Whatever happens at the end of the day, the debate about a possible war with Iraq has brought to the surface fundamental issues on which no agreement exists, even among friends, but which will not go away and cannot be ignored. Indeed, if they are not resolved among those who cherish liberty, the price will be high.

Three issues stand out. First, the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington of 2001 reminded us (in case we had forgotten) that there is a union of values called "the West." These enlightened values form the basis of the constitution of liberty and link the countries of North America, Europe, and some other parts of the world.

If a gap opens up between these countries insofar as the interpretation of Western values is concerned, this is bad news. Perhaps this has happened between the US and many Europeans; if so, the challenge now is to close that gap rather than exploit it, either for unilateral American interest or for enhancing European unity.

Second, defending our values requires instruments of power. Power may have become more diffuse in the contemporary world. Some even speak of "governance without government" because economic fortunes are in part determined without identifiable rulers. Yet traditional power has not gone away, and it is something more than the size of populations or their gross domestic products. Ultimately, power remains the ability to coerce.

In that sense, Europe has but modest capabilities. So, too, Japan, India, Asia's democracies, and the democracies of Latin America. Europe must rely on alliances to exercise power, and these are likely to depend on America for some time to come. Much the same is true among the Asian and Latin American members of the constitution of liberty. In this area, more than in most, wishful thinking is a deadly mistake.

Third, if the basic values in which the West believes are threatened anywhere, we must either be prepared to defend them or to abandon them without a fight. Of course, military force is only one way to defend one's convictions, and its use must be measured--but also timely. Appeasement at Munich in 1938--the "peace in our time" which really meant surrender to a vicious dictator--incited disaster. The eventual victory of democracy in 1945 came at a terrible price, and would not have come at all without American intervention.

All of this is relevant to today's crisis. The US is central to the values of the West; if it is attacked, we are all attacked. Iraq is a rogue state that has proved to be a threat to its own people and to its neighbors. At least in part, it has been known to seek weapons of mass destruction. There must therefore be a presumption in favor of the US line of action, a point made forcefully and persuasively by Britain's Prime Minister, Tony Blair.

To be sure, this is not the last word on the subject. But it is the first word. More than that, it is the first principle that should guide the actions of those who share the West's values.

This raises two critically important sets of issues. The first is that democracies cannot go to war without at least the tacit consent of their peoples. Citizens must be persuaded that the reasons (especially for preemptive action) stand up to scrutiny. This is why--even at this late moment--more must be done to make the case for war to the public in those countries that are prepared to fight for freedom.

Likewise, other democracies must be convinced; indeed, action has to be sanctioned by international bodies. This is why UN inspections are vital, and it is also why Blair and French President Jacques Chirac were right to support and strengthen those in the Bush administration who recognized the place of the UN Security Council in the process.

The second set of issues has to do with the conditions envisaged at the end of whatever action is taken. Talk about "regime change" is not enough. Talk about occupying Iraq for eighteen months or so is intriguing but insufficient. The occupation of Germany--and of Japan--after WWII followed intense fighting for many years, coming at a point when the vanquished countries viewed their defeat as irreversible.

Even then, it took much longer than eighteen months to establish viable democratic orders. There is also the question of whether anything in the texture of Iraqi society can serve as a foundation on which to establish the constitution of liberty in the Tigris/Euphrates valley.

Answers to these questions may be found. America's partners may provide them. An unfortunate analogy used in the Iraq affair poses America as the chef and others, notably Europe, as the cleanup staff. America breaking the eggs and others cooking the omelet would be better. Asserting Western values in a unified way and then assigning jobs to those who can do them best seems a more effective and dignified approach than the present spectacle of Americans moving forward almost blindly while Europeans try to look away.