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Boskin and Sinn

De bancos y rescates financieros

Michael Boskin

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2009-07-23

PALO ALTO – Las señales tempranas de un repunte de la actividad de la industria manufacturera, ya fuerte en Asia, permiten esperar una modesta recuperación de la profunda recesión global que se vive hoy en día. Sin embargo, es improbable que haya una expansión sólida y duradera sino hasta ver avances en la forma de abordar los activos tóxicos que envenenan las hojas de balance de las instituciones financieras y aquejan a las autoridades de casi todos los puntos del planeta.

El sistema financiero es una compleja interacción de acreedores y prestatarios, compradores y vendedores, y ahorristas e inversionistas. Cuando funciona bien, equilibra riesgo y recompensa, e innovación y seguridad.

Los bancos y otras firmas financieras toman préstamos a corto plazo –en los años recientes, cada vez más a partir del mercado de valores comerciales, no de depósitos- y prestan a largo plazo a altos tipos de interés, asumiendo tanto el riesgo del crédito (de que se produzca un impago) como el riesgo del tipo de interés. El creciente apalancamiento potencia las ganancias en épocas de alza, pero es muy riesgoso en las de baja. No es de sorprender entonces que las grandes firmas financieras que han quebrado –Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae y Freddie Mac, AIG y Lehman Brothers- fueran las más apalancadas, por 30 o 40 veces su capital.

Entre 2002 y 2007 se prestaron billones de dólares para hipotecas con alto riesgo crediticio y riesgo crediticio normal, préstamos automotrices, tarjetas de crédito, bienes inmuebles comerciales, capital privado y otros, bajo el supuesto de (la mayoría) de los prestatarios y acreedores de que en el futuro cercano seguirían habiendo un fuerte crecimiento global, un aumento de los precios de las viviendas y un crédito de corto plazo fácil de obtener. Una vez que se detuvo la música, el valor de los activos se desplomó. La complejidad de los conjuntos de préstamos securitizados que se vendían en todo el mundo -de manera bilateral directa- como piezas de distintos tramos de crédito, hizo que nadie estuviera seguro de quién era dueño de qué, o del valor de cada cosa.

Esta dificultad para valorar los ahora llamados activos tóxicos sigue siendo la base de las actuales dificultades del crédito. La inmensa respuesta por parte de los bancos centrales y los ministerios de finanzas ha aliviado un poco la presión. La facilitación de papeles comerciales de la Reserva Federal de los Estados Unidos fue de ayuda para reabrir el mercado de valores comerciales (aunque otras de sus medidas han tenido menos éxito).

El barómetro de estrés que los expertos vigilan más estrechamente, el spread del LIBOR-OIS (Overnight Indexed Swap), ha bajado significativamente con respecto a los niveles estratosféricos que alcanzara durante el apogeo de la crisis. Algunos programas de gobierno se están contrayendo debido a la falta de demanda, pero sigue habiendo poca securitización y un bajo nivel de oferta de los bancos sin respaldo gubernamental.

La idea original del gobierno estadounidense de comprar (algunos de) los activos tóxicos con los 700 mil millones de dólares del TARP (Programa de Alivio para Activos en Problemas, por sus siglas en inglés), dio paso a infusiones de capital (y auto-rescates financieros). El nuevo programa de inversión pública-privada del Secretario del Tesoro Timothy Geithner para comprar activos tóxicos ha tenido pocos interesados, a pesar del financiamiento subsidiado sin posibilidad de recurso (non-recourse). Así, los activos tóxicos siguen presentes en las hojas de balance de los bancos y otras instituciones.

¿Pueden los bancos generar utilidades suficientes por un tiempo lo bastante largo como para amortizar las pérdidas más pequeñas y recabar más tarde capital privado cuando la economía mejore? ¿O son las pérdidas tan grandes -y con el peligro de aumentar aún más a medida que se añadan otras (como las de los bienes inmuebles comerciales)- que se hace improbable, si no imposible, una salida gradual?

