ROME: What does the future hold for transatlantic relations? That question arises with every new American administration. Because worries about a “widening Atlantic” gap have existed since the early 1970s, it is tempting to proceed as if transatlantic relations will remain on roughly the same wavelength as before. The truth is, however, that the US and the EU are rapidly evolving along their own paths: both sides of the Atlantic thus face the challenge of managing an ever more complex relationship.

Two other temptations must also be resisted. On the European side is the temptation to speed the emergence of the Union as an international actor by constantly claiming autonomy or independence from the US. Lingering anti-American undertones, of course, will invariably surface for, as in any long unbalanced relationship, the junior partner will tend to make declaratory statements that generate misperceptions.

Europeans should not succumb to this temptation, for the move from dependency to equal partnership is not measured by rhetoric. Instead, Europeans must assume a fairer share of the transatlantic burden, putting in place a truly common European foreign policy, and think and act as a regional power with a global outreach. If the Euro succeeds as a global currency, which I believe it will, and if Europe’s rapid reaction force becomes a reality soon, as I also think it will, the EU will have secured the preconditions for a more equal partnership – literally by putting its money (and soldiers) where its mouth is.

On the American side, the temptation is to overplay its “sole superpower” role by acting unilaterally. But this is loneliness disguised as leadership and is not in America’s interest. National interests can no longer be effectively pursued unilaterally; US global interests are served best by multilateral action and bodies.

Even if, in military terms, America remains the sole superpower, military might is of limited use in the daily conduct of foreign policy. America would benefit not less than Europe from an effective system of global governance in the achievement of its goals – be it freer trade, a viable non-proliferation regime, containment and prevention of regional conflicts, or better regulated financial markets. To this end, the US has a vital stake in the EU’s coming of age as an international actor. It should therefore do away with the traditional ambivalence of demanding a more mature and active Europe on one hand, all the time feeling uncomfortable with it on the other.

True, America officially welcomed the launching of a common European security and defense policy. But recurring signs of US nervousness about the nature of this process exist. Americans often ask whether it is all about better European capabilities – which would be fine for NATO – or about European integration (i.e. instrumental to a political project). My response is that it is about both, and that Washington should support both. A sober assessment of this process leads me to assert that a more capable and united Europe will usher in a more effective Atlantic Alliance and not, as some believe, in American disengagement from European commitments.

What the EU aims at is not a duplication of NATO structures or an alternative to the Atlantic Alliance. The EU is preparing to deal – jointly with US forces or with purely European forces when NATO as a whole decides not to engage – with crises in and around Europe. More than defense – which will remain NATO-centered – Europe is building up its security role as a regional stabilizer: a role that EU enlargement to include candidate countries in Central and Eastern Europe will strengthen.

For, contrary to what is often said in America’s Congress, Europe already bears the lion’s share of the peacekeeping burden (let alone reconstruction aid) in the Balkans. It goes without saying that there should be “no taxation without representation.” If Europe’s foreign and defense policies succeed, NATO should become more European. Washington, however, should not worry about this: if Europeans see the Alliance as a more European organization they are more likely to commit themselves (in budgetary terms, too) to its success.

A similar logic of partnership applies to enlargement. The concept of Europe is not immutable, and rightly so. On the basis of a broad notion of security and stability, EU enlargement is every bit as important as deepening the EU. Here a common transatlantic approach to both EU and NATO enlargement would enhance stabilization and integration in post-Cold War Europe – to everyone’s benefit.

A new and functional division of labor between Europeans and Americans is thus conceivable, provided it retains the framework of common political commitments and shared responsibilities. What should not be pursued is a rigid, vertical and artificial division of labor, whereby the US plays the lone global leader (with Europe simply following) while the EU concentrates exclusively on enlarging its “house” (with the US disengaging from Continental security). This would be unhealthy and make the transatlantic compound unsustainable.

The antidote is a genuine sharing of choices and decisions. If divisive decisions must be taken, healthy partnership requires that they be discussed openly and honestly. A case in point is the issue of National Missile Defense. No matter what policy the Bush administration adopts, European reservations and doubts should be taken into account.

If Europeans want to have some influence here, they must play a unitary role by, say, encouraging America to update the ABM Treaty in agreement with Moscow. That would help strategic stability, prevent antagonizing Russia (which remains a fundamental factor in European security) and avoid deteriorating the security climate in Asia. The same is true of dealing with so-called “rogue States”: here again, a better combination of US and European strategies could produce a more effective approach, based on a blend of engagement and resolve.

A new division of labor, and a new sharing of responsibilities, depends as much on economics as on security. A stable Euro makes stronger cooperation possible and desirable: not only to prevent global financial instability but to avoid the risk of conflicting currency blocs arising. Provided that the Bush Administration pragmatically pushes for more trade liberalization, we will be able to deepen transatlantic market integration, which will act as a boost for our economies. Scope will also then exist for revitalizing the WTO, for which a strong European-American commitment is a necessary precondition, though not the entire solution.

Here a serious reassessment of our negotiating tactics and old habits is needed. The WTO, but also the IMF and World Bank, must understand the evolving needs of those societies most vulnerable to the impact of globalization. We need to reach out to the rest of the world in a more open and persuasive way. The G-8 process, which Italy chairs this year, will test such resolve - on which rests the legitimacy of the entire process.

A renewed Euro-American partnership based on our own respective styles and instruments in foreign policy will benefit both sides. The EU is rightly searching for its identity as a collective actor. As Europe changes, so too does America – in terms of its demographic and social composition, economic and political structures, geopolitical orientation and national psychology. Granted, transatlantic diversity might cause occasional squabbles. However, mutual interaction and equal partnership remain the only response – especially if they are reflected into long overdue reforms of multilateral institutions and increased global governance.

Operating within multilateral frameworks, however tiresome, has more often than not served US national interests as well as those of Europe. This will not change. A stronger EU is America’s natural partner, occasional competitor, but certainly not a rival. It is the duty of governments on both sides of the Atlantic to persuade their publics of this.