The World in Words
The First And Last Soviet Parliament
Roy Medvedev
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MOSCOW: The attempt ten years ago to create the first democratically elected parliament in the USSR proved to be the most unpredictable of Gorbachev's reforms; the domestic equivalent, indeed, of his decision to allow Eastern Europe to break with communism. Gorbachev's other domestic reforms dealt with economic and cultural problems, even alcohol abuse; here was a bid to reform the system of power. Like much else about perestroika, it foundered on a lack of clear goals.
A former dissident, I was not only one of the first elected people's deputies of the Soviet Union and the Supreme Soviet, but also a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. After almost 20 years of banishment from work, even as a school teacher, I suddenly found myself near the seat of power in the Kremlin! As an historian, I saw this as a unique opportunity to witness history first hand. Let me review some of what I saw.
Communist leaders, first and foremost Gorbachev, expected increased democratization to strengthen the party's hand. Instead, the new parliament soon got out of control by passing laws that destroyed the Communist monopoly on power and undermined Gorbachev's authority.
The new parliament also provided an outlet to confront the country's mushrooming problems. Soon, the new Congress of People's Deputies, as well as the newly-formed parliaments of the Russian Federation and other USSR republics became political battlefields, unleashing processes that lead to the collapse of the Communist Party and the USSR. The fate of that first democratic parliament was ignominious – it functioned for only half its term and was abolished by Yeltsin's Russian parliament. But the fate of that Russian parliament was more dramatic – it was dispatched in 1993 by paratroopers under the rumble of tank fire.
Many people see those first democratically contested elections as the main achievement of Gorbachev's reforms. At the time, I did not attach much importance to them, as there remained so many ambiguities that continued Communist control seemed assured. I did not change my opinion even after I was nominated to run for election in Moscow's Voroshilov district.
Despite the district communist party committee supporting someone else, I was elected. Indeed, independent candidates like me won in 60 districts across the country, among them Andrei Sakharov. Evgeny Primakov was also elected deputy of the USSR from the Communist list, his first step into politics.
It was Boris Yeltsin, however, who enjoyed the biggest triumph. In 1987 he had been stripped of all party jobs; his political career lay in ruins. Nonetheless, he was nominated as a candidate in 200 districts. He ran in the biggest, the Moscow national-territorial district, which included all Moscow, and received 87% of votes cast. This success propelled Yeltsin back into big-time politics.
Because that first Congress lacked clear regulations and an agenda, Gorbachev had a hard time maintaining order. Gorbachev hoped to use the Congress to exert pressure on the conservative party apparatus, but most deputies, even Communists, declared that the wishes of their electorate, not party committees, were now their priority. The leading role of the Communist Party evaporated before our eyes.
The Supreme Soviet elected by that Congress was more tame. It dealt with routine issues, created committees, and discussed a lot of laws. But conditions in the country were worsening. Strikes were mounting. The confidence of the Politburo and Government cracked as leaders did not know what to choose from the numerous reforms being offered. The old clarity of ideology and propaganda was lost.
Meanwhile, the "velvet revolutions" ignited across Eastern Europe. The Berlin Wall fell. The Warsaw Pact and COMECON disintegrated. Nobody in the Soviet leadership knew how to react to these events; no clear decisions were made. International communism disappeared not with a bang but a whimper.
The upshot of this retreat was that dissatisfaction with Gorbachev increased among party and state structures, but their obstructions remained disorganized. Formation of a radical democratic opposition was much surer. A group of 250 people's deputies, formed in the summer of 1989, became the center of opposition. Sakharov became their unofficial leader, but Yeltsin was the most popular figure.
Attacked by Communists and radical democrats alike, Gorbachev found himself in a precarious position, one compounded by the fact that the USSR appeared to be coming apart at the seams. National Fronts were gaining strength in Ukraine, the Caucasian republics, the Baltics.
In the face of this, Gorbachev's political retreat continued. In exchange for introducing presidential rule, he canceled article 6 of the USSR Constitution which proclaimed the Communist Party's leading role. But Gorbachev did not have the courage to hold national presidential elections. He was, instead, elected USSR President in March, 1990 by only 59% of the Congress. Still, no one imagined that collapse of the entire system was fast approaching.
Gorbachev's choice to combine socialism and democracy was not all wrong, though many now denounce it as such. Our country needed democracy and economic reform, but few understood that democracy and the market economy are complex systems which could not develop easily in an unprepared social and economic environment. Back in 1971 I had a discussion with Sakharov who claimed that the USSR could be transformed into a democracy within two years. I thought 15 years of ceaseless effort would be the minimum necessary.
Soviet society was like a lake surrounded by high dams of totalitarian power. But the dams were worn out, threatening a flood. Pent-up energy had to be released, but cautiously. Gorbachev's actions did not create any reliable floodgates; they merely opened cracks in the decrepit structures of power. The gap between totalitarian and democratic systems remained too wide; it was impossible to jump over in a single bound.
Two years after that first democratic parliament was summoned, the Soviet Union collapsed but Russia's peoples did not turn to radicals of either the right or left. That commonsense alone prevented catastrophe, civil war, and conflicts among the former Soviet republics. Extremists of all kinds simply failed to capture the imagination of the masses.
So, even as the USSR imploded, Russia turned out to be stronger and more disciplined and realistic than many people expected. Such cohesion even in the worst of times has even allowed Russia's people to display new respect for the first Soviet president, although these recent displays were caused by the sad death of Raisa Gorbachev. Russia's history for the last 10 years has been harsh, but elections for a new Duma this December, and presidential elections next summer, will again demonstrate that our people have the discipline to persevere despite a decade of chaos.
Roy Medvedev is the author of the classic study of Stalinism, “Let History Judge”, and a longtime dissident.
Copyright Project Syndicate 2012
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