Las estimaciones de las pérdidas sobre los préstamos y valores estadounidenses varían entre 1 billón y casi 4 billones de dólares. El FMI las calcula en 2,7 billones de dólares, pero el margen de incertidumbre es enorme. Más de la mitad corresponde a bancos y corredores de bolsa. En Asia y Europa Occidental hay problemas análogos (por ej., para préstamos a Europa del Este).

El gradualismo y la rentabilidad, y finalmente los bonos Brady de EE.UU., lograron superar la crisis de la deuda latinoamericana en los años 80. Sin embargo, una economía en dificultades empujará a la baja el valor de los activos tóxicos y hará que más de ellos se vuelvan tóxicos. Por ejemplo, la caída de los precios de las viviendas hará que más familias caigan en la categoría de capital negativo, en que las hipotecas valen más que la vivienda. Esto crea un incentivo a que ocurran impagos de la deuda, lo que eleva la cantidad de ejecuciones hipotecarias y reduce el valor de los valores respaldados por hipotecas en los libros de las firmas financieras.

Las autoridades necesitan un Plan B en caso de que sea necesario aplicar uno, que siga el modelo de la rápida solución por parte de Estados Unidos de los ahorros y créditos insolventes a principios de los 90, junto con la venta de activos tóxicos en grandes bloques (para prevenir la así llamada selección adversa, que ocurre al llevar a cabo cualquier proceso de licitación). La historia es instructiva.

De los 500 mil millones de dólares que Estados Unidos requirió para la Resolution Trust Corporation  (equivalentes a 1¼  billón de hoy), 400 mil millones se recuperaron gracias a las ventas de activos, lo que dio un coste neto de 100 mil millones, un décimo de las peores proyecciones, que ascendían a 1 billón. Es probable que el resultado final del rescate financiero de las hipotecas tóxicas y otros activos sea un monto mayor, pero aún así será mucho menos que el valor nominal de los préstamos, debido a que en gran cantidad de casos los activos subyacentes conservarán un valor considerable.

Además de los planes de rescate financiero y activos tóxicos, los gobiernos de todo el mundo quieren que los bancos centrales monitoreen el riesgo del sector financiero y de la macroeconomía, a diferencia de centrarse sólo en firmas individuales. La administración de Barack Obama designaría a la Fed, cuyo historial ha sido reconocer las crisis tardíamente. El Banco de Inglaterra busca poderes similares. La Unión Europea busca establecer una Junta de Riesgo Sistémico Europeo compuesta por los gobernadores de los bancos centrales nacionales y encabezada por el Banco Central Europeo.

¿Qué harán estos bancos centrales para aconsejar acerca del riesgo prudencial a nivel macroeconómico? ¿Exigir ajustes en los grandes desequilibrios de cuenta corriente? ¿Llamar a reducir los impuestos, el gasto y la deuda del gobierno, que son los principales riesgos sistémicos? Hacerlo pondría en peligro la independencia de las políticas monetarias y elevaría la amenaza inflacionaria en el futuro.

No será fácil tratar con las instituciones financieras que se consideran demasiado grandes como para permitir su quiebra. El sistema actual, que permite ganancias privatizadas de tomas de riesgo altamente apalancadas pero socializa las pérdidas en caso de que fracasen, se debe modificar para evitar debacles financieras periódicas.

Para equilibrar los beneficios de escala y alcance con las pérdidas socializadas que terminan pagando los contribuyentes, se debe exigir a las firmas demasiado grandes como para quebrar que tengan más capital, y el monto debería aumentar no en proporción del tamaño. Convertir cierta parte de la deuda en capital bajo ciertas condiciones predeterminadas que alerten sobre una falta de solvencia sería un nivel de protección adicional. Si se añade una cota más alta para los rescates financieros del gobierno, estos mayores incentivos inducirían a las instituciones financieras privadas e inversionistas a asumir sus responsabilidades antes de que ocurra el desastre.

