The World in Words
Expanding NATO is Unnecessary
Michael Mandelbaum
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WASHINGTON D.C.: Some time in 1997 the North Atlantic Alliance is expected to offer NATO membership to some or all of the four "Visegrad" countries: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. This would be a mistake, as I argue in my new book on European security, The Dawn of Peace in Europe.
The stated reason for expanding NATO -- to solidify democracy in the new members -- does not stand up to logical analysis. Democracy is not visibly threatened in Central Europe. To the extent that it may be threatened, the appropriate body for dealing with that threat is the European Union (EU). The EU is better equipped than NATO to help the Visegrad countries achieve prosperity, the best antidote to the poverty, unemployment, and ethnic strife that could subvert democracy in post-Communist Europe. Furthermore, if NATO is a vehicle for reinforcing democracy then membership is being contemplated for the wrong countries. Democracy is shakier, and the stakes for the West higher, in Russia and Ukraine than in Central Europe.
Central Europeans are concerned less about their capacities for democratic government than about Russian power and ambition. But NATO expansion as proposed will not effectively serve an anti-Russian purpose either.
Countries with the greatest cause for concern about Russia -- Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania -- are not to be offered NATO membership. Moreover, Russia is today far too weak to threaten them, as the Russian army's disastrous misadventure in Chechnya demonstrates. One day Russia will be stronger, and if expanding NATO to Central Europe now would discourage revival of an imperial foreign policy then, this would be a strong argument in favor of doing so.
But NATO expansion is not likely to make Russian foreign policy more peaceful ever. Russia's democrats, who have an enormous stake in a peaceful future, are adamant that extending alliance membership to Central Europe will isolate their country from Europe, strengthen Russian political forces that favor authoritarian rule at home and neoimperial policies abroad, and, by appearing to threaten Russia, provide a rallying point for reconstructing Russian military power.
Western proponents of NATO expansion contend that, in addition to bolstering Central European democracy and containing Russia, extension of the Atlantic Alliance to Central Europe is desirable because, there is a "security vacuum" between Russia and Germany. This vacuum, proponents say, will ultimately be filled by something, and so should be filled as soon as possible by something benign, namely NATO.
There is, however, no security vacuum in Europe. To the contrary, there is a new, unprecedented and highly promising, albeit still fragile, system of security in place in the wake of the Cold War.
The new order's parts are the changes that took place in 1989 and 1991 and the arms agreements negotiated and signed between the end of 1989 and 1993, including the all-European Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and the two Strategic Arms Reduction Treatise (START I and II) signed by the United States and Russia.
Those accords resemble Cold War arms treaties in form, but differ in content. First, they reshape Europe's military forces according to the principle of "defense dominance," making them more suitable for defense and far less so for attack. Second, they provide for "transparency," so that every country in Europe, as well the US and Canada, knows what forces the others have and how those forces are deployed and operating.
Establishment of this common security order is a major, and insufficiently appreciated achievement. It makes all Europe more secure, at lower cost and risk, than ever before. NATO expansion risks upsetting the network of understandings, assumptions and agreements on which this new security order rests.
Finally, the eagerness of the countries of Cental Europe to join NATO rests on a misunderstanding of post-Cold War realities. Europe is seen as akin to a medieval fortress, with the countries of the continent either inside its walls and safe or outside, isolated and vulnerable. Being inside Europe is thought to require full membership in the continent's two most important organizations, the EU and NATO.
That distinction was valid during the Cold War, but it is no longer. There will almost certainly come to be different degrees of participation in the EU. If there is a common European currency, Great Britain, among others, will probably not adopt it -- but will not cease to be part of Europe. In security affairs, as well, the "Fortress" metaphor no longer applies. NATO's Partnership for Peace, which offers close association with the Alliance without full membership (and which is acceptable to Russia), provides adequate guarantees for the security of Central Europe.
Partnership for Peace would cease to be adequate if Russia resumed an aggressive foreign policy. Then the countries between Germany and Russia would need added protection. But there will be many warning signs of the return of the old Russia, and thus ample time to meet the threat. It is, moreover, far from certain that this unhappy prospect will come to pass. Boris Yeltsin's re-election is a step in the opposite direction.
In the wake of the Cold War, the countries of Europe have something unprecedented and valuable: a common security order that includes all and threatens none. Their common task now is to do everything possible to preserve and strengthen it.
Michael Mandelbaum is the Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington and Director of the Project on East-West Relations at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. "The Dawn of Peace in Europe" was published by the Twentieth Century Fund, 41 East 70th St., NY, NY 10021, USA.
Copyright Project Syndicate 2012
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