Barry Eichengreen
Marchés émergents et réforme financière mondiale
Barry Eichengreen
BERKELEY – Il est tout à fait approprié que le prochain sommet du G20 se déroule à Pittsburgh, un ancien centre industriel d’une économie avancée, parce que ce sont bien les économies avancées qui ont été chargées de définir l’ordre du jour de la réforme des systèmes financiers. À part une certaine joie maligne à l’idée du malheur des pays industrialisés, les marchés émergents n’ont pas apporté grand chose au débat.
Les Etats-Unis mettent l’accent sur le relèvement des exigences de fonds propres imposées aux banques. Les Européens sont eux favorables à une réforme des bonus dans le secteur financier. Bien que ces deux propositions aient chacune leurs mérites, leur capacité à stabiliser des systèmes financiers dangereusement instables est, au mieux, douteuse.
Ce que les marchés émergents peuvent ajouter à ce programme n’est pas clair, pour le dire charitablement. Ils n’ont pas dit ce qu’ils comptaient faire pour réformer leurs systèmes financiers. Ils peuvent toujours dire que ce n’est pas leur problème – que la crise des deux dernières années a été centrée sur les économies avancées et que ce sont les seuls systèmes financiers de ces pays qui doivent être réformés.
Mais le programme adopté à Pittsburgh définira, pour le meilleur ou pour le pire, non seulement les systèmes financiers américain et européen, mais également le système financier mondial. Les marchés financiers sont trop intégrés – et le resteront, qu’on le veuille ou non – pour que les règles adoptées n’aient pas de profondes répercussions pour les marchés émergents. La Chine, le Brésil et la Russie ont avancé des propositions ambitieuses, qui porteront peut-être des fruits dans 10 ou 20 ans, pour faire du droit de tirage spécial du FMI une monnaie internationale à part entière. Mais ils n’ont rien dit sur la manière dont ils comptent réformer leurs politiques ou systèmes financiers aujourd’hui.
La première priorité doit être les banques internationales. Jusqu’à présent, le régime bancaire international, sous l’égide du FMI et de l’OCDE, a poussé les pays à accepter la présence des banques étrangères sur leur marché. Ce serait compréhensible si les marchés émergents, ayant constaté de graves manquements dans la conduite des banques étrangères, insistaient aujourd’hui sur la propriété et le contrôle des institutions financières.
Mais une politique générale serait une erreur. Contrairement à l’idée selon laquelle les banques étrangères plieraient bagage à la première alerte, elles ont maintenu un niveau de soutien remarquable à leurs succursales des marchés émergents au cours de la crise actuelle. Toutes choses étant égales par ailleurs, les prêts transfrontaliers ont chuté dans une moindre mesure dans les pays ayant une présence importante de banques étrangères que dans les marchés émergents où les banques n’étaient pas détenues de manière prédominante par des entités étrangères. En fait, les banques nationales avec des ressources moindres ont été les plus enclines à se replier.
Certains diront que les pays baltes et de l’Europe du Sud-Est ont eu de la chance que des banques suédoises et autrichiennes responsables, plutôt que leurs homologues toxiques britanniques et américains, aient pénétré leurs marchés. Mais cette remarque sert son propos : la nécessité d’un régime définissant les conditions que doivent remplir les banques étrangères avant de s’établir sur un marché.
Le pays du siège de la banque concernée doit fixer des limites aux effets de levier, limiter les pratiques de financement et d’octroi de liquidités et prévoir un processus de résolution dans les cas de dissolution d’institutions financières complexes. Faute de quoi, les marchés émergents devraient être en droit de refuser l’accès de leur marché aux banques étrangères.
La deuxième priorité doit être l’élaboration par les marchés émergents d’une norme stricte de réglementation des banques étrangères après qu’elles aient ouvert des succursales dans ces pays. En dépit d’autres aspects positifs, la présence de banques étrangères est souvent associée à une disparité entre les monnaies. En Europe centrale et orientale, les banques étrangères ont accordé des crédits commerciaux, immobiliers et automobiles libellés en euro et en francs suisses aux entreprises et aux particuliers dont les revenus étaient en monnaie locale, ce qui a aggravé leurs difficultés financières lorsque la monnaie locale s’est dépréciée. Les autorités autrichiennes, italiennes et suisses, après avoir constaté que l’actif et le passif de leurs banques étaient dans leurs propres devises, ont préféré ignorer le problème.
