BERLIN – Revolutions, it is said, almost always devour their children. Obviously, this is also true for the “color revolutions” – first in Georgia, and now in Ukraine, where President Viktor Yushchenko, the hero of the “Orange Revolution” in 2004, was voted out in the first round of presidential elections a few weeks ago, having received less than 6% of the vote.

By that point, Ukraine’s springtime of freedom had already deteriorated into a very visible development standstill, owing to a mixture of incompetence and corruption that cried out for change. Regardless of which of the remaining candidates will be elected in the upcoming runoff – the incumbent Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko or Viktor Yanukovich – the Orange Revolution will have come to an end.

So it is worth looking back to the hopes that were linked to those wonderfully expectant days and nights on Maidan Square in the center of Kiev, and to Yushchenko’s electoral victory. It was a victory of democracy and independence over electoral fraud and naked power.

But what happened in the winter of 2004/2005 was not only about the Ukrainian people’s democratic right to self-determination and their national independence, but also about the future of the European order as it had emerged from the Cold War’s end. At the time, Europe immediately understood the challenge and reacted effectively. The elections had to be repeated, and democracy won.

Was this, in hindsight, all in vain? By no means! Although Ukraine is in big economic and social trouble, it should not be forgotten that it has, until today, been saved from the fate of becoming a “guided” democracy in the Russian mold.

Independent media and freedom of speech have not been restricted in Ukraine, and elections since 2004 have been judged free and fair by both international observers and the parties themselves. All this cannot be taken for granted in Eastern Europe.

Moreover, regardless of who wins the presidential runoff, fears about Ukraine’s independence will not, in contrast to 2004/2005, be an issue. This too, is a step forward that should not be underestimated.

Frustrated by Ukraine’s immobilism and corruption, Europe has turned away from the country – a stance that could turn out to be a significant strategic mistake. Ukraine is one of the cornerstones on which the European order rests after the Cold War. Europe and Russia meet in Ukraine, and its fate will not only be a crucial factor in defining European security, but will also play a substantial role in future European-Russian relations.

With an independent, democratic Ukraine, European-Russian relations will have a completely different, and much more positive, character than if its role were to fundamentally change and history be reversed. So the future of this big country is of great importance to Europe; in view of its own interests, therefore, Europe cannot afford an emotionally frustrated reaction.

Rather, the opposite is needed: massive economic and political investment, and closer cooperation. Dealing with Ukraine will take patience and perseverance, but there is too much at stake to choose any other path.

This means that, when considering a “new eastern policy,” the European Union must focus first and foremost on Ukraine. The EU’s eastern member states, in particular, must not lose their interest in Ukraine's future, otherwise the Union as a whole may soon do the same.

Here, Germany and Poland will play a central role, for both belong to the EU’s six big member states and have the necessary strategic awareness of Ukraine’s importance for Europe. By contrast, the interests of France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain don’t point in this direction. This was another lesson learned in 2004. Only if Germany and Poland, together with the smaller eastern member states, jointly advocate such an “eastern” and neighborhood policy towards Ukraine, will EU policy as a whole receive the necessary power and perseverance.

Thus, whether Europe effectively pursues its own interests in Eastern Europe will depend on coordination between the governments in Berlin and Warsaw, and between them and the EU in Brussels and the other member states. Germany and Poland should also jointly make sure that Europe’s interest in an independent and democratic Ukraine is not directed against anyone — not just in Kiev, but also in Moscow.

Germany’s new foreign minister has spoken of trying to recreate the old “Weimar Triangle” of France, Germany, and Poland. That will not work, primarily because France shows little interest, and it is an idea whose time is past. But cooperation on Ukraine might eventually lead to the creation of a far more meaningful Germany-Poland-Russia triangle that could give a new stimulus to Europe’s eastern policy.

Copyright: Project Syndicate/Institute of Human Sciences, 2010.
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