La reimpresión de material de este sitio Web sin el consentimiento por escrito de Project Syndicate es una violación de las leyes internacionales de derechos de autor. Para obtener autorización, póngase en contacto con distribution@project-syndicate.org.
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tvselvakumaran 05:26 03 Aug 09

Sorry to say that you are mistaken, Professor!

I. Introduction

This article deals with three issues. In Section II, I explain why dollar de-valuation is not in America’s long-term interest. For this purpose, I analyze Professor Martin Feldstein’s latest article on Project Syndicate on the same topic quite closely. I explain how Professor Feldstein arguments actually spring from the savings glut theory on global imbalances. In Section III, I make some remarks about how to de-toxify the toxic assets. This section is written in response to Professor Michael Boskin’s latest article “Of Banks and Bailouts” on Project Syndicate. I also refer to a recent article on the same topic, written by Professor John Taylor and Professor Ken Scott, that appeared in the Wall Street Journal. In Section IV, I study why my price adjustment mechanism, which I had explained in my recent article, “A New Perspective on the Global Economic Crisis”, is not being adopted by professional economists. To facilitate this study, I introduce the term “Old Keynesians”, and I raise the question whether the “Old Keynesians” would come to exert undue influence on the current administration, just like the “Neo-conservatives” came to hold extra-constitutional authority during the previous administration.

II. Why is Professor Martin Feldstein's reasoning in favor of the dollar's devaluation incorrect?

In his latest article, "America's Saving Rate and the Dollar's Future" on Project Syndicate, Professor Martin Feldstein makes the following prediction, "Although the higher level of household saving will limit the rise in US interest rates, it will not change the fact that the combination of large future fiscal deficits and foreign lenders' reduced willingness to buy US securities will lead to both a lower dollar and higher US interest rates". His reasoning is as follows. The savings rate of American households has risen sharply since the beginning of the year reaching 6.9% of after-tax personal income in May. This translates to an additional annualized savings of $750 billion. For comparison, the peak annual rate of capital inflow into America was $803 billion in 2006. Thus the increase in household savings has the potential to completely eliminate America's need for foreign funds to finance its business investment and residential construction.

Here's how that would play out, according to Professor Feldstein. The international value of the dollar declines (by the Fed's printing of trillions of dollars, which Professor Feldstein doesn't say). The dollar's decline implies both that foreign buyers will find US products cheaper in foreign markets, and American consumers will find US goods and services to be cheaper than foreign goods and services in domestic markets. Thus exports would increase and imports would decrease. Moreover, since the increased production of goods and services in the US would be financed almost exclusively by the increase in US household savings, the US current-account deficit would be eliminated almost completely, except for "net interest and dividends that America's government and businesses owe to the rest of the world". Further, Professor Feldstein warns that without a fall in the dollar, the current situation in which America has a higher savings rate and reduced consumer spending (in view of fall in house prices and in stock markets) could push the US economy into a deep recession. In contrast, a lower dollar would facilitate full employment since exports would then be more competitive, and domestic consumers would find American goods cost-competitive.

Professor Feldstein mentions that there are two caveats to this scenario of re-balancing the current account deficit. The first is that the US government's fiscal deficits are projected to remain high for many years. The Congressional Budget Office projects that the budget deficit will average 5.2% of GDP for the next decade, and be 5.5% of GDP a decade from now. Hence increased government expenditure would absorb all the rise in household savings. As a result, substantial inflows of foreign capital would continue to be needed to fund business investment and housing construction. This inflow would put upward pressure on the dollar and downward pressure on US interest rates. The second caveat is that, China and other foreign lenders, in all likelihood, will not be willing to continue to lend to the US. So, there would be reduced demand for the dollar and upward pressure on US interest rates. Thus the factors that moderate the US current account deficit would be the US government's spending, foreign lenders' willingness to continue to lend to the US, domestic business investment and residential construction in the US, and the international value of the dollar.

