Barry Eichengreen
Los mercados en ascenso y la reforma financiera mundial
Barry Eichengreen
BERKELEY – Resulta apropiado que la próxima cumbre del G-20 vaya a celebrarse en Pittsburg, antiguo centro industrial de un país industrial avanzado, pues se ha permitido a los países avanzados fijar el programa para el fortalecimiento de los sistemas financieros. Aparte de schadenfreude, los mercados en ascenso han puesto poco en la mesa.
Los Estados Unidos insisten en la necesidad de unos requisitos de capital mayores. Los europeos reclaman una reforma de los procedimientos de compensación en el sector financiero. Si bien las dos propuestas son válidas, resulta como mínimo dudoso que sean suficientes para estabilizar nuestros sistemas financieros, peligrosamente inestables.
Lo que los mercados en ascenso pueden añadir a ese programa no está –dicho sea caritativamente– claro. Poco han dicho sobre cómo reformarían los sistemas financieros. Pueden sostener que no es un problema suyo: que la crisis de los dos último años se ha centrado en las economías avanzadas y que lo que se debe reformar son los sistemas financieros de dichos países.
Pero el programa establecido en Pittsburg moldeará, para bien o para mal, no sólo los sistemas financieros de Europa y los Estados Unidos, sino también el sistema financiero mundial. Los mercados financieros están demasiado integrados para no afectar profundamente a los mercados en ascenso... y seguirán estándolo, guste o no, pues, sean cuales fueren las normas que se establezcan, China, el Brasil y Rusia han hecho propuestas ambiciosas, que pueden dar fruto dentro de diez o veinte años, para convertir los derechos especiales de giro del Fondo Monetario Internacional en una verdadera divisa internacional, pero no han dicho cómo reformarían ahora los sistemas y las políticas financieras.
La primera prioridad deben ser los bancos internacionales. Hasta ahora, el régimen internacional, encabezado por el FMI y la OCDE, ha presionado a los países para que permitan que los bancos extranjeros entren en sus mercados. Sería comprensible que los mercados en ascenso, al haber visto problemas profundos en la conducta de los bancos extranjeros, insistan ahora en que la mayoría del capital social y el control de las entidades financieras sean nacionales.
Pero una política uniforme sería un error. Al contrario de la preocupación por que los bancos extranjeros se escabullesen ante la primera señal de problemas, en la crisis actual han mantenido un notable grado de apoyo a sus filiales de los mercados en ascenso. En igualdad de condiciones, los préstamos transfronterizos se redujeron menos en los países que tenían una importante presencia de bancos extranjeros que en los mercados en ascenso en los que no predominaba el capital social extranjero de los bancos. Si acaso, los bancos nacionales con los bolsillos menos llenos han sido más propensos a reducir sus operaciones con la crisis.
Habrá quienes digan que los países bálticos y de la Europa sudoriental tuvieron suerte de que bancos suecos y austríacos responsables, en lugar de sus homólogos americanos y británicos tóxicos, hubieran entrado en sus mercados, pero esta observación indica lo que hace falta: un régimen que determine las condiciones que deben satisfacer los bancos de un país antes de que se les permita entrar.
El país inversor debe poner un tope al apalancamiento, limitar los procedimientos aceptables en materia de liquidez y financiación y contar con un régimen resolutivo para liquidar entidades financieras complejas. De lo contrario, los mercados en ascenso deben poder decir que no se permitirá la entrada de los bancos de ese país determinado.
La segunda prioridad debe ser la de formular un criterio estricto de los mercados en ascenso para la regulación de los bancos extranjeros después de que se haya permitido su entrada. Aparte de otros aspectos positivos, se relaciona la presencia de bancos extranjeros con desequilibrios monetarios. En la Europa central y oriental, bancos extranjeros concedieron préstamos empresariales, hipotecarios y automovilísticos denominados en euros y en francos suizos a empresas y a familias con ingresos en moneda local, que contribuyeron a la precaria situación financiera de las empresas y las familias cuando las monedas locales se hundieron. Los reguladores austríacos, italianos y suizos, al ver que los activos y los pasivos de sus bancos estaban denominados en sus propias divisas, miraron para otro lado.
