The Next Financial Order
Rozvíjející se trhy a globální finanční reforma
Barry Eichengreen
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BERKELEY – Je případné, že se nadcházející summit skupiny G-20 koná právě v Pittsburghu, starém průmyslovém centru rozvinuté průmyslové země, neboť agendu posilování finančních systémů směly určovat právě rozvinuté země. Rozvíjející se trhy toho kromě škodolibosti přinesly k jednacímu stolu málo.
Spojené státy kladou důraz na vyšší kapitálové požadavky. Evropané prosazují reformu praxe odměňování ve finančním sektoru. Oba návrhy sice mají své opodstatnění, avšak je přinejmenším pochybné, zda to bude stačit ke stabilizaci našich nebezpečně nestabilních finančních systémů.
Čím mohou rozvíjející se trhy k této agendě přispět, je mírně řečeno nejasné. Až dosud se jen málo vyjadřovaly k otázce, jak by reformovaly finanční systémy. Mohou tvrdit, že to není jejich problém – že krize z uplynulých dvou let měla těžiště v rozvinutých ekonomikách a že právě finanční systémy těchto zemí je potřeba napravit.
Agenda projednávaná v Pittsburghu však bude k lepšímu či k horšímu utvářet nejen podobu finančních systémů v USA a v Evropě, ale i globálního finančního systému. Finanční trhy jsou příliš integrované – a integrované i zůstanou, ať se nám to líbí, nebo ne –, než aby jakákoliv ustanovená pravidla neměla hluboký dopad i na rozvíjející se trhy. Čína, Brazílie a Rusko podaly ambiciózní návrhy, které mohou přinést ovoce za 10 či 20 let, totiž učinit reálnou mezinárodní měnu ze „zvláštních práv čerpání“ Mezinárodního měnového fondu. Neřekly však, jak by reformovaly finanční systémy a politiku nyní.
Prvořadou prioritou by měly být mezinárodní banky. Mezinárodní režim pod vedením MMF a OECD až dosud vyvíjel na jednotlivé země tlak, aby umožnily vstup zahraničních bank na svůj trh. Bylo by pochopitelné, kdyby rozvíjející se trhy poté, co spatřily v chování zahraničních bank hluboké problémy, nyní trvaly na domácím vlastnictví a kontrole finančních institucí.
Nerozlišující politika by však byla chybou. Navzdory obavám, že se zahraniční banky při prvním náznaku problémů dají na útěk, si tyto banky během současné krize ve skutečnosti zachovaly pozoruhodnou míru podpory svých dceřiných společností na rozvíjejících se trzích. Za jinak stejných podmínek se přeshraniční půjčky v zemích s významnou přítomností zahraničních bank snížily méně než na rozvíjejících se trzích, kde zahraniční vlastnictví bank nebylo dominantní. Kdyby nic jiného, musely totiž domácí banky, které mají hlouběji do kapsy, s větší pravděpodobností omezovat půjčky.
Někdo může namítnout, že pobaltské státy a země z jihovýchodu Evropy měly štěstí, že na jejich trhy vstoupily zodpovědné švédské a rakouské banky, nikoliv jejich toxické americké a britské protějšky. Tato poznámka však ukazuje, co je opravdu zapotřebí: režim, jenž bude definovat, které podmínky musí být splněny, než banky z určité země získají přístup na zahraniční trhy.
Domovská země musí stanovit maximální úroveň zadlužení, omezit přijatelné praktiky s likviditou a financováním a mít režim rozplétání složitých finančních institucí. Jinak by rozvíjející se trhy měly mít možnost prohlásit, že banky z dané země nebudou moci na jejich trh vstoupit.
Druhou prioritou rozvíjejících se trhů by měla být definice přísného standardu pro regulaci zahraničních bank po jejich vstupu na tyto trhy. Nehledě na jiné pozitivní aspekty je přítomnost zahraničních bank spojena s měnovou nesourodostí. Ve střední a východní Evropě rozšířily zahraniční banky firemní úvěry, úvěry domácnostem a úvěry na nákup automobilu denominované v eurech a švýcarských francích i na firmy a domácnosti s příjmy v místní měně, což zvýšilo finanční tíseň firem a domácností, jakmile se místní měny zhroutily. Když rakouští, italští a švýcarští regulátoři viděli, že aktiva a závazky jejich bank jsou v jejich vlastní měně, dívali se jinam.
