The World in Words
Ukrainian Democracy and Its Cynics
Nina L. Khrushcheva
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MOSCOW – “A pox on both your houses” may be an appropriate individual response to frustration with the political candidates on offer in an election. But it is a dangerous sentiment for governments to hold. Choice is the essence of governance, and to abstain from it – for whatever reason – is to shirk responsibility.
But that seems to be the stance of the entire West regarding the upcoming second round of Ukraine’s presidential election. Because the Orange Revolution in 2004 turned out to be a seeming unending series of disappointments, most Western leaders are acting as if it makes no difference whether Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko or her rival, Viktor Yanukovich, wins on February 7.
They are wrong, not only about what the election will mean for Ukraine’s people, who have stoically endured so much, but also about what it will mean for security and stability across Eurasia. For, if the Orange Revolution demonstrated one thing, it is that Ukraine’s politics are not those of the pendulum, swinging predictably between opposing forces that agree on the fundamental rules of democracy. Indeed, it is patently clear from his own words that Yanukovich does not accept the legitimacy of the Orange Revolution, which means that he does not accept the bedrock principle of democracy that you cannot cheat your way to power.
Yanukovich’s anti-democratic position should come as no surprise. His criminal record is often noted, but the particular crimes that sent him to prison are never spelled out. Let me do it.
On December 15, 1967, Yanukovych (then 17 years old) was sentenced to three years in prison for robbery and sexual assault. He was back in prison three years later, convicted of manslaughter. But, for reasons that remain unexplained, the Soviet courts expunged his criminal record in 1978, shortly before he joined the Communist Party.
But in 2006 Yanukovich was charged with falsifying the very documents used to expunge his earlier convictions. Two key documents used to overturn his conviction for rape and robbery had been forged. Moreover, the signature of the judge in his case was also forged.
It is mind-boggling that an unrepentant, twice-convicted violent felon, a man who had sought to steal a presidential election – and who advocated a violent crackdown on the men and women peacefully protesting against his electoral fraud – should be a candidate for any office, let alone the presidency of a country of nearly 50 million people. Yanukovich’s candidacy thus reveals much about the nature of the people who back him, and also about the fragility of Ukraine’s democracy.
Of course, Tymoshenko is no saint. She carved out a successful business career in the rough and tumble of the post-Soviet gas industry. And her opponents have consistently tried to tar her business career with a taint of criminality. But not even when they controlled the entire apparatus of Ukraine’s justice system were they able to make any criminal charges stick.
What is more important about Tymoshenko is her record in government. Last September, the world stood on the edge of a global financial meltdown. In the year since, Tymoshenko’s government has consistently acted to preserve international stability, even if that meant taking political hits at home. Within days of the crisis, her government was in talks with the International Monetary Fund to secure a loan to backstop Ukraine’s economy against the worst, and reached agreement with near-record speed, despite domestic political objections to the rigor of its terms.
Although the whole world has suffered severely from the crisis, Ukraine was hit worse than most countries, as international demand for steel, which accounted for 42% of exports in the first half of 2008, collapsed. As the crisis gathered pace, Ukraine was completely cut off from international financial markets, despite sound public finances and low foreign debt.
One year later, Ukraine’s economy is turning around. After a horrendous fall in late 2008 and early 2009, industrial production grew by 5% month on month in July. Next year, Ukraine looks likely to return to solid economic growth.
Under tremendous strain, Tymoshenko’s government succeeded in keeping the budget deficit under control. Inflation was halved from 31% in May 2008 to around 10% today. The current-account deficit has been almost eliminated, and the banking crisis contained. Ukraine’s international reserves are a reassuring $26 billion, roughly one-quarter of the country’s GDP. The exchange rate has been adjusted, and, given international conditions, is relatively stable, underpinning Ukraine’s international competitiveness.