One should note that, except for his preference that the increase in household savings be spent by private businesses rather than the government, Professor Feldstein is essentially saying the same thing that Professor Krugman has been saying -- that America can finance its (public and private) spending plans through its own savings because there has been a 'savings glut' domestically, and that a revival of American manufacturing industry could be engineered this way. I had already explained the weaknesses of the savings glut theory in my recent article, "A New Perspective on the Global Economic Crisis" (http://selvasblog.blogspot.com/2009/06/new-perspective-on-global-economic.html). I had, in fact, warned that the savings glut theory entertains certain elements of wishful thinking. But I have to say that Professor Feldstein's article does much worse damage. His analysis in his article essentially amounts to gambling away America's future.

First of all, Professor Feldstein assumes that the relative competitiveness of Chinese-made goods in American markets can be mostly attributed to the exchange rate policy of the Chinese government that holds the value of the Chinese currency steady against the dollar, which, in turn is achieved by the Chinese government accumulating massive foreign currency reserves. Professor Feldstein is going to find that in order to make American-made goods as cheap as Chinese-made goods, the US government would also have to provide massive subsidies to the American manufacturing industry. Moreover, American manufacturing companies have been languishing for many years, whereas Chinese manufacturing companies have gained expertise in reaching economies of scale very quickly. So, Chinese companies would be able to adapt more efficiently and retain their markets, if the US government favors American companies only moderately. Thus without an all-out protectionist trade war mentality, it would not be feasible for American manufacturers to re-capture markets from the Chinese manufacturers. Unfortunately, at this point, the American economy is in a precarious state. So, global trade policies that promote protectionism and isolationism, like the Smoot-Hawley tariffs of the 1930s, could result in more risks that America would fall into a depression-like situation than that China would.

Secondly, as I had explained in my article, "A New Perspective on the Global Economic Crisis", one weakness of the savings glut theory is that it is completely agnostic about connecting savings with investments. Professor Feldstein argues that the money that is saved in America would be invested in America, because of his implicit assumption that the domestic interest rates would adjust according to the global supply of funds. In reality, it is the money that is saved in China that is going to finance China's own massive fiscal spending programs (to the tune of $586 billion over two years). Whereas, the money printed by the Federal Reserve, in anticipation of the rise in household savings in America is simply lying dormant in the form of excess bank reserves (to the tune of $800 billion) because American businesses are not seeing growth opportunities that would induce them to borrow. Moreover, different people have different "expectations" for their money. The accumulated capital in America is going to find investment in the emerging market economies, like China, India and East Asia, quite attractive because of the expectation of high returns in those economies due to their rapid growth rates. Whereas, the high savings of Chinese households is going to find its way to America in search of a safe store of value.

In his article, Professor Feldstein considers only the annual $750 billion of extra savings in American households. The fact is that the accumulation of capital in the American financial system is in excess of 20 trillion dollars, mainly in the form of life-time savings of middle class citizens, for example, social security, mutual funds, pension funds, 401(k), IRA, stock portfolios, etc. It is quite conceivable that, in view, of the recession in America, and the high growth rate in the emerging market economies, a trillion or two of this accumulated capital would find its way to the emerging market economies in the next year or two. During this time, the American economy would get out of recession and start to show signs of robust growth. Then the global supply chain would restore itself because America's import orders from Chinese manufacturers would pick up. Meanwhile, China, which has been busy financing its own domestic consumption using massive fiscal deficits of its own in 2009-10, would get back to financing its exports. With the American economy revived and yet American consumers becoming more cost-conscious because of sharp drops in their personal wealth, there is going to be a revival of demand for cheap Chinese-made goods. Thus the trade deficit would continue to grow, and China would accumulate even more dollar reserves.

