MANAGUA – Like thousands of Nicaraguans, I voted for Managua’s mayor in local elections last November. After the voting, the authorities of my jurisdiction posted a copy of the certificate of results on the door of the Electoral Board, which registered 155 votes for the opposition candidate, 76 votes for the candidate of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) and two votes for other candidates.

The next day, however, the results from my board were not included on the Supreme Electoral Board (CSE) Web site with the results of Managua, and victory was awarded to the FSLN candidate.

It has taken months to find this out, but the same thing happened in 660 other local boards: roughly 120,000 votes – 30% of the total – were never made public. If the results of these boards had been counted, the opposition would have won the capital’s mayoralty by a wide margin.

This month, the new mayors took office without the electoral commission (CSE) having made public 100% of the votes, an open violation of Nicaraguan electoral law.

Although the electoral fraud in Managua was the most widely documented, the same modus operandi occurred across the country, affecting more than 40 municipalities. Despite complaints from the Episcopal Conference of the Catholic Church, chambers of commerce and political parties, the CSE has refused to allow a recount of the ballots or scrutiny by impartial observers. And, when citizens protested peacefully, the government resorted to violence to curb them.

Thus, the FSLN government proclaimed itself winner in 109 of the 153 municipalities. This culminated a process of electoral fraud that began five months earlier with the suspension of the legal standing of the opposition Conservative Party and the Sandinista Renewal Movement, a rival to President Daniel Ortega’s FSLN. National and international observers were barred from monitoring the vote until the last moment.

Until November, Nicaragua was on the way to developing a healthy electoral tradition, backed by high levels of participation. Ironically, the democratic opening began with Ortega, who unintentionally inaugurated an era of electoral competition when he lost power in 1990. But the stolen local elections that took place last autumn have set the country back 50 years, to the time of the Somoza dictatorship.  

As a result, politics in Nicaragua is fraying dangerously once more. And the international community, which provides almost a third of the resources needed to make the country work, is being alienated.

Why did Ortega decide to steal the municipal elections, despite the risks this fraud has imposed on his government? The only plausible explanation is the need to clear the way for his re-election as president, whatever the cost.

Unlike presidents Hugo Chávez in Venezuela or Evo Morales in Bolivia, who came to power by majority vote, Ortega regained Nicaragua’s presidency in 2007 despite securing only 38% of the vote in the first round of polling. He crossed the majority threshold only because of a pact he made with former president Arnoldo Alemán, once Ortega’s rival, who was in jail at the time for corruption.

Two years into his term, Ortega needed to win majorities in the local elections in order to impose a constitutional reform that will allow him to seek a second consecutive term. Had he failed to win in the capital and the country’s principal cities, he would have had to recognize the failure of his authoritarian political model, which has also had no success in reducing poverty.

So Ortega ran the risk of committing electoral fraud, and now the country is paying the price. The European Union has suspended $70 million in aid. The outgoing American administration froze $64 million of assistance, leaving a final decision on what to do to the new Obama administration.

But, despite its international isolation and its domestic discredit, Ortega’s has nonetheless renewed his pact with Alemán to preserve his misrule. Last month, the Supreme Court of Justice acquitted Alemán of the corruption charges that had sent him to prison for 20 years. An hour later, Alemán returned Ortega’s favor with interest: his representatives gave Ortega’s Sandinistas control of parliament, putting an end to the legislative paralysis caused by the protests against the electoral fraud.

In allying himself with Alemán’s forces, Ortega has only bought himself time to work out a response to the approaching economic disaster brought on by the world recession. But he has lost the battle for political legitimacy. The benefit of the doubt that had been granted to his administration up to now has been forfeited.

Fortunately for Latin America, there is little indication that Sandinista-style electoral fraud is spreading. The case of Ortega – who Europeans are already calling the Mugabe of Latin America – seems, instead, to be an exception. And it should be remembered that Latin America’s most recent electoral fraudsters – Manuel Noriega of Panama in 1989 and Alberto Fujimori in Peru in 2000 – were evicted from power before finishing their terms in office.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2009.
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