Z toho vyplývá, že rozvíjející se trhy by měly podněcovat vstup zahraničních bank, ale současně by měly striktně regulovat jejich místní úvěrové praktiky. A protože by přísná regulace v případě jednostranného zavedení mohla způsobit, že se zahraniční banky určité zemi jednoduše vyhnout, musí rozvíjející se trhy vytvořit jednotnou frontu.
A konečně platí, že rozvíjející se trhy potřebují zdvojnásobit úsilí o vybudování trhů cenných papírů, ovšem na místní bázi. V zemích s rozvinutějšími trhy cenných papírů měla krize méně nepříznivé dopady, jelikož si velké firmy udržely přístup k nebankovním zdrojům financí.
Otevření těchto trhů zahraničním investorům, což byla převládající strategie jejich rozvoje, však bylo dvousečnou zbraní. Jižní Korea, asijská země s nejvyšším podílem zahraničních investic na svém trhu cenných papírů, zažila nejprudší pokles cen a měnových kurzů, protože investoři – zejména hedgeové fondy – byli nuceni se oddlužit a převést prostředky zpět do své země.
Podněcování zahraničních investorů k účasti je rychlá cesta k nastartování aktivity na místním trhu cenných papírů. Nedávná zkušenost však naznačuje, že nejrychleji neznamená nejlépe. Součástí nového mezinárodního režimu by měla být i regulační opatření omezující účast zahraničních subjektů na rozumnou úroveň.
Příští summit skupiny G-20 se bude konat v Jižní Koreji. Rozvíjející se trhy by se měly už nyní začít připravovat na to, že se na něm přihlásí o slovo.
Barry Eichengreen je profesorem ekonomie a politologie na Kalifornské univerzitě v Berkeley.
Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2009.
www.project-syndicate.org
Z angličtiny přeložil Jiří Kobělka.
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PKurowski 03:23 09 Nov 09
Barry Eichengreen opines “What emerging markets can add to this agenda is, to put it charitably, unclear.”
To begin with emerging countries could remind developed countries of the importance of risk-taking for any human and economic development, something that seems to have been completely forgotten when introducing a regulatory system pillared on capital requirements based on perceived risk, and which, effectively, on top of what the usually coward capital markets already charge in premiums on risk, levies a tax on risk-taking and subsidizes the status quo.
A system that requires zero percent capital of a bank when lending to the government, 1.6 percent when lending to a AAA rated corporation and 8 percent when lending to a BB+ or below rated or unrated entrepreneur, those who we know have the best chance of creating the jobs of tomorrow has, to put it charitable, got its priorities totally messed up.


tvselvakumaran 05:32 30 Sep 09
The official consensus
Professor Martin Feldstein's latest article, "The G-20's Empty Promises" on Project Syndicate needs careful consideration. In his article, Professor Feldstein essentially adopts the "official consensus" of the economics profession on the current economic crisis. This official consensus, in its various mainfestations, has also been elaborated on by other famous economists, notably Professor Robert Lucas in his article in the Economist in early August, and by Professor Paul Krugman in his recent article in the New York Times Magazine. One characterizing feature of this official consensus is a confidence (a.k.a. triumphalism) in the certainty of outcomes predicted by modern economic theory. The main precepts of this official consensus are
(i) Professor Ben Bernanke, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, has at his disposal all the theoretical tools of economics that are necessary and sufficient to deal with the current economic crisis. As Professor Lucas explains it in his Economist article, if one were able to predict in advance exactly when a market crash would occur, it would imply that the market entertains arbritrage opportunities. Hence, it is not possible to predict financial crises in advance. However, except for the precise timing of the occurrence of financial crises, macroeconomic theory could explain the workings of the economy completely. In particular, to avert the recurrence of the Great Depression, certain actions were needed to be taken by the Fed -- the specifics of these actions were all clearly understood by the economics profession. However, it was politically untenable to take these actions before there was a financial crisis. Once the financial crisis occurred though, Professor Bernanke could intervene in the markets and take the necessary actions (in the Fall of 2008). These actions include the injection of several trillion dollars into the economy and making the availability of credit the cheapest possible. The actions taken by the Fed have now resulted in the economy avoiding a recurrence of the Great Depression. This is, in brief, what Professor Lucas has stated in his Economist article.
