SEOUL – On February 12, 2013, North Korea carried out its third nuclear test in the run-up to the inauguration of a new administration – my own – in the South. Around that time, the Presidential Transition Committee adopted the “Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula” as a key policy of the new administration. Though the North’s nuclear test created pressure to revise the trust-building process, I made it clear that I would stay the course. Indeed, since its conception, the trust-building process has taken into account possible military provocations from North Korea, and is intended specifically to break the vicious cycle of provocations followed by compromise and rewards to placate tensions.
The trust-building process was formulated to overcome the limitations of both appeasement and hardline policies: while the former depended entirely on the North’s tenuous good faith, the latter implied only relentless pressure. The trust-building process, based on the strength of formidable deterrence, is intended to build sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula by making North Korea pay dearly for its aggressive acts while ensuring opportunities for change and assistance if it is willing to become a responsible member of the international community.