Thirdly, Professor Feldstein assumes that China would be neutral to the Fed's expansionary monetary policy. Perhaps he takes this position under the influence of the de-coupling theory -- that other things being equal, China would like to be able to sustain high economic growth on its own, without the assistance of exports. Professor Feldstein assumes that the Chinese would simply watch and clap their hands as the dollar devalues. In reality, China has closely pegged its future to that of America. So, while the Fed has flooded the American economy with 4 trillion dollars of excess money printing, the Chinese are doing a proportionate amount of fiscal spending financed partially by their own money printing and partially by their domestic savings. The money printing by the Chinese is calibrated exactly to the extent that the dollar-yuan exchange rate remains stable. Keeping this exchange rate stable preserves the value of China's foreign reserves (about 65% of the 2 trillion dollars of China's foreign reserves is currently held in dollars). Moreover, since the Chinese economy is growing so fast, there would not be a problem for the Chinese to keep lending money to the US. If China's GDP grows at an annual rate of 8% for 9 years, then the GDP would double. So the ratio of China's foreign reserves to its GDP could still stay at the same value, if China lent the US 2 trillion dollars more over the next 9 years.

The main benefit from the increase in household savings rate in America is that the American financial system would become more stable. Families would be able to put down more down payment towards the mortgages on their homes, or to buy cars. The purchase of luxury items and durable goods would be facilitated with people showing their ability to delay gratification and save. With people becoming more conscious of their households' balance-sheets, decisions regarding the long-term spending of families would show a marked improvement. For example, saving for children's college education or saving for retirement (in addition to automatic savings like social security and 401(k)) would be taken more seriously. There are many benefits to the increase of household savings in America. De-valuing the dollar is not one of them.

III. Why would Professor Michael Boskin's Plan B not work?

In his latest article "Of Banks and Bailouts" on Project Syndicate, Professor Michael Boskin says that he has a Plan B for dealing with toxic assets. Here's how it goes. The financial industry has shown huge profits in the second quarter and manufacturing has rebounded strongly in Asia. However, the economic recovery would not be strong and robust without dealing with the toxic assets. "Policymakers need a Plan B in the event that one proves necessary, modeled on America's rapid resolution of insolvent savings and loans in the early 1990s, together with sales of toxic assets in large blocks (to prevent so-called adverse selection from unravelling any bidding process)". I have to say that Professor Boskin is mistaken to suggest, in his Plan B, that the toxic assets could be valued by auctioning them off in large blocks. Isn't this the same principle by which the Public Private Investment Program (PPIP) had been designed? So, why doesn't the PPIP work then?

It is notable that conservative economists have suddenly chosen the present time to raise issues about toxic assets, after a long hiatus of nearly a year. In an Op-Ed, published in the Wall Street Journal on July 20, 2009, Professors Ken Scott and John Taylor have identified the massive complexity of the mortgage assets to be the main stumbling block for valuing the toxic assets. They propose setting up a centralized database for information on the mortgage assets so as to obtain transparency. Three letters to the editor referring to this article was published on July 27, 2009. These letters raised the question why it would become possible to value the toxic assets once one has a database. The main point is that there is no magic formula that would specify the value of the toxic assets once one has a database, or an auction to middle-men.

While dealing with toxic assets, it is useful to keep in mind that the value of a toxic mortgage security is not a single number. Rather, the market price of a mortgage assets is an inter-temporal quantity, with vast amounts of uncertainty associated with the asset, when the value is low (i.e., when the asset is toxic). The only way to deal with a given group of toxic assets is to auction this group among those home-owners whose mortgage loans are pooled together to form the mortgage securities that this group of toxic assets are a part of. Since there would be thousands of home-owners in these auctions, the market for toxic assets would not suffer from illiquidity or fire-sale prices that is currently afflicting it. To conduct these auctions, a direct channel of communication between the home-owners and the security-owners has to be established. It is for this reason that a centralized database is needed. In this way, the prices on mortgage assets is adjusted, in exchange for better loan recovery. I have explained this price adjustment mechanism in detail in my article, "A New Perspective on the Global Economic Crisis" (http://selvasblog.blogspot.com/2009/06/new-perspective-on-global-economic.html).

