Retuning Europe’s Franco-German Engine

Ulrike Guerot

BERLIN – Whether or not the French presidency of the EU, which begins next month, is successful will depend in large part on whether Franco-German cooperation can be revived. In that seemingly long-gone era, common initiatives for Europe were the rule, and a Franco-German proposal usually constituted an acceptable compromise for Europe as a whole. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 was probably the last masterpiece of Franco-German creativity.

But the two countries subsequently grew increasingly estranged from one another. France never engaged enthusiastically in the enlargement process, while the creation of the euro led to serious Franco-German tensions between1993 and 1999. France’s decision to abandon military conscription in 1996 while pressing ahead on nuclear testing did little to improve the relationship. The final years of Jacques Chirac’s presidency produced mostly deadlock, crowned in May 2005 by the French “No” vote to the EU’s draft constitutional treaty.

Of course, the Franco-German engine cannot function as before. The two countries’ haughty behavior – for example, criticizing tax regimes in Eastern Europe while themselves failing to comply with the European Union’s Stability and Growth Pact – appalled other EU countries, especially the newest members. So did their arrogant claim that they alone understood “political Europe,” and would therefore sew up deals – like that on agriculture in October 2002 – bilaterally.

Even so, the EU remains dependent on France and Germany as a driving force. They may have lost authority, but without them nothing much happens in the EU. So what can be done to generate a new sense of leadership around the Franco-German axis?

The election a year ago of French President Nicolas Sarkozy might have promised a new era of cooperation. But Sarkozy’s view that the European Central Bank should be subject to political engineering upset Germany, his visit to Moscow, because Germany felt that it was being circumvented.

Moreover, Sarkozy’s discussions with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown during his two-day state visit to London in March prominently featured a deal to use France’s considerable nuclear expertise to build a new generation of nuclear power stations in Britain – another source of discord with Germany. Whereas Sarkozy views nuclear power as a promising source of “renewable” energy, Germany remains adamantly opposed to it – a policy that Chancellor Angela Merkel placed at the top of her agenda during Germany’s EU presidency in 2007.

Sarkozy’s visit to London also produced a Franco-British commitment to promote the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), and in France’s case to send more troops to Afghanistan. But Germany too, needs to be engaged over the ESDP and Afghanistan. If Sarkozy’s presidency has any relevance to Franco-German relations, it may be to reinforce the view that the EU needs new leadership, and that it must still be based on the founding partners.

Indeed, closer Franco-British cooperation should be viewed as a positive development, for it pulls the United Kingdom once more towards Europe. And German-British relations are also improving. Further progress will become increasingly important as European responsibilities are placed on more shoulders: Iran, climate change, and the ESDP are all examples of shared decision-making.

But the larger geo-strategic questions, such as the EU’s relations with Russia and its links to NATO, require the attention of a larger leadership team, including Eastern European countries. Poland has that leadership potential, even if Germany will remain the glue between East and West.

Sarkozy has said that he wants to focus the French EU presidency on promoting measures to deal with climate change, reviewing European migration policy, and re-energizing the ESDP, in line with France’s decision to return to NATO. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty will probably start being implemented during the French presidency, with nominations for the future EU leadership, including a permanent president, and steps to shape the future European External Action Service, essentially an EU foreign ministry.

It is an ambitious program, and France will need Germany’s support if it is to succeed. Fortunately, Franco-German disputes, while often seemingly fierce, do not last long, and can even serve to refocus people’s attention on the importance of the relationship. For a time, tensions between the two countries rose to the point that France announced the postponement of the “Blaesheim talks,” a regular exchange of views by French and German leaders on European issues that began in 2001. In the end, though, the two countries’ institutional mechanisms of communication have held firm.

France and Germany, along with the other EU states, must bear in mind that the Lisbon Treaty is, in effect, a European constitution, framed to lead the Union into the twenty-first century, and that its success requires broader leadership. France must show during its presidency that it truly cares for Europe and its role in the world, and that the EU is more than a French tool. Building a new leadership team for the EU will be Sarkozy’s main task.