De ello se desprende que los mercados en ascenso, si bien deben estimular la entrada de bancos extranjeros, al mismo tiempo deben regular estrictamente los procedimientos de préstamos locales de dichos bancos y, como, si se adopta unilateralmente, la regulación estricta podría simplemente hacer que los bancos extranjeros rehuyeran al país de que se trate, los mercados en ascenso deben presentar un frente unido.
Por último, los mercados en ascenso deben intensificar sus medidas para crear mercados de bonos, pero con carácter local. Los países con mercados de bonos más desarrollados experimentaron menos secuelas negativas de la crisis, pues sus grandes empresas conservaron el acceso a fuentes de financiación no bancarias.
Pero la apertura de dichos mercados a los inversores extranjeros, que ha sido la estrategia predominante para desarrollarlos, tuvo sus pros y sus contras. Corea del Sur, el país asiático con la mayor participación de inversores extranjeros en su mercado de valores, experimentó también las más pronunciadas bajadas de precios y tipos de cambio, pues dichos inversores, principalmente fondos especulativos, se vieron obligados a desapalancar y repatriar sus fondos.
Alentar la participación de inversores extranjeros es una forma rápida de hacer arrancar la actividad de los mercados locales de bonos, pero la experiencia reciente indica que lo más rápido no es lo mejor. Unas regulaciones que limiten la participación extranjera a niveles prudentes deben formar parte del nuevo régimen internacional.
La próxima presidencia del G-20 corresponderá a Corea del Sur. Los mercados en ascenso deben empezar a prepararse para solicitarle el uso de la palabra.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2009.
www.project-syndicate.org
Traducido del inglés por Carlos Manzano.
PKurowski 03:23 09 Nov 09
Barry Eichengreen opines “What emerging markets can add to this agenda is, to put it charitably, unclear.”
To begin with emerging countries could remind developed countries of the importance of risk-taking for any human and economic development, something that seems to have been completely forgotten when introducing a regulatory system pillared on capital requirements based on perceived risk, and which, effectively, on top of what the usually coward capital markets already charge in premiums on risk, levies a tax on risk-taking and subsidizes the status quo.
A system that requires zero percent capital of a bank when lending to the government, 1.6 percent when lending to a AAA rated corporation and 8 percent when lending to a BB+ or below rated or unrated entrepreneur, those who we know have the best chance of creating the jobs of tomorrow has, to put it charitable, got its priorities totally messed up.
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tvselvakumaran 05:32 30 Sep 09
The official consensus
Professor Martin Feldstein's latest article, "The G-20's Empty Promises" on Project Syndicate needs careful consideration. In his article, Professor Feldstein essentially adopts the "official consensus" of the economics profession on the current economic crisis. This official consensus, in its various mainfestations, has also been elaborated on by other famous economists, notably Professor Robert Lucas in his article in the Economist in early August, and by Professor Paul Krugman in his recent article in the New York Times Magazine. One characterizing feature of this official consensus is a confidence (a.k.a. triumphalism) in the certainty of outcomes predicted by modern economic theory. The main precepts of this official consensus are
(i) Professor Ben Bernanke, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, has at his disposal all the theoretical tools of economics that are necessary and sufficient to deal with the current economic crisis. As Professor Lucas explains it in his Economist article, if one were able to predict in advance exactly when a market crash would occur, it would imply that the market entertains arbritrage opportunities. Hence, it is not possible to predict financial crises in advance. However, except for the precise timing of the occurrence of financial crises, macroeconomic theory could explain the workings of the economy completely. In particular, to avert the recurrence of the Great Depression, certain actions were needed to be taken by the Fed -- the specifics of these actions were all clearly understood by the economics profession. However, it was politically untenable to take these actions before there was a financial crisis. Once the financial crisis occurred though, Professor Bernanke could intervene in the markets and take the necessary actions (in the Fall of 2008). These actions include the injection of several trillion dollars into the economy and making the availability of credit the cheapest possible. The actions taken by the Fed have now resulted in the economy avoiding a recurrence of the Great Depression. This is, in brief, what Professor Lucas has stated in his Economist article.
