give overdoses of morphine to less imminently terminal patients (2), then why couldn't we decide to do (1), and not do (2)? What should make us slip? There are many things that we decide to do up to a point, but not beyond that point!
I too have witnessed a botched euthanasia - of a cat of mine - and I deeply regret not having been capable of preventing it. That means that we should find ways to avoid botched euthanasia, not euthanasia in general. I have also seen cats die as peacefully as possible, after much suffering, and in those cases I rather regret not having called the vet earlier. So the right place to trace the line will obviously always be a difficult issue, but I think it is clear that it is neither banning all euthanasia, nor accepting the useless "euthanasia" - read "slaughter" - of some sixty billion food animals that are killed each year in the world (plus the fish), just because of our pleasure in eating their flesh.
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SteveBarney 06:11 15 Nov 09
I would like to know if the Catholic Church emphasizes a need for informed consent in any of its doctrines, such as those that may apply to sex or children, childhood vs adulthood (age of consent), etc.