(ii) Thus in Professor Lucas' interpretation of things, the collapse of Lehman Brothers, for example, was necessary, in order to justify the intervention of the Federal Reserve in the functioning of the markets. The collapse of Lehman Brothers was, although regrettable, an unavoidable event. But, on the whole, monetary policy, even if it is a profligate one, would be necessary and sufficient to prevent the recurrence of the Great Depression, in Professor Lucas' view. Furthermore, the old wisdom of the Chicago School that government should be kept minimal at all times continues to hold, even in light of the current economic crisis. The Keynesians led by Professor Krugman, on the other hand, believe that Lehman Brothers should never have been allowed to fail. In their view, when the Fed's fund rate is at zero, monetary policy is largely ineffective for sustaining and stimulating economic activity. This is because of liquidity traps caused by businessmen who don't see economic opportunities that would induce them to borrow the cheap money available from the banks. Hence the government should step in to provide massive fiscal assistance to the economy by taking on spending directly, even if it means assuming trillions of dollars of public debt.
(iii) Professor Krugman scored a lot of points by pointing out that the current state of economic theory, highly influenced as it is by the efficient market hypothesis of the Chicago School, indicated that a crisis of such magnitude as the current economic crisis could not happen at all. This fundamental failure to recognize that an enormous crisis could indeed happen, calls for the overthrow of the policy that markets provide the best social gain when they are completely free from government interference. From first impressions, it might seem that the views of the monetarists and Keynesians are vastly different. However, it is important to note that in the view of the Keynesians too, once large scale government spending as prescribed by the Keynesians is instituted, there is again enough assurance that modern economic theory (although with a heavy Keynesian tilt) would be sufficient to deal with the current economic crisis.
(iv) In this regard, perhaps it is relevant to refer here to Professor Robert Shiller's latest article, "Re-inventing Economics" on Project Syndicate. Professor Shiller points out that the free market ideology fails to identify bubbles. Because of the belief that markets know best on all occasions, bubbles cannot occur according to the free market ideology. Professor Shiller's approach pursues a different branch of the Keynesian school of thought than the big spenders. Rather than advocate large government spending to avert a depression, Professor Shiller proposes using techniques from behavioral psychology to predict bubbles in advance. In this way, the socially harmful effects of massive misallocations of capital that arose in the case of the housing bubble or the tech bubble could be prevented in the future. In his other recent article, "Echo Chamber of Boom and Bust" in the New York Times, Professor Shiller elaborates further on the techniques that one could use for studying bubbles. Briefly, the process by which confidence or panic spreads in markets is very similar to the process by which diseases spread among populations. This outlook allows for introducing methods that scientists use to study epidemics into the study of bubbles.
(v) The Keynesians have also managed to re-write the conventional wisdom on the advantages of a strong dollar. Through the works of Professors Barry Eichengreen, Jeffrey Sachs and Ben Bernnake, a consensus has developed that attempting to support the gold standard was a major cause for the prolongation of the Great Depression. This has resulted in a viewpoint among economists that a devaluation of the dollar at present would help to reduce global imbalances by restoring the American manufacturing industry. The implications of this viewpoint were analyzed by Professor Feldstein in his July 2009 article "America's Saving Rate and the Dollar's Future" on Project Syndicate, with the conclusion that devaluation of the dollar would necessarily lead to a better future for America. Lost in this new interpretation is the fact that a stable dollar provides many economic benefits for America. The equity premium for American companies taking more risks globally, the transaction charges for providing market making facilities in global markets, and the provisions of liquidity for the currency of international trade are major drivers of economic growth for America, which derive from the dollar being the global reserve currency.