L’implication est que les marchés émergents, tout en encourageant l’implantation de banques étrangères, doivent en même temps réglementer strictement les prêts accordés par ces banques. Et les marchés émergents doivent présenter un front commun puisqu’une réglementation stricte, si elle était adoptée unilatéralement par un pays, pourrait inciter les banques étrangères à ignorer ce pays.
Enfin, les marchés émergents doivent redoubler leurs efforts pour mettre en place des marchés obligataires, mais sur une base locale. Les pays ayant un marché obligataire ont moins souffert de la crise, parce que leurs entreprises importantes conservaient une source de financement autre que les crédits bancaires.
Mais l’ouverture de ces marchés aux investisseurs étrangers, qui était la stratégie prédominante de leur développement, a eu des avantages et des inconvénients. La Corée du Sud, le pays asiatique ayant la plus forte proportion d’investisseurs étrangers dans son marché d’actions, est aussi le pays ayant connu la plus forte baisse des cours et des échanges quand ces investisseurs, principalement des fonds spéculatifs, ont rapatrié leurs fonds.
Encourager la participation des investisseurs étrangers est une manière rapide de faire décoller un marché obligataire local. Mais l’expérience récente tend à suggérer que le plus rapide n’est pas nécessairement le mieux. Des réglementations fixant la participation étrangère dans des limites prudentes doivent être inscrites dans le nouveau régime international.
La Corée du Sud assumera la prochaine présidence du G20. Les marchés émergents doivent se préparer maintenant à prendre la parole.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2009.
www.project-syndicate.org
Traduit de l’anglais par Julia Gallin
PKurowski 03:23 09 Nov 09
Barry Eichengreen opines “What emerging markets can add to this agenda is, to put it charitably, unclear.”
To begin with emerging countries could remind developed countries of the importance of risk-taking for any human and economic development, something that seems to have been completely forgotten when introducing a regulatory system pillared on capital requirements based on perceived risk, and which, effectively, on top of what the usually coward capital markets already charge in premiums on risk, levies a tax on risk-taking and subsidizes the status quo.
A system that requires zero percent capital of a bank when lending to the government, 1.6 percent when lending to a AAA rated corporation and 8 percent when lending to a BB+ or below rated or unrated entrepreneur, those who we know have the best chance of creating the jobs of tomorrow has, to put it charitable, got its priorities totally messed up.
AUTHOR INFO



tvselvakumaran 05:32 30 Sep 09
The official consensus
Professor Martin Feldstein's latest article, "The G-20's Empty Promises" on Project Syndicate needs careful consideration. In his article, Professor Feldstein essentially adopts the "official consensus" of the economics profession on the current economic crisis. This official consensus, in its various mainfestations, has also been elaborated on by other famous economists, notably Professor Robert Lucas in his article in the Economist in early August, and by Professor Paul Krugman in his recent article in the New York Times Magazine. One characterizing feature of this official consensus is a confidence (a.k.a. triumphalism) in the certainty of outcomes predicted by modern economic theory. The main precepts of this official consensus are
(i) Professor Ben Bernanke, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, has at his disposal all the theoretical tools of economics that are necessary and sufficient to deal with the current economic crisis. As Professor Lucas explains it in his Economist article, if one were able to predict in advance exactly when a market crash would occur, it would imply that the market entertains arbritrage opportunities. Hence, it is not possible to predict financial crises in advance. However, except for the precise timing of the occurrence of financial crises, macroeconomic theory could explain the workings of the economy completely. In particular, to avert the recurrence of the Great Depression, certain actions were needed to be taken by the Fed -- the specifics of these actions were all clearly understood by the economics profession. However, it was politically untenable to take these actions before there was a financial crisis. Once the financial crisis occurred though, Professor Bernanke could intervene in the markets and take the necessary actions (in the Fall of 2008). These actions include the injection of several trillion dollars into the economy and making the availability of credit the cheapest possible. The actions taken by the Fed have now resulted in the economy avoiding a recurrence of the Great Depression. This is, in brief, what Professor Lucas has stated in his Economist article.