Tymoshenko’s government also made a clean break with the ancien régime in the gas business, increasing Europe’s energy security in the process. At considerable domestic political risk, Tymoshenko concluded a long-term gas transit and purchase agreement with Russia that is transparent and market-oriented, as well as a far-reaching agreement with the European Union, the World Bank, the EBRD, and the European Investment Bank on reform of Ukraine’s gas sector and gas-transit system. Yanukovich, whose campaign relies on financing from the main beneficiaries of the old, corrupt energy system, seems certain to undo these reforms, thus reintroducing grave risks into European energy markets.
Moreover, Tymoshenko managed Ukraine’s crisis despite the tremendous and often irresponsible resistance of her political opponents, who frequently paralyzed the parliament when the government refused to accept populist proposals that would undermine efforts at financial stabilization. Amazingly, President Viktor Yushchenko regularly vetoed decisions necessary for that stabilization, including every effort at privatization.
For keeping Ukraine afloat over the past 15 months, Tymoshenko deserves the West’s thanks, not the cynicism that we are currently seeing. Yanukovich’s record of violence and disdain for democratic norms is too entrenched to think that, should he win, he will ever allow his position to be challenged again. A victory for Yanukovich now may be the last free vote Ukraine sees for a long time.
Nina Khrushcheva, author of Imagining Nabokov: Russia Between Art and Politics, teaches international affairs at The New School and is senior fellow at the World Policy Institute in New York.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2010.
www.project-syndicate.org
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cherkasy5 03:57 03 Feb 10
This article by Khrushcheva is just one more slanted propaganda job straight out of Tymoshenko campaign headquarters, which contains the same shallow arguments that Tymo's academic lackeys have been trying to shove down the throats of the Western diplomatic community for the last 6 months.
Western policymakers, like Ukraine's voters, are not buying into Yulia Tymoshenko's empty rhetoric. This presidential campaign is a referendum on which candidate lies less and treats the Ukrainian people with less cynicism. Yanukovich looks bad until you examine the alternative. Underneath her thin rhetorical veil, Yulia Tymoshenko is an autocrat who is potentially the next Hugo Chavez or Aleksandr Lukashenka or Vladimir Putin.
At least if Yanukovich wins, we can be pretty certain that there will be another democratic election in 2015 where voters will have the option of voting him out. Whereas Tymoshenko's only ideology is gaining and keeping power. The democratic process or the desire of Ukraine's voters to hear an honest message means nothing to her.
dmytrop 09:59 03 Feb 10
TODAY - 3 days before the run off - Party of Regions with the support from the Communist Party and MPs loyal to Yushchenko approved with 233 votes ammendments to the Law on Presidential Elections, which totally destroys the principle of parity between the candidates in the electoral commissions and opens the space for mass falsifications and election fraud.
hat0891 10:41 04 Feb 10
I would expect more from the author, given her credentials.
The article is visibly biased and at times even manipulative. The author capitalizes on Yanukovych's alleged criminal past, but does not similarly mention Tymoschenko's, who even spent some time in jail for tax evasion.
I was surprised to read the author's praise of Tymoschenko for her for "keeping the budget deficit under control". This is simply not true. To gain more support, Tymoschenko pursued populist policies and irresponsibly increased budget deficit, particularly in the run-up to the elections. This was a major reason why IMG rejected issuing the fourth tranche of a loan aimed at combating consequences of the economic crisis.
The author tries to argue that Tymoschenko is the lesser of the two evils. I have recently came back from a research trip to Ukraine and I have talked to many liberal-minded pro-EU, pro-NATO people who were saying that if they have to choose from these two, they would actually prefer Yanukovych. Their rationale is that under Yanukovych there are more chances for Ukraine retaining a strong opposition, and therefore more checks on the government, than under Tymoschenko, who is widely described as more charismatic, but also more authoritarian and "Putin-like" personality.
dmytrop 01:53 04 Feb 10
Dear hat0891,
1. Yanukovich will stick to wage rises that were passed in parliament at the end of last year, which prompted the suspension of the IMF programme because the increases would boost the budget deficit. http://www.kyivpost.com/news/politics/detail/58502/
2. If "Tymoschenko is widely described as more charismatic, but also more authoritarian and "Putin-like" personality" - why there are "more chances for Ukraine retaining a strong opposition under Yanukovych? Looks like either the "liberal-minded" people you met are missing rationality, or you mistakenly equals prowestern (or just anti-Russian?) people with the liberal ones.