(vi) Some other Keynesians have gone beyond questioning just the free market ideology. For example, in his latest article, "GDP Fetishism" on Project Syndicate, Professor Joseph Stiglitz proposes a broad set of economic indicators like health, well-being and sustainability rather than a narrow focus on GDP growth. Yet other developments imply that the rest of the world is steadily moving away from using the dollar as the main reserve currency. To finance this new global reserve system, the IMF has created $250 billion worth of Special Drawing Rights (SDR), and the IMF has indicated its intention to triple this allocation of $250 billion in the future. It would need a strong commitment from the policy-makers in America to re-claim for the dollar its position as the predominant global reserve currency. However, judging from the writings of American economists like Professor Feldstein, it appears that the consensus among professional economists favors devaluing the dollar instead.
(vii) The official consensus is a result of a grand compromise between the Chicago School economists and the Keynesians.The conservative economists of the Chicago School would like to avoid the embarassment of getting publicly criticized for the failures of the efficient market hypothesis that this current economics crisis has severely exposed. So famous conservative economists like Professor Lucas have reached out for a consensus by indicating their willingness for a compromise. This compromise involves among other things, (a) foregoing raising concerns about the government's mismanagement of Fanie Mae and Freddie Mac, and (b) lending support to the Fed and the Treasury in their efforts to stabilize the economy, even if the methods that the Fed and the Treasury employ are highly inefficient. What are the Keynesians compromising on? Well, the Western liberal tradition has been intellectually bankrupt ever since the late 1960s. It is only the free market ideology of the Chicago School that has served as the driver of wealth creation in the advanced countries during the last four decades. Hence, the official consensus is a convenient compromise for the Keynesians to avoid asking difficult questions about the future of the Western liberal tradition. Instead, they would like to enact much drama in the media about the resurrection of their hero, John Maynard Keynes.
(viii) One other characterizing feature of the official consensus in the economics profession is a collective tendency to "Blame It All On Obama". The conservative economists blame President Obama for not focusing adequately on America's ballooning national debt. The liberals, led by Professor Krugman, fault President Obama for getting distracted from the left's free spending ways by concerns on the size of the fiscal deficit. In the confusion that has ensued, President Obama's own team of economics advisors has fallen back on the official consensus in the economics profession. Availing themselves of the security provided by this official consensus, President Obama's economics team has misled the President thoroughly in economic matters. To begin with, the President is only empowered to administer the nation's affairs for a four year term. The projections put out by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) for the deficits in the next decade are only a non-authoritative guidance for where the nation's finances would be, if current policies hold for the next decade. Instead, the democrats have been behaving as if the $9 trillion of additional public debt that the CBO projects for the next decade is already a given certainty. In particular, they have not been careful to mention clearly in public discussions how much of this extra spending can be attributed to the President's own spending plans in his current four-year term. Neither have they shown any concerns for taking the Fed and the Treasury to taks for their highly inefficient methods to stabilize the economy. Because of these instances of neglect, the public is not willing to trust the government in financial matters. President Obama has rapidly lost his approval ratings. Professor Lawrence Summers, Professor Christina Romer, Professor Austan Goolsbee and Professor Peter Orszag are directly responsible for this abuse of public trust.
(ix) The official consensus has also prevented economists from recognizing that President Obama's universal message of tolerance and justice, which has been received very favorably all around the world, actually opens up vast areas of economic opportunity for America. Unfortunately, it does not matter, for the economists, whether George W. Bush or Barack Obama is in office. The most they can do is re-work their models to favor Keynesian policies, and to argue that the policies they propose arise directly from their number-crunching methods. One might be tempted to attribute this widespread consensus among economists to stick to a narrow theoretical interpretation of the current economic crisis, to the certainty afforded by the mathematical models, which have become indispensible through the course of the 20th century, for the development of economic theory. However, this would be a big mistake. The official consensus in the economics profession is primarily a result of undue influences of power and money. It is much less a result of mathematically based economic theory. In the long-term, this attitude among economists of sticking to an official consensus is going to do serious damage to the American economy. Some other aspects of the official consensus have been explained very well by Professor Kenneth Rogoff in his recent article, "The Confidence Game" on Project Syndicate. I recommend that the reader go through that article. The official consensus is the single largest threat to a robust recovery in the global economy. The official consensus also gravely misinterprets the events of the Great Depression. The implications of this misinterpretation bear directly on the economic health of America.