(ii) Thus in Professor Lucas' interpretation of things, the collapse of Lehman Brothers, for example, was necessary, in order to justify the intervention of the Federal Reserve in the functioning of the markets. The collapse of Lehman Brothers was, although regrettable, an unavoidable event. But, on the whole, monetary policy, even if it is a profligate one, would be necessary and sufficient to prevent the recurrence of the Great Depression, in Professor Lucas' view. Furthermore, the old wisdom of the Chicago School that government should be kept minimal at all times continues to hold, even in light of the current economic crisis. The Keynesians led by Professor Krugman, on the other hand, believe that Lehman Brothers should never have been allowed to fail. In their view, when the Fed's fund rate is at zero, monetary policy is largely ineffective for sustaining and stimulating economic activity. This is because of liquidity traps caused by businessmen who don't see economic opportunities that would induce them to borrow the cheap money available from the banks. Hence the government should step in to provide massive fiscal assistance to the economy by taking on spending directly, even if it means assuming trillions of dollars of public debt.
(iii) Professor Krugman scored a lot of points by pointing out that the current state of economic theory, highly influenced as it is by the efficient market hypothesis of the Chicago School, indicated that a crisis of such magnitude as the current economic crisis could not happen at all. This fundamental failure to recognize that an enormous crisis could indeed happen, calls for the overthrow of the policy that markets provide the best social gain when they are completely free from government interference. From first impressions, it might seem that the views of the monetarists and Keynesians are vastly different. However, it is important to note that in the view of the Keynesians too, once large scale government spending as prescribed by the Keynesians is instituted, there is again enough assurance that modern economic theory (although with a heavy Keynesian tilt) would be sufficient to deal with the current economic crisis.
(iv) In this regard, perhaps it is relevant to refer here to Professor Robert Shiller's latest article, "Re-inventing Economics" on Project Syndicate. Professor Shiller points out that the free market ideology fails to identify bubbles. Because of the belief that markets know best on all occasions, bubbles cannot occur according to the free market ideology. Professor Shiller's approach pursues a different branch of the Keynesian school of thought than the big spenders. Rather than advocate large government spending to avert a depression, Professor Shiller proposes using techniques from behavioral psychology to predict bubbles in advance. In this way, the socially harmful effects of massive misallocations of capital that arose in the case of the housing bubble or the tech bubble could be prevented in the future. In his other recent article, "Echo Chamber of Boom and Bust" in the New York Times, Professor Shiller elaborates further on the techniques that one could use for studying bubbles. Briefly, the process by which confidence or panic spreads in markets is very similar to the process by which diseases spread among populations. This outlook allows for introducing methods that scientists use to study epidemics into the study of bubbles.
(v) The Keynesians have also managed to re-write the conventional wisdom on the advantages of a strong dollar. Through the works of Professors Barry Eichengreen, Jeffrey Sachs and Ben Bernnake, a consensus has developed that attempting to support the gold standard was a major cause for the prolongation of the Great Depression. This has resulted in a viewpoint among economists that a devaluation of the dollar at present would help to reduce global imbalances by restoring the American manufacturing industry. The implications of this viewpoint were analyzed by Professor Feldstein in his July 2009 article "America's Saving Rate and the Dollar's Future" on Project Syndicate, with the conclusion that devaluation of the dollar would necessarily lead to a better future for America. Lost in this new interpretation is the fact that a stable dollar provides many economic benefits for America. The equity premium for American companies taking more risks globally, the transaction charges for providing market making facilities in global markets, and the provisions of liquidity for the currency of international trade are major drivers of economic growth for America, which derive from the dollar being the global reserve currency.
