Monday, November 24, 2014

Abe’s Asian Gambit

CANBERRA – With the world producing more history than most of us can consume right now, it is easy to lose sight of recent developments that could have even greater consequences for long-term peace and stability than recent alarming events in eastern Ukraine, Gaza, and Syria-Iraq. The outcome of the nuclear negotiations with Iran, the change of leadership in India and Indonesia – two of the world’s three largest democracies – and the re-energizing of the BRICS group of major non-Western states (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) may all be such game-changers.

But Japan’s international muscle-flexing under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe may be even more significant. Unless it is very carefully managed by all concerned, including the United States and Japan’s other closest Asia-Pacific allies, Abe’s makeover of Japanese foreign policy could undermine the fragile power balances that have so far kept the Sino-American rivalry in check.

Japan is right to be concerned about China’s new regional assertiveness, and Abe’s recent diplomatic push to strengthen Japan’s relations in Southeast Asia, and with Australia and India, is understandable in that context. Nor is it inherently unreasonable – despite opposition at home and abroad – for his government to seek to reinterpret Article 9 of Japan’s “peace constitution” to permit wider engagement in collective self-defense operations and military cooperation with allies and partners.

But the risks in all of this must be openly acknowledged. Opposition to any perceived revival of Japanese militarism is hard-wired in Northeast Asia. Abe is an intensely conservative nationalist, still deeply reluctant to accept the extent of Japan’s World War II guilt (even when acknowledging, as he did in Australia recently, “the horrors of the past century’s history” and offering gracious condolences for “the many souls who lost their lives”).

His refusal to rule out future visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, with its war-glorifying Yushukan Museum alongside, fuels hardline skepticism in China. It also makes common cause with South Korea much more difficult, and heightens the risk of maritime territorial disputes becoming explosive.

Less noticed, but possibly more important in the long term, have been Japan’s efforts to reshape regional security arrangements, which for many years have had three key elements. First, there have been the hub-and-spoke alliances of the US with Japan, South Korea, and Australia (and more loosely with Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines). These alliances are accepted and well understood, if not loved, by China.

Second, there are national defense efforts, encouraged by the US, increasingly aimed at greater self-reliance in the event that China’s rise becomes a military threat. This, too, has been accepted reasonably calmly, if not always quietly, by China, and has not undermined the continuing growth in bilateral economic relationships that every country in the region is developing with China.

Finally, there have been multilateral security dialogues – the ASEAN Regional Forum and now the East Asia Summit the most prominent among them – designed to be vehicles for confidence building, and conflict prevention and management. These mechanisms have so far promised more than they have delivered, though not for want of continuing efforts to give them more clout.

For all of the hype that has accompanied the US “pivot” to Asia – announced by President Barack Obama in the Australian Parliament in November 2011 – the delicate balances involved in this basic architecture have changed little for decades. But now Japan, with overt support from Australia in particular, seems determined to change the balance by establishing, as a counterweight to China, a much denser alliance-type relationship with selected partners.

Abe spoke repeatedly in the Australian Parliament earlier this month of Japan’s new “special relationship” with Australia – terminology normally associated only with the strongest of alliance partnerships – and followed his address by signing an agreement for the transfer of defense equipment and technology.

Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott, who earlier this year described Japan as both our “best friend in Asia” and a “strong ally,” has warmly embraced the “special relationship” language. He consummated the love-in by expressing his admiration for “the skill and sense of honor” of the Japanese submariners who died attacking Sydney Harbor in 1942, while saying of Japan’s waging of aggressive war and wartime atrocities only that “we disagreed with what they did.”

We have not yet seen any renewed attempt to re-establish the “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,” comprising Japan, Australia, the US, and India, which conducted joint military exercises in 2007 and was seen by China as a hostile containment enterprise. But it is not hard to imagine that this is still very much on Abe’s wish list.

The dangers should not be exaggerated. But, with strategic competition between the US and China as delicately poised as it is, and with the economic interests of Australia, Japan, and many others in the region bound up just as intensely with China as their security interests are with the US, rocking the boat carries serious risks.

Countries like ours should take a clear stand when China overreaches externally (as it has in the South China Sea with its indefensible “nine-dashed line” asserting historical rights with no known justification in international law). The same applies when China does not behave like a good international citizen on the UN Security Council, or should it commit egregious human-rights violations at home.

But we should be cautious about moving beyond taking stands to taking sides in the region to a greater extent than has been the norm for decades. Kishore Mahbubani has argued recently that we need to recognize that in China, as elsewhere, a significant internal contest between hard- and softer-liners is taking place. To the extent that this is the case, it is smart policy for every state in the region to speak and act in a way that helps the doves and gives no encouragement to the hawks.

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    1. Commentedkiers sohn

      (Sorry for follow on post)
      Actually, I think the US has made it's choice: China first, Japan second.