IV. Why wouldn't economists adopt my price adjustment mechanism?

In this section, we discuss why economists wouldn't adopt my price adjustment mechanism. We provide three reasons.

(i) Pre-occupation with global imbalances: As I had already explained in my "A New Perspective on the Global Economic Crisis II: Fear of Reverse-colonization Did It", during the last five or six years, professional economists, both conservative and liberal, had been pre-occupied with the imbalances in global trade, savings and current accounts. In my opinion, this attitude is mainly motivated by their fears of reverse-colonization. As a result, when the financial crisis hit due to the collapse of the mortgage industry, Western economists blamed it all on global imbalances. As the stock market crashed last Fall and the manufacturing industry took a nose-dive, the Chinese economy also tanked because exports to the advanced countries collapsed. The expectation was that the rapid growth of the Chinese economy would collapse, because of the loss of its exports markets. However, at this point, de-coupling did take place in earnest. China announced its own fiscal spending program and in the first two quarters of 2009, China was able to generate growth opportunities domestically.

For this reason, engineering a dollar devaluation through the Fed's expansionary monetary policy is going to do permanent damage to America's geo-political credibility. Unfortunately, fears of reverse-colonization prevails supreme. Hence Western economists are trying to use some excuse to transmit trillions of dollars of losses to the rest of the world. I have explained in Section III in my article, "A New Perspective on the Global Economic Crisis II: Fear of Reverse-colonization Did It” how the losses in the American financial system can be transmitted through dollar devaluation.

(ii) Economists from the cities: Economists who reside in metropolitan areas do not want the government to be promoting home-ownership. They would prefer that the government spend to clean up inner cities. Moreover, liberal economists don’t like the idea of property rights at all. So, they do not even want to consider my proposal for connecting the property owner with the security owner. These liberal economists believe that the government would be able to solve the financial crisis. They even went to the extent of suggesting temporary nationalization of the Wall Street banks. On the other hand, the conservative economists would like to be seen as friends of businessmen and financiers. So for a long time during the George W. Bush Presidency, they didn’t want to help homeowners avert foreclosures. Only recently, conservative economists like Professor Michael Boskin and Professor John Taylor are beginning to focus again on the issue of toxic assets.

(iii) The wrath of the Old Keynesians: The term “Old Keynesians” refers to a group of highly influential economists who have been using the current crisis as an excuse to implement Keynesian policies to the extreme. On paper, they say that their idea of paradise is the post-war American society of 1945 -- 70, when Keynesian economists wielded a lot of influence on government policies. However, in private, these economists would like to re-shape America as the Great Britain of the 1930s and 40s, when Britain came under great challenges to defend its colonial empire. These Old Keynesians have been working furiously to run up public debt, under various excuses that include (a) replacing the fall in consumer spending, (b) correcting global imbalances, (c) rescuing financial institutions, (d) preventing foreclosures, (e) propping up securitization markets. They have also been actively promoting Great Depression mania. These economists believe that a shared sense of hardship would make American society more cohesive in the future. That American youth would go out into the world to fight against impossible odds in the cause of an empire, just like the British youth did in the 1930s and 40s. Just like the so-called “Neo-conservatives” functioned as an extra-constitutional authority and exerted undue influence on the previous George W. Bush Presidency, there is a danger that the Old Keynesians would come to exert undue influence on this administration in due course of time. These “Old Keynesians” have been instrumental in cooking up dubious theories of economics, like the savings glut theory and the de-coupling theory, in complete dis-regard for the concerns of the rest of the world. They would not like to see a viable solution for the global economic crisis.



AUTHOR INFO

Michael Boskin, currently Professor of Economics at Stanford University and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, was Chairman of President George H. W. Bush’s Council of Economic Advisors, 1989-1993.