(vi) Some other Keynesians have gone beyond questioning just the free market ideology. For example, in his latest article, "GDP Fetishism" on Project Syndicate, Professor Joseph Stiglitz proposes a broad set of economic indicators like health, well-being and sustainability rather than a narrow focus on GDP growth. Yet other developments imply that the rest of the world is steadily moving away from using the dollar as the main reserve currency. To finance this new global reserve system, the IMF has created $250 billion worth of Special Drawing Rights (SDR), and the IMF has indicated its intention to triple this allocation of $250 billion in the future. It would need a strong commitment from the policy-makers in America to re-claim for the dollar its position as the predominant global reserve currency. However, judging from the writings of American economists like Professor Feldstein, it appears that the consensus among professional economists favors devaluing the dollar instead.
(vii) The official consensus is a result of a grand compromise between the Chicago School economists and the Keynesians.The conservative economists of the Chicago School would like to avoid the embarassment of getting publicly criticized for the failures of the efficient market hypothesis that this current economics crisis has severely exposed. So famous conservative economists like Professor Lucas have reached out for a consensus by indicating their willingness for a compromise. This compromise involves among other things, (a) foregoing raising concerns about the government's mismanagement of Fanie Mae and Freddie Mac, and (b) lending support to the Fed and the Treasury in their efforts to stabilize the economy, even if the methods that the Fed and the Treasury employ are highly inefficient. What are the Keynesians compromising on? Well, the Western liberal tradition has been intellectually bankrupt ever since the late 1960s. It is only the free market ideology of the Chicago School that has served as the driver of wealth creation in the advanced countries during the last four decades. Hence, the official consensus is a convenient compromise for the Keynesians to avoid asking difficult questions about the future of the Western liberal tradition. Instead, they would like to enact much drama in the media about the resurrection of their hero, John Maynard Keynes.
(viii) One other characterizing feature of the official consensus in the economics profession is a collective tendency to "Blame It All On Obama". The conservative economists blame President Obama for not focusing adequately on America's ballooning national debt. The liberals, led by Professor Krugman, fault President Obama for getting distracted from the left's free spending ways by concerns on the size of the fiscal deficit. In the confusion that has ensued, President Obama's own team of economics advisors has fallen back on the official consensus in the economics profession. Availing themselves of the security provided by this official consensus, President Obama's economics team has misled the President thoroughly in economic matters. To begin with, the President is only empowered to administer the nation's affairs for a four year term. The projections put out by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) for the deficits in the next decade are only a non-authoritative guidance for where the nation's finances would be, if current policies hold for the next decade. Instead, the democrats have been behaving as if the $9 trillion of additional public debt that the CBO projects for the next decade is already a given certainty. In particular, they have not been careful to mention clearly in public discussions how much of this extra spending can be attributed to the President's own spending plans in his current four-year term. Neither have they shown any concerns for taking the Fed and the Treasury to taks for their highly inefficient methods to stabilize the economy. Because of these instances of neglect, the public is not willing to trust the government in financial matters. President Obama has rapidly lost his approval ratings. Professor Lawrence Summers, Professor Christina Romer, Professor Austan Goolsbee and Professor Peter Orszag are directly responsible for this abuse of public trust.
(ix) The official consensus has also prevented economists from recognizing that President Obama's universal message of tolerance and justice, which has been received very favorably all around the world, actually opens up vast areas of economic opportunity for America. Unfortunately, it does not matter, for the economists, whether George W. Bush or Barack Obama is in office. The most they can do is re-work their models to favor Keynesian policies, and to argue that the policies they propose arise directly from their number-crunching methods. One might be tempted to attribute this widespread consensus among economists to stick to a narrow theoretical interpretation of the current economic crisis, to the certainty afforded by the mathematical models, which have become indispensible through the course of the 20th century, for the development of economic theory. However, this would be a big mistake. The official consensus in the economics profession is primarily a result of undue influences of power and money. It is much less a result of mathematically based economic theory. In the long-term, this attitude among economists of sticking to an official consensus is going to do serious damage to the American economy. Some other aspects of the official consensus have been explained very well by Professor Kenneth Rogoff in his recent article, "The Confidence Game" on Project Syndicate. I recommend that the reader go through that article. The official consensus is the single largest threat to a robust recovery in the global economy. The official consensus also gravely misinterprets the events of the Great Depression. The implications of this misinterpretation bear directly on the economic health of America.