The Chinese government's participation in the United States-led war against terrorism is based on their real fear of internationally coordinated Islamic terrorism in China. China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has accused Uyghur separatist organizations, such as the Eastern Turkestan Information Center and the Uyghur Liberation Front, of being responsible for attacks ranging from the bombing of the Chinese consulate in Istanbul to a March 1997 bus bombing in Beijing. Now, the Chinese government seeks international support for their domestic crackdown on the Uyghur separatists who they claim have direct links to the Taliban and bin Laden's Islamist inspired organizations.

However, no international Uyghur organization listed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledges any responsibility for these earlier violent actions, and since September 11th, most of their expatriate information centers have disclaimed any support for international or domestic violence. Interestingly, in his last officially broadcast television interview, Osama bin Laden gave his backing to several Islamic liberation struggles, yet he failed to mention the Uyghur independence movement.

Taliban-trained Uyghurs have fought against the Northern Alliance and actively participated in the Chechen Muslim struggle against Russian rule. In the mid- to late-1990s, international Uyghur organizations claimed indirect responsibility for numerous ``acts of resistance'' against Chinese rule, including bombings of police stations in Kashgar and Khotan, bus bombings in Urumqi and Beijing, and large uprisings in Yining (Khulja), Aktush, and Kashgar. Nevertheless, though the Chinese government seeks to demonstrate that the Uyghur are a growing domestic threat, they have been unable to cite any recent incidents of domestic Uyghur-related violence.

In the 1950s, the Uyghur and other local populations welcomed the entrance of the People's Liberation Army in what was recognized as a ``peaceful liberation'' of both Xinjiang and Tibet. In Xinjiang, the locals willingly participated in the political redistribution of land and wealth and looked forward to the end of a three-way civil war that had trapped the region between competing Russian, Chinese Communist, and Chinese Nationalist interests. Simultaneously, continuing ethnic tensions between Uyghur, Kazakh, Hui, and Han Chinese threatened to tear the region apart along local and tribal lines.

Life changed dramatically in Xinjiang when it, like Tibet, was swept up in the nation-wide leftist and Maoist struggle-campaigns that culminated in the 10-year Cultural Revolution and from 1966-76 wreaked havoc on the entire country. During this period, domestic migration to Xinjiang was encouraged to ``open the West'' (kaifa xibu), and ``local nationalism'' (difang minzu zhuyi) was repressed. By 1982, the Han Chinese population stood at 38 percent, while the Uyghurs held a slim majority of 42 percent in their own ``autonomous'' region.

The mid-1980s and late 1990s saw an increased local response to the shifting dynamics of Chinese rule. Ethnic intellectuals expressed support for Deng Xiaoping's repudiation of radical Maoist politics and the Cultural Revolution. The media regularly championed Deng's ``market Leninism,'' which sought to loosen state control over economic reform while preserving central power over all political matters.

The relaxation of restrictions on religious and ethnic expression resulted in an explosion of Islamic rituals, mosque building, pilgrimages to Mecca and religious education, and ``ethnic'' festivals spread throughout the social landscape. In 1991, swelling Uyghur pride in their history and distinct ethno-religious traditions led to ill-founded hopes that with the end of the Soviet Union, the independence of the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia would be extended to China, establishing if not an independent ``Uyghuristan,'' at least perhaps a unified ``Eastern Turkestan,'' that would stand alongside Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan as independent Turkic republics.

However, the Uyghur desire for independence met with stiff Chinese resistance. Compounded by the deepening integration of the region through Chinese migration and extractive development policies, Uyghur protests erupted throughout the late 1990s, eventually leading to isolated bombings, attacks on Uyghur sympathizers to Chinese rule, and violent responses to Chinese police actions against illegal social gatherings and activities. Such expressions of rebellion were met with swift and severe Chinese crackdowns, culminating in the ``strike hard'' campaign of 1998.

Presently, diminishing Uyghur activism and decreasing political protests suggest a shift toward withdrawal. Uyghur membership in the Chinese Communist Party has declined, despite a nationwide increase in membership due to CCP placement of supporters in universities and lucrative jobs in the state and semi-private sectors. Government officials and local newspapers complain of a 20% return rate of Xinjiang students who seek training in other parts of China, amounting to domestic ``brain drain.'' Reports from recent immigrants carried on Uyghur websites around the globe suggest an increasing disenchantment and desire to emigrate.

As the Chinese government seeks international backing for its crackdown on terrorism, local Uyghurs seem less inclined to voice their frustrations than ever before. This will mean fewer sources of information for a government that hopes to build support for its development goals in the region.

In a ``market Leninist'' system, only economic development can resolve ethnic and class-based tensions. Yet, withdrawal from participation in that development program may result in ethnic tension and even radicalization of certain dispossessed young Uyghur males. This pool of frustrated talent may prove fertile ground to international terrorist organizations seeking support for their extremist agendas. China's ``strike hard'' campaign has done little but alienate its local ethnic populations. Its war against terrorism must be combined with a policy that gives them hope.