PS. Next time reporting on the results of your "research" in Ukraine, could you please focus more on beer and wine than politics? Thanks!
hat0891 03:40 04 Feb 10
@dmytrop,
I am not advancing a particular political agenda unlike you. I only expressed my feeling about the bias that contained in the article. Neither I am making impolite remarks about others (again, unlike you). I suggest you behave accordingly.
As to your arguments, you are missing the point:
1. In terms of pursuing short-termist populist policies, Tymoschenko is no different from Yanukovych. Both have pursued and will pursue populist short-termist policies to gain public support.
2. Some people in Ukraine (yes liberal, but not necessarily "anti-Russian", as you suggest) indeed feel that there would be more danger of usurpation of power if Tymoschenko comes to power, namely because of her ambitions and personality.
In their arguments they proceed from a premise that, if defeated, Yanukovich will end his political career and many influential figures from PoR will move to Tymoschenko’s camp, therefore leaving Ukraine with a much weakened opposition and fewer check on the executive.
On the other hand, if Yanukovich wins, his support base will still be limited to mainly eastern Ukraine
and will be kept under check by a strong opposition,
among them Tymoschenko
.
This theoretically may ensure that there is no usurpation of power by either political force.
FFTMMFA 04:30 04 Feb 10
hat0891,
So then wouldn't Tymoshenko be confronted by the likes of Yushchenko and his camp - they have split, afterall, and are not as chummy as they were in 2004. The hope for Ukraine is that Tymoshenko wins and the opposition unites around the more liberal (more liberal than Yanukovich, that is) Yushschenko. Such a scenario is plausible and would help to keep the flame of democracy alive in Ukraine. With Yanukovich, such an outcome is much less likely. Besides, who wants a rapist and murderer as President? It's ok for the Transdnieper, I suppose, but not a major European state such as Ukraine.
Regards,
FFTMMFA
dmytrop 07:09 04 Feb 10
Dear hat0891,
1. Yanukovich is already a weak opposition and finally must go. 10% margin in the first round against the opponent - prime minister of the country which has almost defaulted in the crisis? Secondly - how many Ukrainian "liberals" not warning you about Tymoshenko's ambitions have you seen in UKraine? Not many, I assume. This is the best check. As well as (potential) reforms conditioned on the international assistance.
2. Yanukovych was convinced twice. There are documents and you can easily find them online (if you read in Ukrainian). He is not denying this, BTW. So Yanukovych's criminal past is not "alleged", as you are wroting. Alleged is his criminal present and future - the stolen 2nd round of the 2004 elections.
So I'm not terribly polite with you not because I'm happy with Tymoshenko - she is really not saint at all - just because you are not an expert on the issue. Or just lying.
dmytrop 07:21 04 Feb 10
FFTMMFA, pure our opposition if it will try to unite around Yushchenko with his 5% in the 1st round.
chykulay 09:11 09 Feb 10
During 2009 our NGO 'Forum of Ukrainians of the Czech Republic'
conducted extensive research about the ongoing and serious influence
of ex-KGB and ex-Communist leaders in Ukraine's state system. The
results are extremely revealing, in terms of why NATO and EU
membership remain so far out of Ukraine's reach, and why Ukraine
continues to flounder instead of making headway towards a transparent
democratic system.
File for download http://www.box.net/shared/l7yz6xbabe
Scribd http://www.scribd.com/doc/24044731/LUSTRATION-or-Ukraine-under-KGB-Control
It is very difficult to raise public and critical awareness about
these issues in Ukraine, due to systemic problems with political and
media freedom...
Sincerely,
Boris Chykulay
dmytrop 12:47 10 Feb 10
Boris,
Thanks for the report. Its interesting.
Though correlation between the KGB past and the parliamentary present can not be seen from this analysis - it would be great to see how the voting on komsomol correlates with the KGB past of each separate MP.
Dmytro
hsgross 01:40 03 Feb 10
Would be tragic if Ukraine returns to a thugocracy.