      SInce the restart of the cold war, China is still more important to the US than Japan. Economically also China provides cheap labor to US corporations and there's favorable tax treatment of US corporations keeping money outside.

      That the "alliance" of Australia and India with Japan to counter China constitutes "lip service" from the US (a false front action) is evident by looking at the actors: Australia is China's biggest trading partner and Coal supplier and India, in all things, leaves a LOT to be desired except in providing massive amounts of laborers. The US probably won't mind if Australia makes a few more $$s selling Japan some minor arms under this "alliance".

      And Japan, having been under US protective umbrella so long will have a very hard time to "come out" of it. Sorry Japan.

    2. Commentedkiers sohn

      For the first time (thanks to this article) US policy on China has been made clear: to ride out the "marriage" between the worlds biggest communist country and worlds biggest democracy (and vocally proud of it) as long as circumstances allow and corporate profits dictate. In other words there is no policy.

      I think the Game of Co-opetition played by the US with China (cooperation and competition) is running out of wiggle room. Another sign of waning global influence.

      Picking sides is inevitable, unless US thinks it can gracefully "manage to bat down" it's Allies like Japan, Australia, India.

      Frame the argument with Economics: China has opened up belligerence in international policy as a classic counter to a slowing domestic economy (not that you'd hear that in the international press or "official" chinese GDP figures). It makes sense politically: Chinese leadership gets to deflect attention and consolidate it's public support. It makes sense economically: keynesian spending on military during a down cycle.

      For Japan, on the receiving end, there is no economic ability to balance it's economic down cycles with keynesian spending on the military: the post WWII consitutional arrangement with the US forbids it. And yet it must respond.

      The US better get some policy clear here. Either way it will lose something. Good luck reigning in China. So far the US has shown no inclination whatsoever to tell China anything, even providing oil from the newly conquered Iraq to China.

    3. Commentedj. von Hettlingen

      Mr. Evans, when you wrote "Abe's Asian Gambit", days after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit to Australia earlier this month, did you know that Abe would be visiting Latin America too? His visit comes shortly after China's Xi Jinping ended his trip there. Abe is visiting Latin America with the intention to wrestle with China for influence in the region and get support for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.
      During a brief term as prime minister in 2006-7, Abe visited India and stressed the need for a strategic and global partnership with India to strengthen ties between the two countries. India and Japan were fostering a strategic relationship aimed at countering China. Already seven years ago Abe favoured an alliance - a “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue” - between Japan, Australia, the United States and India. A "joint military exercises" was conducted in 2007 and "was seen by China as a hostile containment enterprise". No doubt this plan is "still very much on Abe’s wish list".
      Abe was in Australia over two weeks ago, seen by many as drawing Australia to his side and trying to contain China. Abbott chose to compromise for myopic policies and pandered to an revisionist Japan, "by signing an agreement for the transfer of defense equipment and technology". Without remorse Abe delivered a speech in the Australian parliament and hypocritically vowed never to repeat history.
      Australia plays a crucial role in "Abe's Asian Gambit". In Abbott, Abe has found a soul mate and a source of friendship that is palpably absent from his testy relationships with the leaders of China and South Korea. Due to his unapologetic brand of nationalism he is hardly on speaking terms with China's Xi Jinping and South Korea's Pakr Geun-hye.
      Abe’s mission to forge a military alliance has been welcomed by Australia and other countries in the region, which are alarmed by China’s swift, and opaque, military build-up. Abbot's vociferous support came as no surprise. The Japan-Australia relationship has transformed in the seven decades since the end of the second world war.
      China may be Australia’s biggest trading partner, but there was a time when Tokyo and Canberra’s economic and diplomatic interests converged so seamlessly. Today Australia is Japan's second-biggest trading partner and Abe has long wanted to complete an unfinished business - the conclusion of a free-trade deal with Australia. His maternal grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, was Japan’s prime minister when he signed a commercial pact with his Australian counterpart Robert Menzies in 1957. No doubt Abe and Abbot had reason to celebrate this "special friendship", which Abe saw as his political rehabilitation. Abbot was ingenious by pouring out his "admiration for 'the skill and sense of honor' of the Japanese submariners who died attacking Sydney Harbor in 1942".

    4. CommentedYoshimichi Moriyama

      Abe is not aiming at greater military self-reliance; he is simply shoring up Japan's efforts for better coordination with the United States' pivot to East Asia. It is far beyond Japan's power to alter or undermine the power balance in this region, and no Japanese politician could muster domestic support for that if he/she dared; strong opposition would soon arise and mount up from across the country, even from the ruling party. As a matter of fact, Abe's reinterpretation of the article nine made his approval rating fall.

      The Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP or the ruling party) has not reinterpreted the interpretation of the Supreme Court. It has reinterpreted its own interpretation. I would like anyone, if interested, to read Michi's six comments to Tom Clifford/The Samurai Stirs/On Line Opinion (