(ii) Thus in Professor Lucas' interpretation of things, the collapse of Lehman Brothers, for example, was necessary, in order to justify the intervention of the Federal Reserve in the functioning of the markets. The collapse of Lehman Brothers was, although regrettable, an unavoidable event. But, on the whole, monetary policy, even if it is a profligate one, would be necessary and sufficient to prevent the recurrence of the Great Depression, in Professor Lucas' view. Furthermore, the old wisdom of the Chicago School that government should be kept minimal at all times continues to hold, even in light of the current economic crisis. The Keynesians led by Professor Krugman, on the other hand, believe that Lehman Brothers should never have been allowed to fail. In their view, when the Fed's fund rate is at zero, monetary policy is largely ineffective for sustaining and stimulating economic activity. This is because of liquidity traps caused by businessmen who don't see economic opportunities that would induce them to borrow the cheap money available from the banks. Hence the government should step in to provide massive fiscal assistance to the economy by taking on spending directly, even if it means assuming trillions of dollars of public debt.
(iii) Professor Krugman scored a lot of points by pointing out that the current state of economic theory, highly influenced as it is by the efficient market hypothesis of the Chicago School, indicated that a crisis of such magnitude as the current economic crisis could not happen at all. This fundamental failure to recognize that an enormous crisis could indeed happen, calls for the overthrow of the policy that markets provide the best social gain when they are completely free from government interference. From first impressions, it might seem that the views of the monetarists and Keynesians are vastly different. However, it is important to note that in the view of the Keynesians too, once large scale government spending as prescribed by the Keynesians is instituted, there is again enough assurance that modern economic theory (although with a heavy Keynesian tilt) would be sufficient to deal with the current economic crisis.
(iv) In this regard, perhaps it is relevant to refer here to Professor Robert Shiller's latest article, "Re-inventing Economics" on Project Syndicate. Professor Shiller points out that the free market ideology fails to identify bubbles. Because of the belief that markets know best on all occasions, bubbles cannot occur according to the free market ideology. Professor Shiller's approach pursues a different branch of the Keynesian school of thought than the big spenders. Rather than advocate large government spending to avert a depression, Professor Shiller proposes using techniques from behavioral psychology to predict bubbles in advance. In this way, the socially harmful effects of massive misallocations of capital that arose in the case of the housing bubble or the tech bubble could be prevented in the future. In his other recent article, "Echo Chamber of Boom and Bust" in the New York Times, Professor Shiller elaborates further on the techniques that one could use for studying bubbles. Briefly, the process by which confidence or panic spreads in markets is very similar to the process by which diseases spread among populations. This outlook allows for introducing methods that scientists use to study epidemics into the study of bubbles.
(v) The Keynesians have also managed to re-write the conventional wisdom on the advantages of a strong dollar. Through the works of Professors Barry Eichengreen, Jeffrey Sachs and Ben Bernnake, a consensus has developed that attempting to support the gold standard was a major cause for the prolongation of the Great Depression. This has resulted in a viewpoint among economists that a devaluation of the dollar at present would help to reduce global imbalances by restoring the American manufacturing industry. The implications of this viewpoint were analyzed by Professor Feldstein in his July 2009 article "America's Saving Rate and the Dollar's Future" on Project Syndicate, with the conclusion that devaluation of the dollar would necessarily lead to a better future for America. Lost in this new interpretation is the fact that a stable dollar provides many economic benefits for America. The equity premium for American companies taking more risks globally, the transaction charges for providing market making facilities in global markets, and the provisions of liquidity for the currency of international trade are major drivers of economic growth for America, which derive from the dollar being the global reserve currency.
