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War and Peace by Shlomo Ben-Ami |
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Crossing Cultures by Ian Buruma |
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The Statesmen's Debate by Castaneda, Haass, Rocard |
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Anatomy of the Global Economy by J. Bradford DeLong |
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Net World by Esther Dyson |
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The Rebel Realist by Joschka Fischer |
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Capitalism Then and Now by Harold James |
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The Peacemaker by Richard Holbrooke |
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Global Warning by Bjorn Lomborg |
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European Observer by Dominique Moisi |
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Of Might and Right by Joseph S. Nye |
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History in Motion by Chris Patten |
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Roads to Prosperity by Dani Rodrik |
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The Unbound Economy by Kenneth Rogoff |
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Economics and Justice by Jeffrey D. Sachs |
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Finance in the 21st Century by Roubini, Shiller |
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The Ethics of Life by Peter Singer |
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Transatlantic Perspectives by Feldstein, Sinn |
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I Dissent: Unconventional Economic Wisdom by Joseph E. Stiglitz |
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Against the Current by Robert Skidelsky |
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Awakening India by Shashi Tharoor |
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The Next Wave by Naomi Wolf |
LONDON – As Dmitri Medvedev waits in the wings for his inauguration on May 7, the West is examining his every word, eager for the slightest sign that Russia’s new president will be more “reasonable” and easier to deal with than Vladimir Putin, the man who got him elected.
If one is selective with the evidence, a semi-reasonable case can be built for those desperate enough to believe it. Medvedev was in his twenties when the Soviet Union broke up, and thus is less “contaminated” by a Soviet mentality. He is a fluent English speaker who does not have a secret-service background and has been dealing with the West for almost a decade as the Russian energy industry’s leading figure. Moreover, he is a lawyer by training – presumably instilling in him at least some respect for the rule of law – and his pronouncements and interviews thus far have been largely moderate, even liberal.
Unfortunately, however, words mean almost nothing in such a Byzantine country. In fact, Medvedev will be Russia’s most malleable leader since Tsar Nicholas II. While Medvedev’s liberal instincts are debatable, the forces arrayed against him not in doubt are: the Sechin clan, the Cherkessov clan, the siloviki of the military and security services, his rivals who he beat to the top job, and of course, his predecessor and mentor, Putin.
The irony is that Medvedev has almost no room for maneuver, despite holding one of the most powerful presidencies in the world. His popularity has been bestowed, not earned, so it can be taken away as easily as it was given.
For all his semi-encouraging talk, Medvedev has stressed continuity over change, and his references to Putin’s presidency have been as reverential as he has been obedient. He was chosen for his unquestioning loyalty, and it is difficult to envisage Putin playing second fiddle to a man who has been his underling for 18 years.
Moreover, Medvedev, who was at the helm of the state-owned gas giant Gazprom for the last six years, is likely to be constrained in a more prosaic way. Given Gazprom’s record of opacity while Medvedev’s was in charge, the existence of kompromat (compromising material), used as blackmail against him to keep his energy policy in line and others’ vested interests safe, is highly likely.
Gazprom itself will continue to operate as a non-commercial actor. Despite serious problems with extraction, production and depletion (production at three of Russia’s four major fields is already declining), the propensity to use hydrocarbon resources as a geo-strategic weapon trumps economics. And, with the resource boom fueling Russia’s self-proclaimed return to international influence, the Kremlin will continue to exploit its successful strategy of playing one European country off against another, aided by the EU’s lack of a coherent Russia strategy and a common energy policy.
The widespread misconception that Europe is massively dependent on Russian oil and gas explains its frequent appeasement. But Russia needs the revenue at least as much as Europe needs the energy. Nearly all oil pipelines in the region head west. While Europe accounts for 90% of Russia’ gas exports, Europe’s gas imports are only 60% Russian. Europe is seeking to diversify supply, and Russia its demand – though neither is doing so very successfully.
Perhaps the most worrying prospect is that Medvedev could learn all of Putin’s bad habits and none of his good ones. “Putinism” is predicated on the need for an enemy, and that enemy, at least since 2003, is the West. Medvedev is unlikely to try to change course.
He could, however, smooth over some of the rougher edges of Putin’s energy policy – a small concession here, a new deal there – but only at the fringes. In that case, the West will need to be ever more vigilant. Putin was a wolf, but at least he – unlike Medvedev – dressed the part. Foreign investors and EU politicians may not see through Medvedev’s benign disguise – or may choose not to.
It’s no use complaining about Russia’s strategic bullying when we are not being strategic ourselves. The West can’t change Russia’s behavior with persuasion, so it must try to use its leverage: make the Nabucco pipeline bypassing Russia a reality, build LNG terminals, include energy in Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, diversify supply, and screen companies seeking capital in London’s stock exchange more carefully. Our energy security is in our own hands, not Russia’s.
James Nixey is Manager of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, the London based think-tank.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2008.
www.project-syndicate.org