(vi) Some other Keynesians have gone beyond questioning just the free market ideology. For example, in his latest article, "GDP Fetishism" on Project Syndicate, Professor Joseph Stiglitz proposes a broad set of economic indicators like health, well-being and sustainability rather than a narrow focus on GDP growth. Yet other developments imply that the rest of the world is steadily moving away from using the dollar as the main reserve currency. To finance this new global reserve system, the IMF has created $250 billion worth of Special Drawing Rights (SDR), and the IMF has indicated its intention to triple this allocation of $250 billion in the future. It would need a strong commitment from the policy-makers in America to re-claim for the dollar its position as the predominant global reserve currency. However, judging from the writings of American economists like Professor Feldstein, it appears that the consensus among professional economists favors devaluing the dollar instead.
(vii) The official consensus is a result of a grand compromise between the Chicago School economists and the Keynesians.The conservative economists of the Chicago School would like to avoid the embarassment of getting publicly criticized for the failures of the efficient market hypothesis that this current economics crisis has severely exposed. So famous conservative economists like Professor Lucas have reached out for a consensus by indicating their willingness for a compromise. This compromise involves among other things, (a) foregoing raising concerns about the government's mismanagement of Fanie Mae and Freddie Mac, and (b) lending support to the Fed and the Treasury in their efforts to stabilize the economy, even if the methods that the Fed and the Treasury employ are highly inefficient. What are the Keynesians compromising on? Well, the Western liberal tradition has been intellectually bankrupt ever since the late 1960s. It is only the free market ideology of the Chicago School that has served as the driver of wealth creation in the advanced countries during the last four decades. Hence, the official consensus is a convenient compromise for the Keynesians to avoid asking difficult questions about the future of the Western liberal tradition. Instead, they would like to enact much drama in the media about the resurrection of their hero, John Maynard Keynes.
(viii) One other characterizing feature of the official consensus in the economics profession is a collective tendency to "Blame It All On Obama". The conservative economists blame President Obama for not focusing adequately on America's ballooning national debt. The liberals, led by Professor Krugman, fault President Obama for getting distracted from the left's free spending ways by concerns on the size of the fiscal deficit. In the confusion that has ensued, President Obama's own team of economics advisors has fallen back on the official consensus in the economics profession. Availing themselves of the security provided by this official consensus, President Obama's economics team has misled the President thoroughly in economic matters. To begin with, the President is only empowered to administer the nation's affairs for a four year term. The projections put out by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) for the deficits in the next decade are only a non-authoritative guidance for where the nation's finances would be, if current policies hold for the next decade. Instead, the democrats have been behaving as if the $9 trillion of additional public debt that the CBO projects for the next decade is already a given certainty. In particular, they have not been careful to mention clearly in public discussions how much of this extra spending can be attributed to the President's own spending plans in his current four-year term. Neither have they shown any concerns for taking the Fed and the Treasury to taks for their highly inefficient methods to stabilize the economy. Because of these instances of neglect, the public is not willing to trust the government in financial matters. President Obama has rapidly lost his approval ratings. Professor Lawrence Summers, Professor Christina Romer, Professor Austan Goolsbee and Professor Peter Orszag are directly responsible for this abuse of public trust.
(ix) The official consensus has also prevented economists from recognizing that President Obama's universal message of tolerance and justice, which has been received very favorably all around the world, actually opens up vast areas of economic opportunity for America. Unfortunately, it does not matter, for the economists, whether George W. Bush or Barack Obama is in office. The most they can do is re-work their models to favor Keynesian policies, and to argue that the policies they propose arise directly from their number-crunching methods. One might be tempted to attribute this widespread consensus among economists to stick to a narrow theoretical interpretation of the current economic crisis, to the certainty afforded by the mathematical models, which have become indispensible through the course of the 20th century, for the development of economic theory. However, this would be a big mistake. The official consensus in the economics profession is primarily a result of undue influences of power and money. It is much less a result of mathematically based economic theory. In the long-term, this attitude among economists of sticking to an official consensus is going to do serious damage to the American economy. Some other aspects of the official consensus have been explained very well by Professor Kenneth Rogoff in his recent article, "The Confidence Game" on Project Syndicate. I recommend that the reader go through that article. The official consensus is the single largest threat to a robust recovery in the global economy. The official consensus also gravely misinterprets the events of the Great Depression. The implications of this misinterpretation bear directly on the economic health of America.